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Abstract
Every day animals and humans must make countless decisions that lead to better long-
term outcomes in order to survive. Learning to associate unambiguous sensory cues with
rewarded choices is known to be mediated by dopamine neurons. From a computational
standpoint, reinforcement learning constitutes the normative framework to learn optimal
behaviour, and it has been fundamental in understanding how reward-related brain ar-
eas works in simple paradigms of conditioning. In particular, convincing evidence, first
inspired by algorithmic ideas from reinforcement, seems to indicate that the activity of
dopamine neurons signals reward prediction errors, or the discrepancy between the ex-
pected and currently experienced rewards. However, little is known about how dopamine
neurons behave when choices rely on such uncertain reward-predicting stimuli.
In this thesis I analyse whether and how dopamine neurons represent reward prediction-
related signal in tasks that require non-trivial processing of external information. When
sensory information is ambiguous and incomplete it has been suggested that the brain
engages in Bayesian inference during perception. Assuming that reward predictions and
reward prediction errors are computed using the result of this inference process we propose
a model based analysis of the dopamine signal during two different tasks.
In chapter 3 I re-examine data recorded when the animal is engaged in the detection
of possibly weak vibrotactile stimuli delivered at random times. According to this study
the dopamine reward prediction error signal reflects the certainty of the animal about
the detection and temporal expectations that depend on the subjective detection of the
relevant stimulus.
In chapter 4 I analyse new recordings collected during a discrimination task requiring
the sequential comparison of two vibrational stimuli separated by a delay period of a
few seconds. I find that the DA reward prediction error signal in response to the second
stimulus codes for the subjective difficult that the animal faces in the discrimination pro-
cess. According to our analysis this subjective difficult is related with differential sensory
evidence integration (that differ from trial-to-trial) and the dopamine activation is in line
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with an anomaly in the performance, known as the contraction bias that can emerges
from Bayesian inference. Additionally we find a sustained positive tonic activation of
the dopamine neurons during the delay period. This persistent activation has not been
encountered a previous studies involving working memory, but is consistent with the idea
that tonic dopamine plays an important role to retain the relevant information in working
memory.
The results of this thesis extend the well known reward prediction error coding of
dopamine to the domain of decision making, and suggest a normative framework to study
the role of these neurons in guiding optimal behaviour.
Resumen
Todos los d´ıas, para poder sobrevivir, tanto animales como humanos deben tomar deci-
siones que lleven a buenos resultados a largo plazo. Es sabido que las neuronas dopamina
median en el proceso de aprender a relacionar est´ımulos concretos con decisiones que
lleven a una recompensa. Desde un punto de vista computacional, el aprendizaje con re-
fuerzo constituye el marco normativo para aprender comportamientos o´ptimos, y ha sido
fundamental para entender como a´reas del cerebro relacionadas con recompensa funcio-
nan en casos simples de condicionamiento. Particularmente, hay evidencia convincente,
inspirada inicialmente por ideas de algoritmos de aprendizaje con refuerzo, de que la ac-
tividad de las neuronas dopamine´rgicas codifica el error de prediccio´n de la recompensa,
es decir, la diferencia entre la recompensa esperada y la recibida. Sin embargo, se sabe
poco acerca de como se comportan las neuronas dopamine´rgicas cuando las decisiones se
basan en est´ımulos ambiguos.
En esta tesis analizo si, y de que manera, las neuronas dopamine´rgicas representan el
error de prediccio´n de la recompensa en tareas que requieren procesamiento no trivial de
sen˜ales externas. Cuando la informacio´n sensorial es ambigua e incompleta, se ha sugerido
que el cerebro lleva a cabo inferencia bayesiana durante la percepcio´n. Asumiendo que
las predicciones de recompensas futuras y los errores de prediccio´n en la recompensa se
calculan basa´ndose en esta inferencia, proponemos un modelo basado en el ana´lisis de las
sen˜ales dopamina en dos tareas distintas.
En el capitulo 3, re-examino datos tomados mientras el animal esta´ involucrado en
la deteccio´n de posibles est´ımulos de´biles, administrados en tiempos aleatorios. Segu´n
este estudio, la sen˜al de error de prediccio´n de la recompensa de la dopamina refleja
la certidumbre del animal sobre la deteccio´n, as´ı como expectaciones temporales que
dependen de la deteccio´n subjetiva del est´ımulo relevante.
En el capitulo 4, analizo nuevos datos tomados durante una tarea de discriminacio´n que
consiste en comparar dos est´ımulos vibracionales aplicados con una diferencia temporal
de unos pocos segundos. Encuentro que la sen˜al de error de prediccio´n de la recompensa
iv
vde la dopamina despue´s del segundo estimulo codifica la dificultad subjetiva a la que el
animal se enfrenta en la tarea. Segu´n mi ana´lisis, esta dificultad subjetiva esta´ relacionada
con la integracio´n diferencial de la evidencia sensorial (que difiere de ensayo a ensayo); y
la activacio´n de la dopamina esta´ en concordancia con una anomal´ıa que se observa en el
rendimiento del animal, conocido como el prejuicio de contraccio´n (contraction bias), que
puede aparecer fruto de la integracio´n bayesiana. Asimismo, encontramos una activacio´n
sostenida de las neuronas dopamina durante el periodo entre estimulos. Esta activacio´n
persistente no se hab´ıa encontrado en otros estudios relacionados con la memoria de
trabajo, pero es consistente con la idea de que la actividad de neuronas dopamina juega
un papel importante en la retencio´n de informacio´n importante en la memoria de trabajo.
Los resultados de esta tesis extienden el conocido rol de la neuronas de dopamina
en la codificacio´n del error de la prediccio´n de recompensa al terreno de la toma de
decisiones, y sugieren un cuadro normativo para estudiar el rol de estas neuronas en guiar
un comportamiento o´ptimo.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis I try to elucidate how dopamine neurons behave when choices rely on uncer-
tain reward-predicting stimuli that require non-trivial processing of external information.
Extensive literature exists on the role of dopamine neurons in guiding reward predic-
tions and associative learning in simple experiment of conditioning. From a theoretical
standpoint the computational field of reinforcement learning constitutes the normative
framework to analyse an interpret the responses of dopamine neurons. During the last
years indeed, algorithmic ideas from reinforcement learning clarified the crucial role of
dopamine neurons in broadcasting a fundamental teaching signal and suggested possible
underlying neural substrates for learning and action selection in the specific brain areas.
This chapter aims to provide an overview of relevant work in three broad fields: com-
putational reinforcement learning, relevant data concerning the activity of dopamine-
producing neurons (preceded by a brief introduction to the behavioural paradigm of con-
ditioning and a quick glance to reward related brain areas), and models of the dopamine
system.
1.1 Computational Reinforcement Learning
The idea that we learn by interacting with our environment is probably the first that comes
up to our mind when we think about the notion of learning. Reinforcement learning, an
area of machine learning inspired by behaviourist psychology, constitutes the computa-
tional normative framework to deal with the idea of learning from interaction. Generally
speaking the reinforcement learning problem is characterized from three distinguishing
aspects: first of all, it concerns closed-loop problems, because the learning system’s ac-
tions influence its later inputs. Second it relies on the so call trial-and-error search: the
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learner is not told which actions to take and must be able to collect information about
the cause/effect structure of the external environment from its own experience in order
to choose the actions leading to the most favorable consequences. Finally, because re-
wards are often delayed, the learner must face a problem known as the credit assignment
problem, i.e the difficulty of relating actions with their long term consequences.
This section will review some basic ideas, notations and algorithms of computational
reinforcement learning, mainly focusing on the theoretical work that has been widely
applied to the understanding of the brain.
1.1.1 The agent environment interaction
Reinforcement learning concerns the problem of optimal decision making: how we learn
to act in an uncertain and changing world in a way that maximizes some definition of
reward on the long term. The learner and decision-maker, typically referred to as the
agent, is not told which actions to take (as in many forms of machine learning) but has
to acquire the ability to select appropriate actions exclusively via the interaction with the
environment.
Considering a discrete temporal evolution the agent-environment interaction can be
sketched as follows: at each time step t the agent receives information about the state of
the environment st performs an action at, observes the outcome of its actions rt+1 and
transitions to a (possibly) new state st+1. The formal definition of the problem requires
to specify a set of states S (representing the situations the agent comes across while
interacting with the environment), a set of actions A (which can differ from state to
state, in which case they are denoted A(s)), and two objects describing the dynamics
of the environment: a state transition matrix T whose elements represent the transition
probability from all states to their successors, and a vector reward functionR representing
the expected value of the immediate reward from all states. Hereafter the shorthand
T ass′ = P (st+1 = s′|st = s, at = a) will be used for the elements of the transition probability
matrix and Ras = E(rt+1|st = s, at = a) for the elements of the expected reward function.
The fact that the transition probabilities and reward expectations can be specified this
way stems from the assumption that the environment is Markovian. This means that all
relevant information about the system at time t is compactly retained in the last state st
and action at
1.
1In the general case given the history of the system Ht = s0, a0, r0, . . . , at, st (i.e all the past states,
actions and rewards) the elements of the matrix T are defined as P (st+1|Ht) and the elements of R as
P (rt+1|Ht), i.e transition and reward probabilities are conditioned on entire history.
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While interacting with the environment the agent selects actions according to a policy
pi: a mapping from states to actions. The mapping need not to be deterministic, so in
general a policy represents a mapping from states to probability of actions. The function
pi(s, a) = P (a|s, pi) indicates the probability of taking the action a given the state s and
following the policy pi. In this framework the aim of the decision process is dual: first the
agent needs to learn which of the visited states are more responsible for future rewards
according to its current policy p¯i. This problem is called policy evaluation and relates to
the well known the credit-assignment problem: rewards, especially in fine grained state-
action spaces, can occur terribly temporally delayed and therefore the agent needs to
take into account not only the immediate consequences of an action (i.e. the immediate
reinforcement), but also the value of the next state in term of long-term return. Second
the agent needs to find an optimal policy pi∗, i.e a mapping from states to action that
maximizes future rewards. This process is called policy improvement.
A final remark before proceeding with the description of the methods for policy evalu-
ation and policy improvement. In the first part of this chapter I will restrict the attention
to the case of ”fully observable” environment. This corresponds to assume that the infor-
mation received from the agent precisely represents the state of the environment. When
the environment is both Markovian and fully observable the decision process is called a
Markov decision process (MDP). However in real world situations the agent receives only
noisy and uncertain informations and is not aware of the precise state of the environment.
In this case the environment is only ”partially observable” and the decision process is
called a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). This last approach rep-
resents a more realistic mathematical framework for modeling decision making and it will
be discussed at the end of this section (in subsection 1.1.5).
1.1.2 Temporal-difference methods for prediction learning
Prediction learning can be studied considering an MDP in which the policy is fixed. In
this case the MDP reduces to a Markov chain with the transition probability defined as
T piss′ =
∑
a∈A(s) pi(s, a)T ass′ and reward expectation as Rpis =
∑
a∈A(s) pi(s, a)Ras .2 Prediction
learning relies on the concept of state-value function V˜ pi(s), representing some measure
of the expected future reward, known as expected return, when the agent starts in state
s at time t and follows the policy pi. The definition of the state-value function requires
2More generally an MDP reduces to a Markov chain (or Markov reward process) whenever the dynam-
ics of environment is independent from the actions of the agent, and transition probability and reward
expectation reduce respectively to Tss′ = P (st+1 = s′|st = s) and to Rs = E(rt+1|st = s).
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to specify the objective of the learning process in a formal way, i.e. we need to define a
specific function of the rewards sequence representing the expected return (that is object
to predict in the case of prediction learning and the object to maximize when we consider
the more general problem of finding optimal behaviour). In episodic tasks3, i.e. those
in which the agent-environment interaction breaks naturally into subsequences (usually
referred as episodes), it is possible to simply define the long-run return as the cumulative
expected future reward.
However, in general, when the temporal horizon of the problem we are interested in
is infinite (i.e we study a problem without an obvious endpoint) such a quantity is not
finite and a better measure of optimal behaviour needs to be specified. A way to define
the finite return in an infinite horizon problem is by introducing the additional concept
of temporal discounting. According to this approach, the agent tries to select actions so
that the sum of the discounted rewards it receives over the future is maximized. Usually
the long-run return Gt at time t is defined as the exponentially discounted sum of future
rewards:
Gt =
∞∑
i=0
γirt+i+1 (1.1)
where γ is a parameter called the discount factor and 0 < γ < 1. At behavioural level
discounting allows to explain humans and animals preference for earlier rewards to later
ones. The existence of a discount reflects the fact that delaying a reward introduces addi-
tional risks because rewards could not be available anymore in the future. The particular
form of discounting introduced in Equation 1.1 is known as exponential discounting. It is
equivalent to assume a constant probability of risk per unit time of a hazard (preventing
the reward availability) to occur, given that it has not occurred yet. In what follows
Equation 1.1 will be used as the definition for the long-run return.
A few alternative definitions have been use in the RL framework to study infinite
horizon problems and will be discussed at the end of this section. Given the definition
in Equation 1.1 the state-value function V˜ pi(s), i.e the expected return when the agent
3An absorbing Markov process is a Markov chain in which every state can reach a final state, known
as absorbing state, that, once entered, cannot be left.
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starts in state s at time t and follows the policy pi is defined as:
V˜ pi(s) = Epi
[
Gt|st = s
]
= Epi
[
rt+1 + γ
∞∑
i=0
γirt+i+2|st = s
]
=
∑
a∈A
pi(s, a)
[
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
T ass′V˜ pi(s′)
]
= Epi
[
rt+1 + γV˜
pi(st+1)|st = s
]
= Rpis + γ
∑
s′∈S
T piss′V˜ pi(s′) (1.2)
Equation 1.2 is known as the Bellman equation for the state-value function under the
policy pi. It expresses a recursive relationship between consecutive states and can be
expressed concisely using matrices:
V˜pi = Rpi + γT piV˜pi (1.3)
where V˜pi is a column vector with one entry per state representing the corresponding state-
value. Considering a N -dimensional state space S once the dynamics of the environment
is known (i.e the transition and reward probabilities) the Bellman equation reduces to
nothing but a set of N linear equations with N unknowns and can easily be solved4.
When the number of states is large the problem becomes computationally too complex
and difficult to handle. In this case the Bellman equation can be solved with iterative
methods.The function Vpi indicates the N -component vector representing an estimate of
the vector V˜pi. After initializing each component of Vpi to zero, the estimate can be
repeatedly updated as:
Vpin ← Rpi + γT piVpin−1 (1.4)
where Vpin indicates the nth update of the estimate V of the real state-value vector V˜
pi.
This approach is guaranteed to converge because it directly implements the consistency
relation of Equation 1.35. Solving the Bellman equation for a known MDP represents the
core of Dynamic Programming. However when the MDP is unknown (i.e the model of
the environment is not available) the agent needs to somehow estimate the value function
4Equation 1.3 can be written as V˜pi = (I−γT pi)−1Rpi, where I indicates the identity matrix. Therefore
the problem reduces to the inversion of the matrix (I − γT )−1, a problem of computational complexity
O(N3) for N states.
5This reasoning works in the synchronous form of value iteration, in which the values of all the states
are updated simultaneously (i.e. the nth value of every state is used to compute the n + 1st backup of
the value function). It turns out an asynchronous form of value iteration also converges. In this version,
the value of each state is updated individually using the latest available values of the other states.
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from its stream of experience. Temporal difference (TD) methods provide an efficient
solution to the problem of prediction learning in a model-free fashion (i.e for an unknown
MDP). The key idea behind the TD algorithm is using a guess of the expected long-run
return when the agent starts in state s and follows the policy pi to estimate the state-
value function V pi(s). Suppose that the agent starts from state s, performs action a,
transitions to state s¯ and obtains the outcome r. In this transition the agent experiences
a (biased) sample of
[
Rpis + γ
∑
s′∈S T piss′V˜ pi(s′)
]
. After many visits to state s the agent
obtains unbiased samples of the reward expectation and of the transition probabilities 6.
Therefore after each visit to the state s the agent can use the sample it observes (that is
rt+1 + γV (st+1) as a guess for the value of V˜
pi(s) and can update the estimated value of
s proportionally to is the discrepancy between what was expected (the current estimate
V pi(st)) and what actually occurred (the actual guess). The last quantity is known as the
reward-prediction error or TD-error δt:
δt = [G˜
(1)(st)− V pi(st)] = [rt+1 + γV pi(st+1)− V pi(st)] (1.5)
where G˜(1)(st) = rt+1 + γV
pi(st+1) defines the 1-step guess or 1-step return. The depen-
dence on pi has been omitted in the 1-step guess for simplifying the notations. The same
convention will be adopted for the more general n-step return and λ-return defined below.
TD learning then updates the estimate for the value of the last visited state st based on
the TD error and a parameter α representing the learning rate:
V (st) = V (st) + αδt (1.6)
The above equation is known as the TD(0) algorithm or the 1-step TD backup for the
state-value function. It is interesting to note that according to Equation 1.6 the state-
value function converges to an exponential recency weighted average of the sequence of
guesses about the value V˜ pi(s) that the agent experiences each time it visits the state s.7
The formal justification for TD learning as a method for optimal learning stems from
the fact that it directly implements dynamic programming methods (Barto et al., 1989;
Sutton, 1988). Under some technical assumptions about the learning rate schedule and
the structure of the MDP (e.g., all states must be sampled infinitely often) this algorithm
6The idea is that each time the agent visits the state s it selects a with probability pi(s, a). Therefore
after visiting s many times the agent can obtain an unbiased sample of T piss′ (because after the action a
from the state s the environment transitions to the state s′ with probability T ass′). A similar reasoning
applies to Rpis .
7Given a sequence of number x1, x2, . . . , xn and the update x¯n = x¯n−1 + α[xn − x¯n−1] the value x¯n
converges to x¯n = α
∑n−1
k=0(1− α)n−kxk, i.e an exponential recency weighted average of the sequence.
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converges (Dayan, 1992). Arbitrary function approximation schemes can be used to rep-
resent the value function V in place of lookup tables and the algorithm has been proven
to converge (to some approximation of V whose error can be quantified) for linear func-
tion approximation (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996). Temporal difference learning with
function approximation will be discussed in subsection 1.1.4.
Alternatively the value of the state s can be learned using a n-steps TD backup: after
visiting the state s at time t the agent can wait n steps, observe the sequence of rewards
rt+1, rt+2, . . . , rt+n+1. Then this sequence of rewards can be used to construct the guess
G˜(n)(st) = rt+1 + rt+2 + · · ·+ rt+n+1 + γnV (st+n+1) and to update the value of st as
V (st) = V (st) + α[G˜
(n)(st)− V (st)] (1.7)
The validity of the above backup relies on the fact that the Bellman equation can easily
be generalized to an equation relating the values of two states separated by n time-steps:
V˜pi = Rpi + γT piRpi + γ2(T pi)2Rpi + · · ·+ γn(T pi)nRpi + γn(T pi)nV˜pi (1.8)
In the more general case every combination of the n-steps guesses G˜(n)(st) can be used
to update the value of the state st visited at time t. In the TD(λ) algorithm the actual
guess for the value function is constructed as the average of all the n-step backups, each
weighted proportional to λn−1 , where λ ∈ [0, 1], and normalized by a factor of 1 − λ to
ensure that the weights sum to 1. The λ-guess can be written as
G˜(λ)(st) = (1− λ)
n∑
i=1
λi−1G˜(i)(st) (1.9)
The value of st is updated as:
V (st) = V (st) + α[G˜
(λ)(st)− V (st)] (1.10)
The backup of the above equation is not directly implementable online because it is
acausal, it requires knowledge of what will happen many steps later the actual time
t. However it is possible to (approximately) implement the backup of Equation 1.10 in
an online fashion. This can be achieved by introducing an additional memory variable
associated with each state, its eligibility trace (Sutton and Barto, 1998), that record
which states have been visited recently (in terms of γλ). Two types of eligibility traces
that slightly differ for their temporal evolution have been traditionally used in the RL
literature. In the first type, known as accumulating traces, the eligibility traces evolve in
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time as follow: on each time step the traces decay by a factor γλ. In addition, the trace
of the visited state is increased by 1:
et(s) =
γλet(s) + 1 if st = sγλet(s) otherwise (1.11)
where the function denoted et(s) ∈ R+ represents the eligibility trace for the state s at
time t. The latter type, known as replacing traces, differs from the previous case in the
temporal evolution of the trace of the last visited state, which simply takes the value 1
after the visit. The temporal evolution in the replacing case can be written as:
et(s) =
1 if st = sγλet(s) otherwise (1.12)
The TD(λ) update for the value functions at time t is in both cases as follows:
V (s) = V (s) + αδtet(s) ∀s ∈ S (1.13)
Therefore, unlike the TD(0) backup Equation 1.13, according to the TD(λ) backup on
each time step the value of all the states is updated. Changes are proportional to the
reward-prediction error δt and to the eligibility traces, that indicate the degree to which
each state is responsible for the actual reinforcement. Said in other words: earlier states
are given less credit for the actual TD error δt and therefore are modiefied less. In this
sense eligibility traces provide an elegant solution to the credit-assignment problem. A
final remark about eligibility traces. The theoretical view of eligibility traces in term of
the λ-return is known as forward view, the mechanistic implementation of the algorithm
in Equation 1.10 in term of the function e(s) is known as backward view. It can be
shown (Sutton and Barto, 1998) that, for episodic tasks, and provided that updates are
accumulated within episode but applied in batch at the end of episode (oﬄine updates)
the forward and the backward view of the algorithm are equivalent8. When updates are
applied online, i.e at each step within episode, the forward and backward views of the
TD(λ) algorithm are not exactly equivalent. However it has been recently proved that,
by using a slightly different form of eligibility trace, a perfect equivalence can be achieved
for the online backup (van Seijen and Sutton, 2014).
All the TD(λ) methods presented so far rely on the hypothesis of exponential discount-
ing and on the resulting definition for the long-run return described in (1.1). There exist
8Here equivalence indicates that the total update at end of an episode is the same. To be more precise
the equivalence holds only when considering accumulating traces.
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alternative definitions for the discounting and the rest of this section will quick glance
over them.
Many studies show that animals exhibit time preferences which are not exponential,
but instead fall off with delay at a decreasing proportional rate. This trend is consistent
with hyperbolic discounting. Under the assumption of hyperbolic discounting it is possible
to define a hyperbolically discounted return GHt as:
GHt =
∞∑
i=0
rt+i+1/(i+ 1) (1.14)
Hyperbolic discounting can be formally explained by an uncertain underlying hazard rate,
with an exponential prior distribution for the hazard to occur (Sozou, 1998). The above
definition of the long-term return has been mostly ignored in reinforcement learning liter-
ature because the resulting state value function cannot be written recursively and there-
fore cannot be calculated by recursive methods (such as TD learning; Daw and Touretzky,
2000). Although reinforcement learning methods with hyperbolic discounting will be not
discussed in this thesis it is interesting to point out that a recursive temporal difference
implementation of the hyperbolic model has been recently proposed in (Alexander and
Brown, 2010).
The formulation of temporal decision making in terms of discounting correspond to
assume that humans and animals try to maximizes the reward-to-risk ratio. An alternative
hypothesis is that animals seek to maximize their average intake of rewards over time.
In this case the objective of learning becomes the average reward return GAt and can be
defined as:
GAt =
∞∑
i=0
(rt+i+1 − ρ) (1.15)
where ρ = limn→∞ 1nE(
∑
i=0n rt+1+i) represents the average reward per time-step
9. A
precise TD algorithm for average return reward can be find in (Tsitsiklis and Van Roy,
1999, 2002) and its application to the study of the dopamine neurons response has been
explored in (Daw and Touretzky, 2000; Daw et al., 2006).
9More precisely given a start state st and a stationary policy pi the average reward per time-step is
defined as: ρpi = limn→∞ 1nEst(
∑
i=0n rt+1+i|st, pi). If the MDP is ergodic (each state is visited an infinite
number of times and without any systematic period) for any stationary policy the average reward per
time-step ρpi that is independent of start state st. The same property is valid for an ergodic Markov
chain. In Equation 1.15 we are making the implicit assumption of ergodicity.
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1.1.3 The Actor/Critic method
This section describes policy improvement algorithms mainly focusing on a method for ac-
tion selection known as Actor/Critic model. the discussion will focus on the Actor/Critic
method because it is the RL method that has been most strongly linked to prediction
learning and action selection in the brain, and because it constitutes the core implemen-
tation of the models presented in the rest of this thesis (in chapter 3 and in chapter 4). As
in the prediction problem TD methods for policy improvement rely on dynamic program-
ming algorithms to compute optimal policies. Given a perfect knowledge of the MDP and
some candidate policy pi a new policy pi′ can be obtained by acting greedily with respect
to V pi:
pi′(s) = argmaxa∈A
[
Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
T ass′V˜ pi(s′)
]
(1.16)
It is easy to see that the new policy is equal or better than the old one. If the number
of states and actions are finite and policy evaluation is systematically followed by policy
improvement the cycle can be proven to always converges to the optimal policy pi∗. This
alternation of policy evaluation and improvement is known as policy iteration and all
model-free methods rest on this procedure to find the optimal policy. In particular actor-
critic methods are TD methods that have two separate structures to represent the state-
value function and the policy. The policy structure is known as the actor because it
selects actions. The critic element estimates the value function and provides an evaluative
feedback (”criticizes”) of the conduct of the actor.
These methods were first introduced in (Barto et al., 1983) where it was shown how
a system consisting of two neuron-like adaptive elements can effectively solve a difficult
credit assignment problem. The key idea behind these methods is to use the reward
prediction error signal to simultaneously find the best policy and to estimate the state-
value function for the current policy. Indeed, while interacting with the environment, the
agent can evaluate how good is an action even in absence of immediate reinforcement by
simply considering whether the next state is more or less attractive of the previous one
in term of future reward. In this sense the TD error signal, that in absence of immediate
reward is δt = γV
pi(st+1)−V pi(st), represents a surrogate of the reinforcement. Therefore
modifying the policy according to the TD error signal naturally leads to strengthen the
probability of those actions that lead the system to states more valuable (and to decrease
the probability of less appropriate actions).
Below two implementation of the actor-critic architecture will be presented, mainly
following Dayan and Abbott, 2001. In both cases the state value function is updated
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according to Equation 1.5, but they differ in the way the teaching signal δt is used to
improve the policy.
Let assume that the policy is parametrized using a set of modifiable weights and that
each weight ν(s, a) indicates the tendency to select (preference for) action a when the
system is in the state s. These weights are then used to implement the policy via a
softmax distribution:
pi(s, a) =
exp(βν(s, a))∑
a′∈A exp(βν(s, a
′))
(1.17)
where β is a parameter that governs the exploration/exploitation trade-off. For large β
the policy becomes almost a deterministic function of the preference parameters ν(s, a),
if β is small the policy tends to become random.
A first way to improve the policy, known as the indirect actor, is to base the action
choice on state-action value function Q˜pi(s, a). This function is defined as the expected
return when the action a is selected in the state s and the policy pi is followed afterwards.
The preference weight ν(s, a) approximates the value of Q˜pi(s, a) by using the following
update at each time step t10:
νt+1(s, a) =
νt(s, a) + ηδt if st = s , at = aνt(s, a) if st = s , at 6= a (1.18)
where η represents the learning rate for the actor element.
An alternative way to learn the policy, known as the direct actor, consists in updating
the preference directly to maximize the expected long-run return. This can be done by
stochastically following the gradient ∂V˜ pi(s)/∂ν(s, a). Such a gradient can be written as:
∂V˜ pi(s)
ν(s, a)
∝ pi(s, a)[1− pi(s, a)](Ras + γ∑
s′∈S
T ass′V˜ pi(s′)− C(s)
)
− (1.19)
−
∑
a′ 6=a
pi(s, a′)pi(s, a)
(
Ra′s + γ
∑
s′∈S
T a′ss′V˜ pi(s′)− C(s)
)
where a state dependent constant C(s) have been included in both terms on the right side
because it cancels out. After starting from the state st the experienced immediate reward
rt+1 and the value of the next state V
pi(st+1) can be used as a guess for the corresponding
expected value and setting the constant C(s) = V pi(s) the preferences can be updated as:
νt+1(s, a) =
νt(s, a) + ηδt
[
1− pi(s, a)] if st = s , at = a
νt(s, a)− ηδtpi(s, a) if st = s , at 6= a
(1.20)
10This is because the state-value function can be written as V˜ pi(s) =
∑
a∈A pi(s, a)Q˜
pi(s, a). The agent
experiences a sample of Q˜pi(s, a) each time it visit the state s and selects the action a. Therefore, if the
policy changes slowly, the preference weight ν(s, a) tracks the value of Qpi(s, a).
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Both the Equation 1.18 and Equation 1.20 combined with TD methods for policy eval-
uation represent a stochastic version of the policy iteration algorithm. The Actor/Critic
algorithm has not been proved to converge because policy evaluation and policy improve-
ment are carried out simultaneously. Nevertheless, it has been the framework most widely
used as a model of neural reinforcement learning and action selection in the basal ganglia
(Barto et al., 1983; Barto, 1995; Houk et al., 1995; Suri and Schultz, 1999; Suri, 2002).
This is mainly due to the resemblance of the Actor/Critic architecture with the anatomi-
cal division of the striatum in dorsal and ventral part (supposed to implement respectively
the actor and the critic element (O’Doherty et al., 2004; see Joel et al., 2002 for a review).
A couple of model-free methods that use the state-action value function to improve
the policy will be quickly sketched to conclude this section. First, it is possible to write
a Bellman equation for the function Qpi(s, a):
Q˜pi(s, a) = Ras + γ
∑
s′∈S
T ass′
∑
a′∈A
pi(s′, a′)Q˜pi(s′, a′) (1.21)
With the same reasoning employed to develop a TD algorithm for the value function it
is possible to use samples of observed states and action to define a TD update for the
state-action value function:
Qpi(st, at) = Q
pi(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γQ
pi(st+1, at+1)−Qpi(st, at)] (1.22)
where the function Qpi(s, a) indicates the current estimate Q˜pi(s, a). The algorithm de-
scribed in Equation 1.22 is known as SARSA because it uses the sequence of state-action-
reward-state-action to carry out each backup. Alternatively the agent can try to learn
directly the optimal state value function Q˜∗(s, a) using an off-policy TD algorithm. This
reinforcement learning technique is known as Q-learning and uses the estimate of the
optimal state-action value function to perform the backup:
Qpi(st, at) = Q
pi(st, at) + α[rt+1 + γmaxa′Q
pi(st+1, a
′)−Qpi(st, at)] (1.23)
The above equation converges to Q˜∗(s, a) because it directly implements the Bellman
optimality equation for the state-action value function (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
1.1.4 TD learning with function approximation
So far the discussion focused on TD methods for table-lookup representation of the the
state-value function, i.e. when states are described via localist representations (one unit
per state). Here it is described how these methods can be extended when arbitrary
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function approximation schemes are used to represent the state-value (also referred as
distributed representation of the state).
When the state space of the MDPs increases the problem of prediction becomes un-
manageable: in addition to the memory problem related with the large number of state
values to store, solving the prediction problem for each state individually becomes too
slow. To solve the problem for large MDPs it is suitable to replace the table representation
for the value function with a parametrized functional form:
V (s,w) ≈ V˜ pi(s) (1.24)
where w ∈ Rn indicates a vector of parameters that are adjusted during the learning
process using TD methods. The number of parameters n is typically much less than the
number of states and therefore function approximation reduces the computational cost
of the problem and more importantly allows to generalized from experienced state to
ones that have never been seen. Generally the performance of function approximation
method is measured using a cost function defined as expected squared difference between
the approximate value function V (s,w) and the true value function:
J(w) =
1
2
Epi
[(
V˜ pi(s)− V (s,w))2] (1.25)
The cost function J(w) can be minimized using stochastic gradient descent methods, i.e
we can apply use gradient descent methods to the experienced samples to find a local
minimum. According to this approach the parameter vector w is updated after each
experienced state st in the direction that would reduce the squared-error on that specific
sample:
wt+1 = wt − α∇wJ(wt)
= wt + α
[
V˜ pi(st)− V (st,w)t
]∇wV (st,wt) (1.26)
where α is a small parameter defining the learning rate. In the function approxima-
tion scheme states are represented by feature vectors which component provide a com-
pressed characterization of the states. Hereafter only linear function approximation will
be discussed because stochastic gradient descent methods are proven to converge to some
estimation of V˜ pi(st) (whose error can be quantified) in this case (Bertsekas and Tsitsik-
lis, 1996). Let then write the state value function at time t as V (st) = xt · wt, where
xt = {x1t , x2t , · · ·xnt } indicates a n-component feature vector. Following the same rea-
soning of the previous sections the value V˜ pi(st) can be estimated through the observed
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samples. Using as estimate the 1-step return and according to (1.26) we can define the
TD(0) backup for linear value function approximation as:
wt+1 = wt + αδtxt (1.27)
Stochastic gradient descent methods can be similarly applied to implement the TD(λ)
backup after introducing an appropriate eligibility trace for the feature vector x. Following
(Sutton and Barto, 1998) the temporal evolution of et for accumulating traces can be
defined as:
et+1 = λγet +∇wV (st,wt) = λγet + xt (1.28)
where the last equivalence holds because the attention has been restricted to linear func-
tion approximation. The temporal evolution of replacing traces and for linear approxi-
mation can be written as:
emt+1 =
xmt if xmt 6= 0γλemt otherwise (1.29)
where emt indicates the m-component of the vector et. In both accumulating and replacing
traces at each time step t the TD(λ) update for the weight vector w is defined as:
wt+1 = wt + αδtet (1.30)
From the above equations it is easy to see that TD methods with the lookup-table are
just a special case of the TD algorithm with linear function approximation. When the
feature vector is defined using the presence representation, i.e. it is defined as xmt = 1 if
st = sm and 0 otherwise the (1.30) reduces to (1.13). Under some technical assumptions on
the decrease of the learning rate stochastic gradient descent TD(λ) methods are proven
to converge close to a global optimum (i.e to a global minimum of the error function)
when the function approximation is linear (this is because the cost function is a quadratic
function of the parameter vector w; see Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1997 for details).
1.1.5 Partial observability
The reinforcement learning formalism described in the previous sections presents several
difficulties when applied to real world situations. One crucial lack of the approach dis-
cussed so far is the assumption of fully observability: in MDPs, indeed, the agent does
have full access to all the information necessary to precisely describe the situations it
comes across, i.e. the agent directly observes the environment state. The abstract de-
scription of the agent environment interaction assumed in MDPs is clearly faraway from
1.1 Computational Reinforcement Learning 15
the context where realistic decision making processes happen. Generally the agent does
not observe the environment state directly but it needs to make decisions relying on noisy
sensory informations that describe the environment only partially. Decision making un-
der uncertainty can be appropriately described as a partially-observable MDP (POMDP,
see Kaelbling et al., 1998, for background) that is a process whose dynamics abides by
the Markov property, but whose states cannot be observed directly. Instead of directly
experiencing the state of the world, at each time step, the agent receives an observation
ot drawn from a state dependent probability distribution Os = P (ot|st = s). Different
reinforcement learning approaches can be used to cope with the problem of partial observ-
ability. Here special importance is given to a Bayesian probabilistic approach because it
has been suggested that when the knowledge of the world is incomplete the brain imple-
ments Bayesian inference during perception (Rao et al., 2002; Knill and Richards, 1996).
In the Bayesian scheme states are replaced by beliefs, i.e. posterior probability about the
state of the environment, that can be then combined with reinforcement learning methods
to select optimal actions (Dayan and Daw, 2008; Bogacz and Larsen, 2011). A belief state
is a probability distribution over a set of hidden states S that depends on the history of
the system Ht = ot, at−1, ot−1, . . . , a0, o0 (i.e all the past observations and actions). The
ith component of the belief state is defined as bt(i) = P (st = i|Ht) and can be computed
recursively over time from the previous belief state using Bayes rule:
bt(i) = k · P (ot, |st = i, at−1, ot−1, . . . , a0, o0)P (st = i|at−1, ot−1, . . . , a0, o0)
= k · P (ot, |st = i)
∑
j
P (st = i|at−1, ot−1, st−1 = j)P (st−1 = j|at−1, ot−1)
= k · P (ot, |st = i)
∑
j
T aij bt−1(j) (1.31)
where k is a normalization constant and the Markov property has been used. The fact
that the belief can be updated recursively using the last observation and action implies
that the belief state B is a sufficient statistic, i.e in the belief state the process is a MDP.
Oﬄine exact solutions for POMDPs in the finite horizon case have been discussed in
(Kaelbling et al., 1998). In general once converted in a MPD oﬄine solution for the
POMDP can be find using standard dynamic programming algorithm (see for example
Sutton and Barto, 1998) and this approach have been successfully applied to the study
of reward optimization decision making under uncertainty in the brain (Huang and Rao,
2013). Considering that in the belief space B the process is an MDP one can also use
function approximation techniques to solve the POMDP with standard online methods for
MDPs. Relying on this consideration Rao, 2010 suggested a possible implementation of
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neural decision making under uncertainty in the brain using an actor-critic architecture
and TD learning. The ideas and the algorithm suggested in that work will be briefly
sketched in subsection 1.3.3.
1.2 Behavioural experiment and neurophysiology of
the dopamine system
This section describes the neurophysiology of reward structures in the brain, mainly focus-
ing on the activity of the dopamine-producing neurons, a small group of neurons located
in two areas of the midbrain, the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the substantia ni-
gra pars compacta (SNc). Dopamine is one of the four mayor neuromadulators of the
brain and the dopaminergic system is involved in a variety of important brain functions
such as reward-dependent learning, motivation, motor control. The loss of a large num-
ber of dopamine neurons leads to Parkinson’s disease and in general the dysfunction of
the dopaminergic system is associated with a number of disorders including addiction,
schizophrenia, and ADHD.
The discussion will focus on the role of dopamine in reward-related learning because
of its relationship with computational theory of reinforcement learning described so far
and in particular because of the close parallel between TD learning and the activity of
dopamine producing neurons. This parallel is expressed by the reward prediction error
hypothesis of dopamine, stating that the phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons codes a
discrepancy between the predicted and currently experienced rewards,a pattern of activity
that strictly resembles the reward prediction error signal of the TD learning algorithm
(see Equation 1.5).
Further evidence emphasizing the role of dopamine in reward-related learning rests
on the strong interaction between dopamine neurons in the midbrain and the striatum,
a critical component of the motor and reward system. The striatum is the main input
structure for a group of subcortical nuclei situated at the base of the forebrain known
as the basal ganglia. It receives organized, convergent inputs from widespread areas
of the cortex, which are projected to other basal ganglia structures such as the globus
pallidus, and eventually projected back to cortex through the thalamus. Dopaminergic
neurons crucially affect the activity of the basal ganglia circuits because of their interaction
with striatal neurons. They receive inputs that are related to primary reinforcement
of appetitive nature coming from different brain areas (such as the pedunculopontine
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Figure 1.1: Schematic view of the dopamine pathways.
nucleus, the habenula, the amygdala, ecc.) and inputs from striatal neurons that are
related to cortical activity. Crucially they project back their reward prediction error
signal to the same striatal zone that send them inputs. Specifically neurons in the SNc
mainly project to the dorsal parts of the striatum, and those in the VTA to the ventral
striatum (and to the prefrontal cortex; see Figure 1.1). Additionally, stiatal areas have
been demonstrated to be subject to dopamine-dependent long-term potentiation (LTP)
and long-term depression (LTD) (Wickens et al., 1996; Calabresi et al., 2000; Reynolds
and Wickens, 2002).
All these results suggest very clearly that the phasic activity of the midbrain dopamine
neurons provides a global teaching signal to the striatum that guides reward related learn-
ing through a mechanism of dopamine-dependent plasticity in corticostriatal synapses
(Schultz, 1998). These synaptic modifications and the reward prediction error signal of
dopamine neurons, in turn, provide the mechanistic underpinning for a specific class of
reinforcement learning mechanisms in the brain, and suggest that humans and many other
animals may be implementing algorithms that correspond in a close way to the algorithms
of the formal theory.
In what follows data and theory about relevant aspects and function of the dopamine
system will be reviewed. The attention will focus on the main steps that have led to the
formulation of the reward prediction error hypothesis and that support this theory. This
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approach is followed for two reason: on the one hand, although alternative hypothesis
about what type of signal is conveyed by dopaminergic activity in the midbrain exist (see
for example Berridge, 2007; Friston et al., 2012), and the type of information coded by
dopaminergic transmission is very likely to go beyond reward-prediction error, it is widely
accepted that ”to date no alternative has mustered as convincing and multidirectional
experimental support as the prediction-error theory of dopamine” (Niv and Montague,
2008; but see also Glimcher, 2011). On the other hand, in the central part of this thesis
(chapter 3 and chapter 4) I will assume the validity of this hypothesis and study how
Bayesian inference and RL algorithms can be integrated to improve our understanding
of the dopamine neurons activity when animals need to rely their decision on uncertain
stimuli.
Before proceeding with the presentation of some relevant electrophysiological findings
about the dopamine activity the learning paradigm of conditioning will be briefly intro-
duced. Conditioning is relevant in what follows for two reasons: the majority of existing
data about dopamine neurons have been recorded during behavioural conditioning tasks.
And the TD algorithm was initially developed to explain behaviour and only during the
last two decades it became a leading model of the brain.
1.2.1 Conditioning
Conditioning is the study of how animals learn to predict appetitive outcomes and direct
their behaviour accordingly. It is common to make a distinction between two forms of
conditioning: Pavlovian (or classical) conditioning, and instrumental (or operant) con-
ditioning. In the former outcomes occur regardless of the animal’s actions and learning
consists in acquir the ability to predict the causal relationships between events in the
world. In the latter the animal directly affects the occurrence of significant outcomes and
learn to strengthen those actions that lead to positive consequences.
In the typical Pavlovian paradigm an initially neutral stimulus (known as conditioned
stimulus, CS) is associated with a biologically important stimulus (unconditioned stimu-
lus, US) by repeatedly present the two stimuli with some predefined temporal relationship.
The temporal interval between the CS (usually a visual cue) and the US (normally a drop
o juice that serves as reward) is denominated inter-stimulus interval (ISI); whilst the tem-
poral interval separating two consecutive trials is known as inter-trial interval (ITI). The
CS need to be presented before than the US in order to establish a causal relationship
between the two stimuli (i.e the ISI must be positive). In the delay conditioning proce-
dure the CS is presented for some period of time and the US is delivered when the CS
1.2 Behavioural experiment and neurophysiology of the dopamine system 19
Phenomenon Pre-Train Train Result
Acquisition A→US A =⇒ CR
Extinction A→US A→ · A =⇒ ·
Partial A→US (PA,US) A→ · A =⇒ αPCR
Blocking A→US A,B→US A =⇒ CR B =⇒ ·
Overshadow A→US A,B→A A =⇒ αACR B =⇒ αBCR
Secondary A→US B→A B =⇒ CR
Table 1.1: Some major effects in classical conditioning. Train and Pre-Train typically
consists in several repetitions of each trial type. A,B indicates two different CS’s. In the
”Train” column the symbol ”·” indicates omission. In the ”Result”column the ”·” denotes
a CR that is missing (or significantly diminished), the factors of α denote a partial or
weakened expectation. The αP in the case of partial reinforcement indicates that the
partial expectation depends on the probability PA,US of reward in the training stage.
is still present. When instead the CS and the US are separated by a temporal delay the
procedure is known as trace conditioning. In both cases, after pairing is repeated, the
(initially neutral) CS alone starts to elicit a behavioural response, known as conditioned
response (CR), that is similar to the one naturally caused by the US. The association is
reached faster in the delay procedure (because of the temporal contiguity) and the degree
of the CR typically reflects the degree of association between the two stimuli (i.e the
degree to which the US is expected due to the presentation of the CS). In addition to
the appearance of the CR a variety of behavioural effects have been observed in classical
conditioning. If the US is repeatedly omitted after the presentation of the CS the asso-
ciation between the two stimuli and consequently the CR disappear. This phenomena is
known as extinction. Another effect known as blocking consists in the observation that
if an US is already predicted by a CS then adding a second CS that also predict the US
produces only reduced learning. A summary of some major effects observed in classical
conditioning can be found in Table 1.1.
Instrumental conditioning includes three types of experiments: free operant task, and
discrete choice tasks. In free operant tasks an animal is placed in a computer-controlled
box (known as operant conditioning chamber or ”Skinner Box”) and learns to respond
to specific stimuli (such as a light or a sound signal) with given actions (like pressing
a lever). Correct performance is associated with rewards delivery, and, in some cases,
the animal receives a punishment for incorrect or missing responses. Free operant tasks
can follow two main different programmed schedules, the ratio schedule and the interval
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schedule. In the ratio schedule, one out of n leverpresses is rewarded. The number of
leverpresses required for the reward delivery can be constant or variable across trails. In
the interval schedule, for instance, a reward occurs following the first leverpress after an
interval of time has elapsed from the previous reward. The threshold interval can be
fixed or variable. A classical result in the fixed interval schedule is that the leverpressing
sharply increases when the end of the fixed interval is approaching. This schedule has
been recently used to study how striatal neurons are involved in timing (Mello et al., 2015)
and I will discuss significant findings in the next chapter. Discrete choice tasks consist in a
two-armed bandit task: the animal has to decide between two different stimuli associated
with different reward magnitude, delay and probability. This type of experiments have
been extensively used to investigate time discounting. The way how animals and humans
are discounting future rewards cannot be measured directly. However key insights on this
issue can be obtained by observing how their preferences change when reward magnitude
and delay vary. Given that an animal is presented with two different amounts of reward,
r1 and r2, delivered after different delays, d1 and d2, and that it systematically prefers
one of them, if the delay of both rewards is increased of the same temporal interval ∆ the
preference should not change under the assumption of exponential discounting. Actually
in many species of animals, from pigeons to primate (and to humans), the preference does
change depending on the duration of the interval ∆. This behavioural effect is known as
preference reversal and can be justified under the assumption of hyperbolic discounting.
Although in the rest of thesis I will formulate the reinforcement learning problem in the
term of exponential discounting it is interesting to notice that some evidence for hyperbolic
discounting have been observed even in the response of dopamine neurons (Kobayashi and
Schultz, 2008). However the result obtained in that work was not completely clear and the
distinction between hyperbolic and exponential discount models at single neurons level
was not striking.
1.2.2 Dopamine activity reward prediction errors
The study of the dopamine activity initially focused on the role of dopamine in motor
control. This was due to the fact that one relevant symptom of Parkinson’s disease, known
to be caused by the degeneration of dopamine neurons, is the loss of motor control. Sur-
prisingly early recording conducted by Romo and Schultz, 1990 showed that movement
alone did not imply any response, and that the response of dopamine neurons was un-
related to movement parameters, but rather it was signaling an expectation of reward.
More specifically Romo and Schultz, 1990 trained two monkeys to perform two different
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tasks: in the first experiment the monkeys performed self-initiated arm movements from
a resting key into a covered box containing food. In a second task, the arm movement
was triggered by the rapid opening of the door of the food box. They found that neither
in the first nor in the second task the dopamine neurons activity was correlated with the
initiation of the movement. In the first task they observed a significant response after
the monkey’s hand touched the food inside the box or the bare wire normally holding
the food. Importantly they found that the touching of the same bare wire outside of the
behavioural task did not elicit any response. In the second task they observed that, after
some period of training, neurons started to respond mainly to the door opening and not
to the food. These findings constituted the first steps toward the reward prediction error
hypothesis and inspired series of later experiments.
Subsequent works from the same group focused on analysing the activation of dopamine
neurons during different steps of learning of simple instrumental conditioning reaction time
tasks (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Schultz et al., 1993; Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1994). These
studies highlighted the importance of unpredictability for reward responses in dopamine
neurons showing that when learning was established the response of neurons transferred
from the reward to the reward-predicting, movement-triggering stimulus. In addition,
in trials in which the trained monkey received no reward (because the key pressed was
accidentally wrong) many of the dopamine neurons showed a sharp decrease in their fir-
ing rates below baseline shortly after the reward’s usual time of delivery. These results
suggested that dopaminergic activity is sensitive to both the occurrence and time of the
reward. The idiosyncratic pattern of dopaminergic activity observed during these exper-
iments is summarized in Figure 1.2.
Early electrophysiology studies guided the formulation of the reward prediction error
hypothesis and of the first TD-based model of the dopamine system (Montague et al., 1996;
Schultz et al., 1997). The model proposed by Montague et al., 1996 elucidated how and
why the normative approach of reinforcement learning and in particular the TD algorithm
accounted (qualitatively) for the output of dopamine neurons during learning. It provided
strong evidence to the hypothesis that the output of these neurons was consistent with the
scalar prediction error signal required by the normative reinforcement learning models.
The details of this model implementation together with the way how the mismatches
between the TD error resulting from the original model and dopamine neuron activity
have been be addressed will be discussed later in this chapter.
Many other studies have investigated weather the dopamine responses had the char-
acteristic of the teaching signal of the formal theory and weather the signal conveyed by
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Figure 1.2: Standard phasic activation of a typical dopamine neuron resembling an error
in reward prediction, from (Schultz et al., 1997).
this group of neurons reflected learning at behavioural level. Hollerman and Schultz, 1998
found that in a discrimination task the response to the reward progressively decreased
in a way consistent with the course of learning at behavioural level. Waelti et al., 2001
using a blocking procedure confirmed that learning both at neural and at behavioural
level depended crucially on prediction errors and not on stimuli-reward association alone.
During the last decade the validity of the reward prediction hypothesis has been con-
firmed by a wide number of quantitative tests. Using using a general regression model
Bayer and colleagues showed that the dopaminergic response to the reward in the current
trial could be predicted using an exponentially recency weighted average of previously
experienced rewards (this is implicit in the TD update as discussed in subsection 1.1.2).
Additionally this study showed that, at least in the positive domain, it was possible to
extract (positive) reward prediction errors from dopamine firing rates. Later it was shown
that negative prediction errors were encoded by the length of the pause below the baseline
firing rate, rather than the magnitude of the pause (Bayer et al., 2007).
Further works manipulated the magnitude and/or probability of the reward occurrence
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and showed that the phasic dopaminergic response to the CS was in agreement with TD
models predictions and resulted proportional to the magnitude and/or probability of the
predicted reward (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Morris et al., 2004; Tobler et al., 2005). (Fior-
illo et al., 2003) analysed the response of neurons in a delay conditioning experiment in
which reward was delivered only probabilistically. They encountered that the population
response averaged in trials showed a clear ramping profile during the interval between the
CS and the reward, and that this ramping activity seemed to reflect uncertainty in the
reward delivery, rather than a prediction error. Niv et al., 2005 reconciled this experimen-
tal finding and TD models showing that, if negative and positive prediction errors were
encoded differentially in the dopamine neurons (as shown in Bayer and Glimcher, 2005),
the ramp was in accord with a constantly back-propagating error signal as predicted by
the existing formal theory.
The majority of the studies mentioned above used rather simple Pavlovian or instru-
mental tasks. A first analysis of the dopamine responses in a more complex scenario was
reported in (Morris et al., 2006). Monkeys were trained to perform an instructed-choice
task and a two-armed bandit choice task. They found that, in choice trials, the response
of neurons immediately after the presentation of the two cues reflected the value of the
subsequent choice, a pattern of activity in line with SARSA learning. Another study
performed in rats (Roesch et al., 2007) showed that the activity of dopamine neurons
complied with the predictions of Q-learning. These contrasting results can be due to
many differences between these two studies, including the animal species (a tendency
for optimal and suboptimal behaviour have been reported respectively in rats and mon-
keys). Finally, it is worth to note that both these results are at odds with straightforward
predictions of an Actor/Critic mechanism (although this will be main action selection
mechanism used in this thesis).
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in investigating the response of dopamine
neurons in more realistic decision making tasks (Nomoto et al., 2010; de Lafuente and
Romo, 2011). The existing studies seem to indicate that the DA signal has a much richer
structure than in simple choice paradigms. For example, Nomoto et al., 2010, found that
the response to visual dynamic random dot stimuli is more complex than the response to
the stimuli commonly used in previous studies. The DA activity seemed to follow a more
elaborate temporal profile, first responding abruptly to the onset of the stimulus (presum-
ably due to its detection) and then producing a more extended response (supposedly due
to the decision-making process, Nomoto et al., 2010 ; see also Schultz, 2015). In another
recent study, de Lafuente and Romo, 2011 recorded DA neurons while a monkey was
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engaged in the detection of weak vibrotactile stimuli. In this task, when the animal was
instructed to communicate its choice by pushing one of two push buttons, these neurons
responded with a burst that coded the animal’s uncertainty on its own judgement. The
activity of dopamine neurons in two specific decision making tasks will be investigated in
chapter 3 and in chapter 4. In particular, in chapter 3 I will perform a detailed model
based (re-)analysis of that data reported in (de Lafuente and Romo, 2011).
Another issue that has been only glanced until now concerns the relationship between
dopamine responses and the processing of time (see Daw, 2003 for an extensive review on
behavioural data and early electrophysiological recordings about this topic).
Schultz et al., 1993 were the firsts to notice that, the responding of dopamine neurons
appeared to be high sensitive to the exact timing of relevant task events and strictly
related with the temporal predictability of their appearance. They trained a monkey to
perform three different versions of an instrumental conditioning task. In the experiment
one of two light instructions and a trigger were turned on at different delays from each
other and the animal had to wait the trigger presentation before responding accordingly
to the instruction previously presented in order to receive a reward. After sufficient
training the monkey was able to correctly perform and, as previously reported, after
learning neurons ceased to respond to the reward delivery and started to activate after
the instruction presentation. In addition to a pause at the time of the expected reward
in occasionally wrong trials, the author noticed another additional remarkable feature in
the dopamine response. They found that neurons did not respond to the trigger when
the instruction-trigger delay was fixed but they did respond when the delay was variable
(i.e respectively in the second stage and third stage of the task; see Figure 1.3, left). In
another study (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998) a monkey was trained to expect a reward
one second after a cue, and the authors analysed the responding of neurons in occasional
probe trials in which rewards were moved up or delayed (of half second in both cases). If a
reward was delayed (similarly to what happened when it is omitted altogether), dopamine
neurons showed a pause in their background firing at the time when the reward should
have occurred and a phasic burst at its (delayed) delivery. An early reward caused a
dopaminergic burst, but there was no corresponding pause at the time the reward was
normally delivered (see Figure 1.3, right). The observations described above suggested
that the monkeys were internally keeping track of the timing of the relevant task events
and that these temporal expectations were reflected in the activity of dopamine neurons.
More recently Fiorillo et al., 2008 analysed more in detail how the activation of
dopamine neurons related with temporal expectations. They found that both at be-
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Figure 1.3: Response of dopamine neurons to timing varying events. Left: In the first
version of the task (”Spatial choice task”) the trigger and the instruction were presented
together, and, when learning is established, neurons respond to their occurrence. In the
”Instructed spatial task” the instruction-trigger delay was fixed to 1 s and the trigger did
not generate any response because it was fully predicted by the instruction. The response
to the trigger persisted, although learning was fully established, when the instruction-
trigger delay varied between 2.5 s and 3.5 s (”Delay response task”). Data from (Schultz
et al., 1993)). Right: Effects of reward timing on dopamine activation. During familiar
trials, following a correct response, the reward was delivered after 1.0 s. In occasionally
probe trials the reward was delivered after 1.5 s (delayed) or after 0.5 s (early). Data
from (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998).
havioural and at neural level the precision of the expectation was not high and that the
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precision declined with the passage of time in way consistent with the Weber’s law. Sim-
ilar results were found in (Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008). Additionally it has been shown
that the presence of time-varying reward related events produced a tonic slow decrease of
the dopamine neurons firing rate. The deviation from the baseline started from the first
time the event could be presented and increased in magnitude as time elapsed resembling
a form of negative prediction error (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; but see also Fiorillo
et al., 2008; Nomoto et al., 2010; Pasquereau and Turner, 2015; Starkweather et al., 2017
for similar results). More interestingly, it has been recently proved that dopamine neu-
rons are indeed implicated in the perception of the passage of time (Soares et al., 2016).
Another quite new study analysed the response of dopamine neurons in a classical con-
ditioning task in which the reward, in addition to be presented after a variable interval
from the CS, was delivered only in the 90 % of the trials. The main result was that
dopamine neurons reflected prediction errors provided that the TD machinery received a
hidden variable reflecting Bayesian inference as input.
Both Bayesian inference and the representation of elapsed time in TD models of the
dopamine activity will be central to this thesis. They represent fundamental elements
to take into account when TD algorithms are used to model task in which decisions rely
on temporal and sensory uncertain stimuli. In particular chapter 2 will provide a more
detailed description of the relationship between the firing rate of dopamine neurons and
temporal expectation and I will analyse in details the way a particular TD model deals
with current data. The necessity to incorporate Bayesian inference in TD models of the
dopamine system will be addressed in depth in chapter 3 and in chapter 4 where I will
discuss a model based analysis of data from two specific decision making tasks.
1.3 TD models of the dopamine response
This section will conclude the literature review with a brief discussion of existing TD
model of the dopamine activity. The discussion will mainly focus on the representation of
time in TD model of the basal ganglia (a topic that will be resumed in the next chapter).
The way Bayesian inference and TD learning have been integrated in a quite recent work
(Rao, 2010) will be also discussed.
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1.3.1 Early TD models
The most specific and now standard formulation of TD model of the dopamine system
was introduced in (Montague et al., 1996) (presented here as in Schultz et al., 1997). In
that model each task event activated a a set of N features xt = {x1(t), x2(t) . . . xN(t)}
corresponding the animal’s representation of the temporal interval elapsed from the event
onset. Using the terminology of section 1.1 the state of the system corresponded to the
interval of time between relevant task events(in the simplest case just between the CS
and the reward). The value of each event was estimated as a linear combination of these
features V (st) = wt · xt, and events were supposed to contribute in an additive way to
the value function. The value function was learned by adjusting the weights according
to the TD(0) algorithm (see Equation 1.27). This early application of TD learning to
the dopamine system assumed a tapped-delay line representation of stimulus history, also
known as the complete serial compound (CSC; Sutton and Barto, 1990). Time was dis-
cretized into time steps of a typical duration of 100 ms (a timescale corresponding to the
response latency of dopamine neurons; see for example Romo and Schultz, 1990; Schultz
and Romo, 1990), and the CSC represented every time step following stimulus onset as
a separate feature, making implicitly the assumption of a perfect clock. This assumption
is clearly unrealistic and produces a series of erroneous predictions that will be discussed
below and in particular chapter 2. Another noteworthy simplification was that the model
considered the return being predicted as confined to single trials. The model correctly re-
produced that the response of dopamine neuron activity shifted from unpredicted rewards
to the predictor; that when more than one predictor was presented neuron responded to a
reward-predicting stimulus only when its timing relative to a previous predictor was vari-
able (Schultz et al., 1993). The predictions of the model qualitatively mismatched with
the data when the reward was occasionally omitted, showing a too pronounced and short
pause. More importantly the model also mispredicted part of the results of the Holler-
man and Schultz (1998) experiment, in which a reward occasionally occurred earlier or
later than expected. Predictions qualitatively corresponded to the data when the reward
was delayed with respect to its usual time of occurrence; however when the reward was
presented early, the model predicted a pronounced pause at the time when the reward
was expected. which was not observed in the activity of dopamine neurons. To conclude,
two issues that will be discussed in detail in chapter 2 deserve to be mentioned. First, the
model generates an erroneous prediction of the response of dopamine neurons when the
interval between relevant task events varies accordingly to some predefined schedule (for
example the ones reported in Fiorillo et al., 2008; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). Second,
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Figure 1.4: Schematic view of possible implementation of TD learning in the costricostri-
atal circuits.
due the unrealistic representation of time the model is also unable to deal with all those
aspect of dopamine activation related to timing noise.
Many refinement have been added to the original theoretical formulation and will be
discussed below. However no one of these changes questioned the core idea behind the
reward prediction error hypothesis of dopamine. Besides establishing the parallel between
dopamine responses and TD errors Schultz and colleagues were pioneers in linking the
computational theory with the neurobiology of the brain. They envisioned that the targets
of the VTA dopamine neurons (e.g. amygdala and ventral striatum) were involved in
learning underlying value prediction, and that dopamine projections from SNC to dorsal
striatum were responsible for behavioural control. The neural basis of reinforcement
learning have been widely investigated during the last two decades.
According to RL models of the basal ganglia, states are represented in the cortex and
act as cortical inputs to the striatum. Specifically, in the model proposed in (Schultz
et al., 1993) these cortical inputs correspond to the set of features used to represent the
stimulus and to linearly estimate the value function. The striatum itself (in particular the
ventral striatum) is assumed to encode the estimated value. The adjustable weights of the
TD algorithm represents corticostriatal synapses. The role of dopamine is to modulate
corticostriatal plasticity similarly to how the temporal difference signal modifies the set of
weights in the algorithm. A schematic view of the correspondence between reward-based
prediction learning in the brain and the TD algorithm of RL is depicted in Figure 1.4.
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A subsequent model was introduces in Suri and Schultz, 1998, 1999. The model was
conceived to show that an actor-critic architecture could learn a spatial delayed response
task as the one in (Schultz et al., 1993). Such a model resembled that of (Montague et al.,
1996) in many aspects, but used a different temporal representation and a variation on the
usual TD algorithm to update the weights. Specifically they used a large number of tem-
porally extended representational elements that activates simultaneously at the onset of
the stimulus. The value of these basis functions exponentially ramped up with the elapsed
time and each element abruptly decreased its value to zero at a given time step after the
stimulus onset. The only weight eligible for learning was the one corresponding to the
representational element that had just shut off. Most importantly the authors introduced
a reset mechanism allowing a high value reward-predicting stimulus or the reward itself to
erase the representation of previous stimuli. With this additional mechanism the model
could reproduce the activity of dopamine neurons after the delivery of an early reward
as observed in (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998) (because once the representation of the
stimulus is cancelled by the reward occurrence the prediction of pause at the usual time
of reward delivery naturally disappeared). This reset device made the model also able to
cope with of the timing variability (for example it can account for the results observed in
Fiorillo et al., 2008). Nevertheless, exactly as the model of (Montague et al., 1996), the
model presented by (Suri and Schultz, 1998, 1999) supposed a infinitely precise timing
mechanism (because the weight update produced learning only in representational ele-
ment that had just shut off), and therefore it completely disregarded all the involvement
of dopamine activation due to the noisy measurement of the temporal intervals.
1.3.2 TD models and the representation of time
The way time is represented in RL models of the dopamine system raised increased interest
during the last decade. Here two attempts to fix part of the mismatches between theory
and data will be presented.
A solution to the limitations of the CSC was suggested by (Ludvig et al., 2008). They
introduced a more realistic temporal stimulus representation for the TD model called ”mi-
crostimulus” representation that constituted a temporally smeared version of the CSC (see
Figure 1.5). Aside from the detailed way this representation was constructed, two impor-
tant features of the new representation deserve attention. First, in the the microstimulus
representation each feature activates and, thus is eligible for learning, for a temporal
range (and not for a single time step as in the CSC). Second, the temporal precision
of the features decreases with time. This last feature makes the model naturally able
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Figure 1.5: The CSC representation (left) and the microstimuli representation (right).
to cope with timing noise. In addition to this smeared temporal representation in the
microstimulus model the reward is treated as a detectable event and therefore associated
with its own temporal representation. The last (minor) change of the model consists in
using the TD(λ) backup for prediction learning (specifically in the accumulation eligibility
trace version). The predictions arising from this new TD machinery fitted the previous
data considerably better than previous models. The model responded to reward omission
with a shallow, extended negative TD error starting around the time the reward was ex-
pected. It is also able to behave similarly to the data reported in (Hollerman and Schultz,
1998) when an early reward is delivered ( because the microstimuli representing the re-
ward itself cancelled the positive prediction generated by the cue). More interestingly the
miscrostimulus model can account for more recent data (Fiorillo et al., 2008 ;but see also
Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008 for similar results). In that study monkeys were trained on a
classical conditioning task in which the five different cues were associated with five differ-
ent ISI’s spanning from 1 to 16 s. As expected as a consequence of temporal discounting
the dopamine response to the cue decreased with the ISI. Surprisingly they found that the
dopamine response to the reward increased with the cue-reward interval resulting similar
to the response to a completely unpredicted reward for the largest ISI. This last result was
interpreted as resulting from a temporal precision of the neural expectation that sharply
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declined with the interval and is compatible with the coarse temporal representation of
the microstimulus model (but not with the perfect clock implicitly assumed in the CSC;
see Gershman et al., 2014). Although some predictions of the model proposed in (Ludvig
et al., 2008) are strictly connected with the introduction of a temporal representation for
the US, the mayor improvements generated as a consequence of the coarse representation
of the passage of time naturally associated with the microstimuli .
A completely different approach to the problem of timing in theories of the dopamine
system was suggested in (Daw et al., 2006). They proposed a partially observable semi-
Markov TD model in which dopaminergic prediction errors reflect inference over the hid-
den relevant variables describing the system. As mentioned at the beginning of this
chapter the notion of POMDP refers to the fact that the underlying state is unknown to
the agent and can only be inferred from sensory data. In addition in the semi-Markov
framework the agent is also uncertain about the amount of time that has elapsed since
entry into the current state and all the transition probabilities depend also on the pre-
cise dwell time distribution corresponding to each state of the system. A more detailed
analysis of this alternative approach is beyond the purpose of this thesis. However, it is
interesting to point out that the standpoint proposed in (Daw et al., 2006) was pioneering
in suggesting that the reward prediction errors signalled by dopamine neurons operated
over hidden (or ’belief’) states.
The belief-state model and the microstimulus model have been generally seen as com-
peting alternatives. The latter approach, or more in general an approach relying on
a distributed element temporal representation, has been long considered preferable for
several reasons (Gershman et al., 2014). From a pure computational standpoint this ap-
proach naturally fit with standard RL models of the basal ganglia, which mostly use a
linear function approximation architecture. At neural level recent data (Adler et al., 2012;
Mello et al., 2015) have provided direct evidence for a representation of time in the stria-
tum that is distributed over a set of neurons. more in general any approach relying on a
distributed element temporal representation can be suitable to analyse how timing affect
the activity of dopaminergic neurons. In the last part of the next chapter an alternative
internal temporal representation (originally proposed in Shankar and Howard, 2012) will
be discussed and I will study in detail interesting predictions that can be done when this
representation is embedded in the machinery of TD learning.
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1.3.3 TD models and decision making under uncertainty
Despite their ability to reproduce the activity of dopamine neurons in classical and instru-
mental conditioning TD models have been scarcely applied to the study of the dopamine
system in decision making tasks. One important advance in this direction have been
proposed in (Rao, 2010). In that work the author proposed a neural POMDP model and
applied it to a reaction-time version of the well-known random dots motion discrimination
task used to study decision making in primates (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; but see also
Shadlen and Newsome, 2001).
Briefly, the animal had to decide the direction of motion of the coherently moving dots
and was rewarded for correct decisions. The coherence of the motion varied from trial to
trial making sometimes the task difficult for the animal. While making the decision the
animal did not have access to the property of the stimulus relevant for obtaining the reward
(in this case the direction of the dots motion). For this reason the model assumed that the
noisy observations provided from the environment were used to calculate a belief about the
motion direction. This belief was subsequently sent to an actor-critic architecture and the
TD error signal was used to model the dopamine response. To cope with the continuous
nature of belief space the model implemented function approximation using radial basis
function as feature vector (both for the critic and for the actor). The value function was
learnt using stochastic gradient descent TD(0) methods. The policy was represented using
a softmax distribution and trained with a standard policy gradient algorithm. The model
fitted the monkeys’ behaviour, correctly reproducing the performance and the reaction
times observed in the data. After learning, as intuitively expected, the actor learnt to
make a decision only when the belief about one of the two direction was sufficiently high
and keeping accumulation evidence otherwise. More importantly the TD signal developed
after learning caught all the remarkable characteristics of the dopamine firing rate as
reported in (Nomoto et al., 2010). In particular the TD signal showed a two component
response: at the beginning of the dot motion the TD error was in all trials, and increased
later only for sufficiently high value of coherence motion. A graded response to the reward
delivery similar to that observed in the recordings was also reproduced by the TD signal.
These results strongly suggested the existence of neural underpinnings of RL that go
beyond simple paradigms of classical and instrumental conditioning, and opened interest-
ing perspectives for a theoretical analysis of decision making in the brain.
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1.4 Neural substrate of RL in the brain
As it has been mentioned above the correspondence between RL and neural mechanisms
for decision making in the brain is deeper than the simple parallel between TD learning
and the phasic bursts of dopamine neurons.
The idea that an algorithm similar to the actor-critic could be implemented in the
basal ganglia has been confirmed by many electrophysiology and imaging studies (see
Joel et al., 2002 for a review on anatomical perspectives). According to the current view
of RL in the basal ganglia, the ventral striatum is generally associated with prediction
learning whereas the dorsal striatum is assumed to subserve action selection and policy
learning.
The ventral striatum is a good candidate to act as the critic of the formal theory
for a variety of reasons: it projects to, and receives projections from, the dopaminergic
system (Joel and Weiner, 2000); it shows sustained activity during the period in which
rewards are expected (Schultz et al., 1992; Setlow et al., 2003). In addition the ventral
striatum, unlike other portions of the striatum, is connected to dopaminergic neurons
that project to all regions of the striatum (Joel and Weiner, 2000). This last property
is fundamental for generating a dopamine signal that acts as the prediction error in the
actor-critic architecture and guide both prediction learning and action selection. Other
brain areas fulfilling similar requirements and closely interconnected anatomically with
the ventral striatum are the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala. Indeed, it is likely
that these three areas may work together to implement the critic.
The association of the the actor with the dorsolateral striatum is supported by the
implication of this part of the basal ganglia in habitual behaviour (Packard and Knowl-
ton, 2002; Daw et al., 2005; Wickens et al., 2007). Furthermore many results provided
additional evidence for the idea that the critic is related to the ventral striatum and the
actor is related to the dorsal striatum. O’Doherty et al., 2004 conducted an fMRI study
in human encountering that BOLD activation in the dorsal striatum was related with
prediction errors only when active choice behaviour was required (whereas the activation
in the ventral striatum correlated with prediction errors also in pavlovian contingencies).
An electrophysiological study in rats (Daw, 2003) showed that neurons in the dorsal stria-
tum represented actions whereas neurons in the ventral striatum represented predicted
rewards.
Although some studies suggested that dopamine response could reflect different RL
algorithms (see Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007), the role of the striatum in reward-
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related learning is ubiquitous. Correlates of prediction errors in the dorsal and ventral
striatum have now been seen in multiple studies. A study reported in (Scho¨nberg et al.,
2007) showed that the ability to learn optimally was highly correlated with striatal BOLD
activation reflecting reward prediction error.
To summarize: during the last years TD models and the reward prediction error
hypothesis have gone beyond the simple parallel between the phasic dopaminergic signals
and the TD learning algorithm. Indeed they have further linked algorithmic ideas from RL
to possible underlying neural substrates, specifically, to learning and action selection in
the basal ganglia mediated by corticostriatal dopamine-dependent plasticity. Converging
evidence from a wide variety of recording and imaging methods supports this hypothesis.
Chapter 2
Dopamine, temporal expectations,
and TD models
Keeping track of time is fundamental to learn about the sometimes-delayed consequences
of actions and to guide optimal rewarding behaviour. Although timing and prediction
error driven learning have historically been treated as independent processes, growing
evidence seems to indicate that they are strictly connected.
Distributed sets of brain areas, especially the cortico-basal ganglia circuits, known
for being involved in reinforcement learning and decision making (Lau and Glimcher,
2008; Cai et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012; Ding and Gold, 2013; Lee et al., 2015), have been
implicated in the representation of time across temporal intervals (Hinton and Meck, 2004;
Meck, 2006; Wencil et al., 2010; Merchant et al., 2013).
Recordings from the striatum (of both rats and monkeys) have indicated the existence
of cluster of neurons which activity encoded time in a way that resembled the one required
by RL models (Jin et al., 2009; Adler et al., 2012; Mello et al., 2015).
The information carried by these neurons appeared to be sufficient to decode time
from the population response (Jin et al., 2009), and the time estimates decoded from the
population activity predicted the animal timing behaviour (Mello et al., 2015).
In addition a deep connection between the dopamine reward prediction errors and the
processing of time has been demonstrated in a wealth of studies. The phasic activation of
dopamine neurons crucially depended on relative timing of the relevant (reward-related)
task events (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Nomoto et al., 2010). Negative tonic modulations
of the dopaminergic neurons basal firing rate seemed to reflect temporal expectations
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Pasquereau and Turner, 2015). Data indicated that the
temporal precision of reward (or reward related) predictions in dopamine neurons sharply
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declined with time (Fiorillo et al., 2008).
These studies have suggested that a distribute elements temporal representation which
precision decreases with the interval duration could be appropriate to represent time in
RL models of the basal ganglia (Gershman et al., 2014). However a few different temporal
representations fulfil these requirements.
This chapter analyses reward prediction errors deriving from a precise choice of tem-
poral representation and compares this prediction with current available recordings. The
next section will briefly review how the activity of dopamine neurons relates with temporal
expectations. Then I will introduce in the TD machinery a scale invariant representation
of time (Shankar and Howard, 2012, 2013) and I will compare the predictions generated
from the model with available data. This study will determine the choice of the temporal
representation adopted in chapter 3 and in chapter 4.
2.1 Dopamine recordings and temporal expectations
Pioneering observations showing that the dopamine prediction error signals were sensitive
to temporal expectation of reward and predictors were reported in (Schultz et al., 1993;
Hollerman and Schultz, 1998), as discussed in chapter 1. The general findings of these
early studies were that when the relative timings of relevant task events was deterministic,
dopamine neurons fired only to the first stimulus. Besides, dopamine neurons responded
to events whose timing was variable, provided that the variability in event timing exceeded
some threshold (200-500 ms; Daw, 2003)
Fiorillo et al., 2008 performed three different experiments to shed light on the way how
temporal expectations affected the dopamine reward prediction errors. They found that
dopamine responses were sensitive to temporal aspects of reward expectation, both at
the time of the reward-predicting stimulus and at the time of the reward (see Kobayashi
and Schultz, 2008 for similar results). In addition, the dopamine response was not highly
precise and the precision declined sharply with the interval duration.
In the first Pavlovian task monkeys were trained to expect the reward after a fixed
delay interval of variable duration. The ISI varied from 1-16 s depending of the visual
stimulus presented at the beginning of each trial. The response to the CS was found to
decrease with the duration of the ISI, as expected taking into account temporal discount-
ing (see Figure 2.1a, left). However, in contrast with previous observations with short
fixed intervals (typically between 1 and 2 seconds), when the duration of the ISI increased
the reward caused a substantial activation of dopamine neurons (see Figure 2.1a, right).
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Figure 2.1: Dopamine responses and temporal expectation. (a) When the reward
was delivered after different ISI of fixed duration the response of dopamine neurons to the
CS decreased with the ISI duration (left). The response to the reward showed an opposite
trend (right). (b) When the ISI duration varied according to a uniform distribution (left)
the dopamine activation to the reward decreased with the ISI. The gray bar represents
the response to the reward delivered after a fixed interval of 2 s (middle). In the variable
interval following the CS the dopamine tonic activity showed a decreasing trend (right,
black line). Note how for a 2 s fixed ISI the activity before the reward delivery was
suppressed with respect to its baseline calculated before the cue presentation (right, gray
line). Adapted from (Fiorillo et al., 2008).
The authors concluded that the momentary expectation of reward decreased with inter-
val duration (likely accordingly to Weber’s law), and that neurons showed a significant
response for long intervals because of the poorly precise reward prediction.
The fact that temporal expectation at neural level was not very accurate was confirmed
by another experiment reported in the same work. The activation of dopamine neurons
seemed to indicate that the neural expectation was relatively strong even after just half
of the usual ISI. Indeed, the dopamine response to the reward was greater than the
activation at the usual time of the reward delivery, but much less than the activation
to an ’unpredicted’ reward. In addition the firing rate showed a slight decrease before
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the usual time of reward delivery with respect to its baseline calculated before the cue
presentation (see the gray line in Figure 2.1b, right). This effect can be interpreted in
terms of the animals’ timing noise as a form of negative prediction error due to a weak
expectation of reward even in a short period before the end of the usual ISI. Finally Fiorillo
and colleagues analysed the dopamine response to a reward delivered after a variable
ISI (uniformly chosen between 1 and 3 seconds). They found that neuron responded
with greater activation to the reward after short ISI, consistently with the idea that
the reward expectation grew with the elapsed time. However neurons were only slightly
more activated by reward delivered after the variable interval than after a fixed 2-s interval
(again consistently with a low precise neural temporal expectation; see Figure 2.1b, center,
gray bar). In addition the firing rate of dopamine neurons gradually declined as the
stimulus-reward interval elapsed in the absence of reward (Figure 2.1b, center, black
bars). This was interpreted as a form of negative prediction errors connected with the
reward expectation.
Similar patterns of activity were observed in several studies that have analysed the
neural temporal expectation related to events different from primary rewards (Bromberg-
Martin et al., 2010; Nomoto et al., 2010; Pasquereau and Turner, 2015). These works
reported that, when the interval preceding the event was variable, dopamine neurons
carried two distinct signals. On the one hand a tonic decreasing activation anticipated
the time of the upcoming event. On the other hand the occurrence of such an event
produced a phasic dopamine burst that depended on the elapsed interval.
All these studies suggested that dopamine neurons encoded the timing distribution
of upcoming task events through gradual decreasing modulation in their tonic activity.
Figure 2.2a (right) shows how the tonic dopamine activity anticipated the start cue oc-
currence for three different ITIs, all of variable duration. At each moment when the timed
event failed to appear but could have potentially occurred the pattern of activity resem-
bled negative reward prediction errors related with temporal expectations. This tonic
signal appeared to be modulated by the timed event hazard rate, i.e the probability of
the event to occur given that it has not occurred yet. The first panel in Figure 2.1b (left)
shows the anticipatory activity for a fixed ITI of duration equal to 2.2 seconds. Note the
decreasing tonic modulation slightly before the cue appearance, and the similarity with
the result reported in (Fiorillo et al., 2008) (shown in Figure 2.1b, right, gray line).
Contrasting event-evoked dopamine responses were instead reported in these studies.
The majority of the data indicated that the evoked responses were smaller for longer
intervals. Fiorillo et al., 2008 found that the dopamine neurons were less activated by
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Figure 2.2: Dopamine response after variable ITIs. (a) Anticipation dopamine
activity preceding the star cue presentation for ITIs of different duration. Note the de-
creasing tonic modulation slightly before the cue presentation for the fixed duration ITI
(first panel on the left). (b) Cue-evoked response sorted according to the ITI duration,
for an ITI that lasted between 2.2 and 3.2 seconds (flat distribution). Adapted from
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010).
the reward for longer ISIs (Figure 2.1b, center, black bars). A similar pattern of evoked
response was reported in (Pasquereau and Turner, 2015), that investigated how dopamin-
ergic neurons changed their activity in relation to a go signal (triggering a reaching move-
ment) that varied temporally across trials with a flat distribution from 0.5 to 1.5 s. And
also in (Nomoto et al., 2010) in relation to the activity following the visual appearance
of random moving dots, that occurred between 0.5 and 1.5 seconds after a previous cue.
However (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010) reported an opposite trend: dopamine responses
to a start cue were larger for longer ITIs (see Figure 2.2b).
In what follows I will analyse the reward prediction error deriving from a specific TD
model. Neither the learning algorithm nor the temporal representation I will adopt are
new. The TD algorithm is the one used in (Montague et al., 1996) with an additional
reset mechanism (similar tothe one suggested in Suri and Schultz, 1999). The temporal
representation has been developed in (Shankar and Howard, 2012, 2013). The analysis
will suggest that the apparently contrasting evoked responses are due to the durations of
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the variable interval being timed, namely between 0.5 ans 1.5 seconds (so relatively short)
in (Nomoto et al., 2010; Pasquereau and Turner, 2015) and between 2.2 and 3.2 seconds
(or longer) in (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). The results of the simulation will show
that an adequate choice of the temporal representation can enable the TD model to cope
with all the current available data.
2.2 The TD model
2.2.1 Temporal representations
The onset of each reward-predictive stimulus initiates a vector of sub-states x(t) =
{x1(t), x2(t), ...} that tracks the passage of time. From a computational perspective this
sequence of states corresponds to the stimulus features for value computation. Two differ-
ent temporal representations will be adopted in the simulations, and are briefly discussed
below. Each of them makes different assumptions about the temporal precision with
which animals track the passage of time.
Complete serial compound The ’complete serial compound’ (CSC) is the temporal
representation used in the original application of TD learning to the dopamine system
(Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997). At each time step after the stimulus pre-
sentation, only one state of the vector representation is active. This means that xi(t) = 1
only i time steps after the stimulus onset, and it remains equal to zero otherwise (see Fig-
ure 1.5, left). The representation completely excludes temporal generalization between
consecutive time steps and therefore it makes the implicit assumption of a perfect clock.
Shankar-Howard representation The representation of time proposed in (Shankar
and Howard, 2012, 2013; hereafter referred to as the SH representation) belongs to the
class of distributed elements representations that allows generalization between nearby
time points (similar to the one adopted in Ludvig et al., 2008).
The reward-predictive stimulus (a pulse of duration equal to one time step dt) is
represented at different latencies (or nodes) τm from its onset through a set of function
which precision decreases with the passage of time (see Figure 2.3). Indicating with tCS the
onset time of the stimulus an explicit mathematical realization of the SH representation
is the following:
xm(t) =
1
|τm|C(k)
∫ tCS−t
tCS−t+dt
(
τ ′
τm
)k
e−k
τ ′
τm dτ ′ (2.1)
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Figure 2.3: The SH representation with nodes distributed uniformly on a logarithmic time
scale.
where C(k) = kk+1/k! and the parameter k controls the smear in the representation (the
larger is k the more accurate is the representation). The distribution of the nodes crucially
affects the properties of the SH representation. Accordingly to the optimality principles
described in Shankar and Howard (2013) the nodes are chosen to be distributed uniformly
on a logarithmic time scale:
τmin, τmin(1 + c), τmin(1 + c)
2, · · · τmin(1 + c)(Nmax−1) = τmax. (2.2)
where Nmax is the number of nodes (and therefore the number of feature vectors) used
by the SH representation. The parameters are chosen accordingly to the shortest and the
longest temporal interval to be timed. Here I will use τmin = dt = 0.1 s and τmax = 10
s. To minimize both information redundancy and information loss, for a given value of k,
the parameter c will be picked in order to approximately satisfy the following relationship
(Shankar and Howard, 2013):
k
(k − 1)√(k − 2) ≈ c1 + c (2.3)
2.2.2 Learning algorithm
The model learns through the linear TD(0) algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Schultz
et al., 1997; Montague et al., 1996), that has been discussed in subsection 1.1.4. For
completeness the basic equations of the algorithm will be repeated below. At each time
step, the estimated value is determined by a linear combination of stimulus features:
V (t) = wT · x(t) =
N∑
i=1
wi · xi(t) (2.4)
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and N is the total number of features. The weights are updated according to the following
learning rule:
∆wi = αδ(t)xi(t− 1) (2.5)
where α is the learning rate, δ(t) = r(t) + γV (t)−V (t− 1) is the usual reward prediction
error, and γ is the discount factor.
2.2.3 Additional reset mechanism
A simple modification of the TD algorithm described above can be achieved by introducing
a ’reset’ mechanism that sets all the stimulus features to 0 after reward arrives:
x(t) = 0 ∀ t ≥ tr (2.6)
where tr indicates the time step of the reward delivery.
The introduction of the reset crucially affects the convergence of the TD algorithm.
In particular in this case the value function converges to:
V (t) = E
[ ∞∑
i=0
γir(t+ 1 + i)|r(t′) = 0 ∀ t′ < t
]
(2.7)
See Appendix A for a formal justification of the above equation.
The TD model without reset is fully defined by the choice of the temporal representa-
tion and by the Equation 2.4 and Equation 2.5. The complete definition of the TD model
with reset requires the additional Equation 2.6. In all simulations, the discount factor
and the learning rate were fixed to the values α = 0.1, γ = 0.97, and 10 time steps were
interpreted as a unit of 1 s.
The TD model yielded asymptotic results after a number of trials that depended on
the presence of the reset mechanism and on the temporal representation (for small values
of the parameter k the number of trial increased). The results shown in what follows
represent the average of n = 3000 simulated trials taken after the TD model showed
asymptotic properties.
2.3 Results
I used the TD model described above to simulate experiments of simple acquisition in
which the reward is delivered at random times. In all the simulations a CS was presented
at time step tCS = 0 and the reward occurs between the time steps t
min
r and t
max
r with
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flat probability distribution f(t) = P (r(t)). I analysed the TD model predictions with
and without the reset mechanism, and with different temporal representations, namely
for the CSC and for the SH representation with different level of temporal precision (i.e
different values of the parameter k). The extremes of the flat distribution (tminr and t
max
r )
were varied to analyse the effects of timing and temporal uncertainty. In Appendix A I
will show that the TD model with the reset mechanism in the simulations of the simple
acquisition described here produce a RPE at reward delivery that is equivalent (from
an algorithmic point of view) to the RPE generated by the occurrence of a general task
event that resets the representation of previous stimuli. This equivalence justifies the
study preformed in what follows and the comparison with the available data described in
section 2.1.
2.3.1 Results: TD model without reset
I simulated the TD model without reset for an experiment of simple acquisition similar
to the one studied in (Fiorillo et al., 2008). In each trial a CS was presented at time 0,
and reward was delivered after 1 s to 3 s (with flat distribution f(t)), i.e between time
steps tminr = 10 and t
max
r = 30. Hereafter I will refer to the period of time between t
min
r
and tmaxr as the possible reward window, and to the interval between the CS presentation
and the beginning of the possible reward window (i.e t < tminr ) as the pre-reward period.
The TD model with CSC and without reset produced RPEs at reward delivery that
were roughly independent from the ISI duration (see Figure 2.4b). The pattern of RPEs
across different ISIs (see the red line in Figure 2.4a) resembled a flipped distribution of
experienced ISIs (i.e it resembled the flipped probability distribution f(t)). These RPEs
were clearly at odd with the results encountered in (Fiorillo et al., 2008). Data from that
study suggested that the activation of neurons at reward delivery were greater on trials
with shorter ISIs (see Figure 2.1b, middle). Also, unlike the pattern of constant negative
RPEs across different ISIs produced by the simulations, data suggested that the tonic
firing rate tended to gradually decline as the variable interval elapsed (compare the red
line in Figure 2.4a and, the black line in Figure 2.1b, right).
Noteworthy was the temporal evolution of the value function (see the blue line in
Figure 2.4, left). The value exponentially increased from the time of the CS presentation to
the first time of possible reward delivery. After the time step tminr (corresponding to an ISI
of 1 s) the value started to decline and became equal to 0 at time step tmaxr (corresponding
to the maximum ISI, i.e 3 s). The value function can be calculated analytically for the TD
model with CSC and it can be proved to decreased in a way that is roughly proportional to
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Figure 2.4: TD model without reset and with CSC. (a) TD whitout reset and with
CSC produced a pattern of negative de RPEs (red line) within the possible reward window
(marked by the dashed gray lines) that resembled a flipped probability distribution. The
simulated value function (blue line) decreased as the ISI duration increased and coincided
with its analytic expected value represented by green dashed line. (b) The RPEs at
reward delivery were roughly independent from the ISI duration.
the increase of the cumulative distribution function F (t) =
∑t−1
i=0 f(i) (see Appendix A).
This temporal evolution reflected the definition of the value function, that represented
the expected discounted sum of future rewards and that decreased as time elapsed during
the possible reward window. However the value temporal evolution obtained from the
TD model without reset was clearly at odd with the intuitive idea of reward expectation.
Given that the reward has not occurred yet, its expectation should indeed increase during
the possible reward interval, becoming bigger and bigger for longer ISIs.
Introducing the SH representation in the TD model without reset did not help to fix
these problems (see Figure 2.5). Independently from the precision of the representation
the value function converged roughly to the same temporal profile encountered with the
CSC, and thus the TD model without reset and with the SH representation produced
similar mismatches between simulations and data.
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Figure 2.5: TD model without reset and with SH representation. Same that in
Figure 2.4 but using two differently precise SH representations in the TD model without
reset. (a,b) For a highly precise representation (k = 80) the results were almost identi-
cal to those obtained with the CSC. (c,d) Although the precision of the representation
considerably decreased (k = 10) the TD model showed similar asymptotic behaviour.
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2.3.2 Results: TD model with reset
The introduction of the reset mechanism rectified key inconsistencies between the data
reported in (Fiorillo et al., 2008) and the simple CSC TD model. The RPEs at reward
delivery showed a clear tendency to decrease for long ISIs, behaving similarly to the
response of neurons (compare Figure 2.6b with the middle panel in Figure 2.1b). The
pattern of RPEs across different ISIs (red line in Figure 2.6a) showed only a slight negative
modulation during the possible reward window, unlike the clear decreasing profile with
elapsed time in Figure 2.1b (black line on the left).
Importantly, unlike the TD model without reset, the the temporal profile of the value
function (blue line in Figure 2.6a) was clearly consistent with the idea of reward ex-
pectation: the value increased as the time elapsed during the possible reward window,
resembling the fact that the reward became more and more expected given that it has not
occurred yet. The profile of the value function can be calculated analytically for the TD
model with reset. This analytic profile coincided with the simulated value function of the
TD model with CSC, and in each time step converged to the expected discounted sum of
future rewards conditioned to the fact that the reward has not occurred previously (see
Appendix A). Assuming a perfect internal clock (as implicit in the CSC), at the end of
the possible reward windows the occurrence of the reward became fully predicted and the
value function approached to one.
Using the SH representation to track the passage of time, for the same variable ISI
(between 1 s and 3 s), the results crucially depended on the precision of the representation
(determined by the parameter k). The value function deviated from its analytic profile
during the possible reward window (Figure 2.7a,c,e). The time step in which the deviation
began and the magnitude of the deviation depended on the precision of the representation.
When the accuracy was very low (k = 10) the deviation was remarkable even for ISI
of medium duration. The RPEs at reward delivery decrease with the ISI for a high
precise representation (Figure 2.7b) but exhibited an opposite trend when the precision
sharply decreases (Figure 2.7f). For a representation of average precision the decreasing
trend of the RPEs was reversed for very long ISIs (Figure 2.7d; note the similarity with
the pattern of responses reported in (Fiorillo et al., 2008)). To summarize: the results
with the SH representation matched those obtained with the CSC at different levels
of accuracy (that depended on the parametr k). The value function tracked its analytic
profile that corresponds to reward expectation conditioned to the fact that the reward has
not occurred. However the TD model, due to the imperfect timing mechanism associated
with the SH representation, was unable to produce a perfect tracking of the analytic value
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Figure 2.6: TD model with reset and CSC for ISI between 1 s and 3 s. (a)
TD whit the additional reset mechanism and with CSC produced a value function (blue
line) that increased with the ISI duration, consistently with the intuitive idea of reward
expectation. The analytic expected value (green dashed line) again coincided with the
simulated value function when the temporal representation was the CSC. (b) The RPEs
at reward delivery decreased with the ISI duration.
profile for long ISIs. As time elapsed during the possible reward window, its tracking
cease to be sufficiently accurate. As a consequence the momentary expectation of reward
decreased, producing large RPEs at reward delivery for long ISIs (this effect is particularly
evident for the SH representation with k = 10 and k = 40, depicted in Figure 2.7d,f).
I simulated the TD model with reset for different durations of the pre-reward pe-
riod and for different durations of the possible simulation window. The ISIs duration
were chosen to allow a comparison with current available data. Although the major-
ity of the studies described in section 2.1 analysed the response of dopamine neurons to
events which timing was variable different from primary rewards, in Appendix A I show
that, concerning to the dependence on temporal expectation, the TD model with reset
would produce similar results independently on the nature of the resetting event. The
algorithmic equivalence reported in Appendix A justifies the approach employed in what
follows.
The TD model with reset and with CSC produced similar results independently from
the temporal parameters that determined the ISI duration (i.e the pre-reward and possible
reward window duration). The value function always tracked its analytic profile and the
RPEs after reward occurrence decreased for long ISIs.
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The model simulated with the SH functions of high precision closely resembled the
value profile and the RPEs obtained with the CSC when the pre-reward period was short
(Figure 2.9a-d). However for an ISI variable between 5 s and 7 s the accuracy in repro-
ducing the analytic value profile dropped toward the end of the possible reward window
(Figure 2.9e) and the RPEs at reward delivery increased for very long ISIs (Figure 2.9f).
A very low precise SH representation (see Figure 2.11) for all the simulated ISI produced
a pattern of RPEs that increased for long ISIs. More interesting was the situation when
an average precise SH representation was incorporated in the TD model. For a short
pre-reward period the tracking of time was quite accurate and the reward expectation
increased during the possible reward window suppressing the RPEs at reward occurrence
for long ISIs (see Figure 2.10b). This result was in agreement with the data reported
in (Pasquereau and Turner, 2015). As far as the pre-reward period increased the RPEs
toward the end of the possible reward window became more pronounced because of the
dropping in the timing accuracy (Figure 2.10f). Note in particular that for a temporal
variability similar to the one analysed in (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010) the average pre-
cise SH representation produced a pronounced RPE at the end of the possible reward
window that resemble the response of the dopamine neurons (compare Figure 2.2b with
Figure 2.10d).
To summarize: the results obtained with the TD model and reset were consistent with
the idea that when the reward could have been delivered but failed to occur its expectation
increased. The perfect clock imposed by the CSC produced results exactly in line with this
idea of increasing temporal expectation. For the SH representation the results crucially
depended on the precision of the timing mechanism (determined by the parameter k),
and on the properties of the interval to be timed (namely the pre-reward period and
the possible reward window duration). The simulation showed that the TD model with
reset and with an average precise SH representation produced RPEs compatible with the
responses of dopamine neuron as reported in available data.
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Figure 2.7: TD model with reset and with SH representation for ISI between 1
s and 3 s. (a,b) For a highly precise SH representation (k = 80) the results were quite
similar to those obtained with the CSC. The simulated value function (see the a panel)
departed from the analytic expected value for long ISIs, and this produced large negative
modulation of the RPEs (red line) toward the end of the possible reward window. As in
the simulation with CSC the RPEs at reward delivery (depicted in b) decreased for longer
ISIs. (c,d) The TD with a less accurate temporal representation (k = 40) produced a
value function that mismatched its analytic expected value for a longer period toward
the end of the possible reward windows. This effect was responsible for the a slight
increase of the RPEs when the reward occurred at the end of the possible reward window
(see the last bin of the histogram in d). (e,f) When the precision of the representation
further decreased (k = 10) the results of the simulations considerably deviated from those
obtained with the CSC. Note in particular that the RPEs increased for long ISIs as shown
in f.
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Figure 2.8: TD model with reset and with CSC for ISI of different duration.
Independently from the duration of the possible reward window and from the value of the
shortest ISI the CSC produced qualitatively similar results. The simulated value function
always matched its analytic expected value (see panels a,c,e) and the RPEs decreased for
longer ISIs (see panels b,d,f).
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Figure 2.9: TD model with reset and SH (k=80) for ISI of different duration.
(a) When the duration of the (variable) ISI was rather short (it varied between 0.5 s and
1.5 s) the highly precise SH representation (k = 80) approximated quite well the results
obtained with the CSC. (b) As a consequence the RPEs at reward decreased with the ISI
duration. (c) If the pre-reward period increased the value function (blue line) started to
separate from the analytic temporal profile toward the end of the possible reward window,
and the negative modulation of the RPEs became more pronounced (red line). (d) The
RPEs at reward delivery decreased with the ISI duration, although for very long ISIs
the RPEs at reward showed a tendency to increase (see the last bin of the histogram).
(e) Both the value function and the pattern of RPEs showed a tendency similar to that
of panel c, with long ISI worse represented. (f) The RPEs at reward delivery showed a
decreasing/increasing pattern similar to the one described in d.
52 Dopamine, temporal expectations, and TD models
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.5
1
Time from CS (s)
 
 
RPE
Value
Value fit
ISI between 0.5 s and 1.4 s
SH (k=40, c=0.2)
a b
0.5 1 1.5
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
ISI (s)
R
PE
 a
t r
ew
ar
d
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0
0.5
1
Time from CS (s)
 
 
RPE
Value
Value fit
ISI between 2.2 s and 3.4 s
c d
2 3
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
ISI (s)
R
PE
 a
t r
ew
ar
d
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
0.5
1
Time from CS (s)
 
 
RPE
Value
Value fit
ISI between 5 s and 7 s
e f
5 6 7
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
ISI (s)
R
PE
 a
t r
ew
ar
d
Figure 2.10: TD model with reset and SH (k=40) for ISI of different duration.
(a,b) For an averagely precise SH representation (k = 40) and short pre-reward period
results are similar to those obtained with the CSC (apart from a slight mismatching of
the value function toward the end of the possible reward window). (c,d) However when
the pre-reward period increased to 2.2 s the value function remarkably deviated from
the analytic profile (see the c panel), and the RPEs at reward considerably increased for
long ISIs (last bin of the histogram in panel d). (e,f) Results deviated more and more
from those obtained with the CSC and the RPEs at reward delivery started to show an
increasing tendency even for trials that lasted slightly more than the average (see the last
two bin of the histogram in panel f).
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Figure 2.11: TD model with reset and SH (k=10) for ISI of different duration.
(a) For a very inaccurate SH representation (k = 10) the results deviate from those
obtained with the CSC even for a very short pre-stimulus reward. (b) The RPEs showed
a decreasing/increasing tendency when the ISI varied between 0.5 s and 1.5 s. (c,e)
The value function deviated from its analytic profile before the beginning of the possible
reward window. This produced a slight negative modulation of the RPEs toward the end
of the pre-reward period (red line). (d,f) The very low accuracy of the SH representation
produces RPEs at reward delivery that increased with the ISI duration.
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2.4 Discussion
Timing is pivotal to guide optimal rewarding behaviour. The RPE signals conveyed by
midbrain dopamine neurons, which are thought to drive associative learning, have been
demonstrated to be strictly related with the temporal expectation of reward and reward-
related events. In particular, when the relative timing of reward-related events varied
according to some predefined probability distribution, the dopamine signal seemed to
reflect the probability of the event to occur given that it has not yet occurred.
Here I focused on the ability of a simple TD model to cope with current available
data, simulating experiments of acquisition in which rewards were delivered at variable
times according to some predefined probabilistic schedule. I analysed how the model
predictions depended on two factors: the way of representing time (namely the temporal
representation adopted by the model), and the presence of a reset mechanism that stopped
the interval counts after the arrival of the reward.
In absence of the reset the TD model, independently from the temporal representation,
gave rise to RPEs that were at odd with existent experimental findings (Fiorillo et al.,
2008). In particular, the simulated value function deviated from the intuitive idea of
reward expectation that would be expected to increase as time elapsed and the reward
failed to occur.
The TD model with reset and CSC could explain the data reported in (Fiorillo et al.,
2008). The results generated by the model were consistent with the fact that the expecta-
tion of reward increased as the reward failed to appear during the possible reward window,
and its occurrence became more and more predictable. In particular the RPEs at reward
delivery showed a decreasing trend for rewards delivered after long ISIs. This dependence
of the RPEs on the conditioned probability of the reward occurrence is consistent with a
previous study that analysed the responses of dopamine neurons in a somehow different
context (Nakahara et al., 2004). In that work the authors noted that the dopamine neu-
rons responses were related to history effects, and that the dopamine conveyed a prediction
error signal based on the trial-to-trial conditional probability of reward.
Returning on the prediction of the TD model with reset and CSC, the simulation
showed that, due to the implicit assumption of a perfect clock, the use of the CSC repre-
sentation produced RPEs that were independent on the duration of the pre-reward period
and of the possible reward window. Thus, the TD with reset and with CSC could explain
data reported in (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010).
The introduction of the SH generated results that depended on the temporal properties
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of the ISI distribution to be timed, and that were crucially affected by the precision of
the interval timing mechanism (encoded by the parameter k). Results were consistent
with the idea that, although the reward became more expected with the elapsing of time,
for long ISI the momentary expectation of reward decreased, due to the imprecise timing
mechanism. Specifically, for sufficiently long pre-reward periods the RPEs exhibited a
tendency to increase toward the end of the possible reward window. The exact profile of
the RPEs across different ISIs depended on the precision of the temporal representation.
The results of the simulations showed that a SH representation of average precision (k =
40) could cope with all the current data. Particularly noteworthy was the prediction of
a more pronounced RPEs for long ISIs when the temporal parameters of the simulation
were similar to the experimental condition reported in (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010).
The reset mechanism has been introduced in the TD machinery by (Suri and Schultz,
1998, 1999; Brown et al., 1999) to fix some mispredictions of the original model formula-
tion proposed in (Montague et al., 1996). In particular this original formulation produced
a spurious inhibition at the usual time of reward occurrence for rewards delivered early
than expected, a prediction inconsistent with the data reported in (Hollerman and Schultz,
1998). The reset mechanism has been criticized for being an ad hoc device of doubtful
generality, and for being not revealing about the computations carried out by dopamin-
ergic neurons (Daw et al., 2006). It has been instead suggested that dopaminergic RPEs
were shaped by state uncertainty. In this perspective time is nothing more than any other
state that cannot be observed directly (i.e a hidden state), and that the system needs to
infer in order to calculate reward predictions and reward prediction errors. Such a hidden
state approach is compelling because it proposes a normative solution to the problem of
keeping track of time in RL models, that can be achieved by performing TD learning
on the state posteriors (the belief state; see subsection 1.1.5). Additionally, it has been
further supported by a recent study in which reward delivery occurred only probabilisti-
cally (Starkweather et al., 2017). However it is interesting to note that the hidden state
approach provides, in limited circumstances, a justification to the reset mechanism. In
this scheme the occurrence of the reward (or of a reward-related event) induces indeed a
state transition and therefore the reset mechanism arises as a consequence of the inference
process.
In this thesis I will not tackle the problem of inference about time . This approach is
dictated by the fact that the central part of the thesis will focus on a model based anal-
ysis of the dopamine activity recorded while monkeys were engaged in complex decision
making task. In the context of decision making animals face the non-trivial problem of
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extracting information about ambiguous stimuli in order to perform rewarding choices. In
the formal theory this means that the the agent-environment interaction can be modelled
as a POMDP, in which the properties of the stimuli relevant to achieve future rewards
correspond to the state that needs to be inferred. I will therefore concentrate on this
second form of inference (because of its relevance in DM), keeping aside the problem of
inference about time. Nevertheless, a timing mechanism is unavoidable in RL models of
the dopamine system. Thus, guided from the preliminary analysis of this chapter, I will
thus assume in what follows a SH representation of average precision and the presence of
the reset mechanism. Integrating state and time inference in a formal theory of RL and
DM of the dopamine system is an intriguing problem that could be the object of future
research, but that remains beyond the scope of this thesis.
Chapter 3
The dopamine signal in tasks with
sensory and temporal uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
When an inexperienced animal hears a soft rustle in the nearby foliage it does not associate
this cue with the escaping prey that it observes immediately after. How does the animal
get to learn that that sound is a predictor of a possible catch and that the correct action
to take is to approach it and try to get it? In perceptual decision-making experiments,
animals learn how to make decisions based on their perception of weak sensory stimuli,
receiving a reward for their correct choices, which they are taught to communicate by
means of a specific motor action (Hanes and Schall, 1996; Shadlen and Newsome, 1996;
Romo et al., 1999; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Cook and Maunsell, 2002; de Lafuente
and Romo, 2005; Herna´ndez et al., 2010). The learning of these tasks is presumably
mediated by the activity of midbrain dopamine (DA) neurons (Schultz, 1998). Although
DA recordings made while animals are engaged in making such difficult decisions are
scarce, experiments on Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning have shown that under a
novel stimulus-reward association, DA neurons respond to the unexpected reward with an
activity burst. Remarkably, after training this phasic response is shifted to the conditioned
stimulus where it works as a signal predicting the future reward (Romo and Schultz,
1990; Ljungberg et al., 1992; Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1994; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998;
Schultz, 1998). From a computational standpoint, reinforcement learning (RL) methods
(Sutton and Barto, 1998) have been successfully applied to explain this and many other
observations (Schultz et al., 1997; and for reviews see: Niv, 2009; Maia, 2009; Ludvig
et al., 2011). According to the reward prediction error hypothesis (RPE) (Barto, 1995;
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Montague et al., 1996), the DA phasic activity signals an error in the prediction of the
expected total reward (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Steinberg et al., 2013; Chang et al.,
2016) and it is used to learn associations between rewards and task events.
In classical and instrumental conditioning the reward acts as a reinforcer strengthening
the association with the stimulus, provided the animal follows the task instructions. In
some experiments the reward was delivered only after the animal made a choice between
alternative options(Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005).
However, in those studies the task events were unambiguous: the perceptual reports were
always correct and there was a well-defined temporal relationship between the perceived
stimulus and reward delivery. But, this is very different from the real world situation
described above in which the reward is announced by a muted sound produced in a noisy
environment at an unexpected time. Consequently, little is known about the DA signal in
such uncertain conditions and up to now few experiments have attempted to fill this gap.
The existing studies seem to indicate that the DA signal has a much richer structure than
in simple choice paradigms. For example, Nomoto et al., 2010 found that the response
to visual dynamic random dot stimuli is more complex than the response to the stimuli
commonly used in previous studies. The DA activity seemed to follow a more elaborate
temporal profile, first responding abruptly to the onset of the stimulus (presumably due
to its detection) and then producing a more extended response (supposedly due to the
decision-making process, Nomoto et al., 2010; see also Schultz, 2015). In another recent
study, de de Lafuente and Romo, 2011 recorded DA neurons while a monkey was engaged
in the detection of weak vibrotactile stimuli. In this task, when the animal was instructed
to communicate its choice by pushing one of two push buttons, these neurons coded the
uncertainty associated with a perceptual judgement about the presence or absence of the
stimulus.
Here, we combined data analysis and computational modeling to investigate the DA
signal recorded as monkeys detected weak vibrotactile stimuli applied at random times
(Figure 3.1a and Methods). In this task (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006), a start cue
indicated the beginning of a trial and was followed by an interval of variable duration
after which, with probability 0.5, the vibrotactile stimulus was applied. After a fixed
interval, a go cue instructed the monkey to communicate its decision about the presence
or absence of the stimulus by pushing one of two buttons. The animal was rewarded in
all correct trials. The difficulty of the task stems from the use of very weak stimulus
amplitudes and from the uncertainty about the time of possible stimulation. It has been
proven that because of these uncertainties, the firing activity of frontal lobe cortex neurons
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codes internal processes associated with the elaboration of the decision reports in this task
(Carnevale et al., 2012, 2013, 2015). A key result in the midbrain DA system was that the
neurons’ response to the go cue is weaker in trials with stimulus-present choices (hit and
false alarm trials) than in trials with stimulus-absent choices (correct rejection and miss
trials) (de Lafuente and Romo, 2011). This was attributed to the higher certainty that
the animal has on its decision in ”yes” response trials. The result is important because it
indicates that the DA phasic response reflects internal processes; however, several issues
have been left unanswered. For instance, the nature of those processes was attributed to
decision certainty on the basis of a comparison of the probabilities of reward in stimulus-
present versus stimulus-absent trials, which resulted higher in the former case. However,
in the task the animal made a choice and received a reward only after the delivery of the go
cue. It is then not clear whether the DA phasic response to that signal was related to the
choice itself or to some other process that occurred during the formation of the decision.
Besides, whatever the nature of the process, it should be explained why it became visible
in the DA activity under the application of the go cue. Finally, the response to this event
was different in each of the four trial types and the reason of this graduation in the DA
activity is not known.
Apart from stimulus uncertainty the detection task also has temporal uncertainty.
The effect of the trial-to-trial variability in the trial duration on the DA activity was not
considered in the previous work. However, it is known to have important consequences
over prefrontal neurons (Carnevale et al., 2012, 2015) and it is reasonable to believe
that it will also affect the midbrain DA system. In fact, effects of temporal variability
on DA neurons have been reported several times in tasks without stimulus uncertainty
(Fiorillo et al., 2008; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Pasquereau and Turner, 2015) or with
it (Nomoto et al., 2010). To investigate these issues we have taken a different approach,
proposing a model based on the RL framework and using it to understand the activity
of DA neurons. Because of the two kinds of uncertainty, on the stimulus amplitude and
trial duration, the model estimates the total reward and reward prediction errors using
belief states (Dayan and Daw, 2008; Rao, 2010; Bogacz and Larsen, 2011).
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3.2 Results
3.2.1 Temporal profile of the DA response
Behavior can be described in terms of the four possible trial types of the vibrotactile
detection task. Stimulus-present trials can be correct (hits) or wrong (misses) responses,
while stimulus-absent trials produce correct rejection (CR) or false alarm (FA) responses.
Reward is delivered only in trials with correct responses. Since we want to discuss the
data in the framework of RL we kept only those neurons compatible with RL ideas; all
the electrophysiological results presented in this work have been obtained from midbrain
DA neurons responding to reward delivery with a positive phasic activation in correct
(rewarded) trials and with a pause in error (unrewarded) trials. These are 23 out of the
69 neurons analyzed in de Lafuente and Romo, 2011 (see Figure B.1 and Methods about
the selection criteria). Figure 3.1b shows the average firing rate of the population of
the selected DA neurons during the vibrotactile detection task. This temporal profile is
similar to that of the firing rate of the larger population of midbrain DA neurons analyzed
before (de Lafuente and Romo, 2011). However, there seems to be an important difference
between the two datasets: in Figure 3.1b, the DA activity immediately before the go cue
exhibits a pronounced decay in all trial types. Instead, the firing rate of the discarded
neurons does not show this modulation (Figure B.2).
3.2.2 Transient DA activity in the period of possible stimulation
If the DA response to the go cue codes some type of certainty we wondered how the
activity of the DA midbrain neurons might have acquired this property. We reasoned that
a detection process and the certainty about detected events could have been elaborated
in cortical circuits and then transmitted to midbrain neurons producing transient changes
in their activity. We have then investigated the existence of transient activation of the
DA neurons during the possible stimulation window (Figure 3.1a; the interval between
1,5 s and 3,5 s after the key down event).
It has been suggested that the initial response of DA neurons to external stimuli reflects
their physical salience (Schultz, 2015). In fact, Figure 3.1b shows that in hit trials the
vibrotactile stimulus generates a clear transient response with a linear dependence of the
neurons’ firing rate at the stimulus onset as function of the stimulus amplitude Figure 3.1c.
This effect had been observed for the larger dataset (de Lafuente and Romo, 2011) but
here we show that it is also present for neurons compatible with the RL framework.
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Figure 3.1: Detection task and temporal profile of the DA neurons activity.
(a) Trials began with a start cue instruction, i.e when the stimulator probe indented
the skin of one fingertip of the restrained hand. The monkey reacted by placing its free
hand on an immovable key (key down event). In stimulus- present trials, after a variable
pre-stimulus period (1.5-3.5 s), a vibratory 0.5 s stimulus was presented. Then, after a
fixed delay period (3 s), the go cue (stimulator probe tip lifted off from the skin) was
delivered and the monkey communicated its decision by pressing one of the two buttons
(push button event). The reward was delivered immediately after the push button event
in correct choice trials. Stimulus-absent trials had the same temporal structure with the
only difference that the vibrotactile stimulus was not presented. (b) Mean population
firing rate (black line, ± SEM colored bands) plotted as a function of time for the four
trial types. Activity is aligned to the start cue (left), go cue (center) and reward delivery
(right). The dotted line indicates the baseline activity (5.1 spikes per second). Before
the go cue the activity exhibited a pronounced decay with respect to the baseline in all
trial types. (c) Responses of DA neurons at the stimulus onset (SO) in yes-decision trials
sorted by stimulus amplitude. Data showed a positive linear increase of the response with
the amplitude of the stimulus (R2 = 0.98, P < 0.001) (See Methods for more details on
data analysis).
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Figure 3.1b suggests that the vibrotactile stimulus generates a phasic response in the
DA neurons only in hit trials (de Lafuente and Romo, 2011). However there are reasons to
believe that the apparent unresponsiveness of DA neurons in FA and miss trials requires
a more detailed analysis. For example, in FA trials the animal indicated the presence of
a stimulus and this perception could somehow be reflected in the activity of DA neurons.
Also, since the majority of miss trials occur for low amplitude stimuli, the existence of
a transient response to high amplitude stimuli might be hidden in the mean over all
miss trials (neurons in cortical areas are activated by the stimulus even in miss trials,
de Lafuente and Romo, 2005). Hence, one should not discard that in high amplitude
miss trials the information about the presence of a stimulus is transmitted to midbrain
neurons. We have then investigated whether there are transient DA responses in high
amplitude miss trials and FA trials.
In miss trials the onset of the stimulus seems not to produce any evident modulation
of the firing rate (Figure 3.1b); it could then be argued that in these trials the stimulus
was not detected by cortical frontal neurons. Indeed, most miss trials occur when the
stimulus amplitude is weak and the firing rate of DA neurons is not modulated by its
application (green trace in the left panel of Figure 3.2a). However, when high amplitude
miss trials are analyzed, we see that the firing rate of the cells did increase at stimulus
onset (blue trace in the left panel of Figure 3.2a).
In FA trials, although the subject reported the presence of a stimulus, the firing rate in
Figure 3.1b does not show any apparent modulation. Thus, it is not clear how a stimulus-
present choice was elaborated during the trial. A recent work about frontal lobe cortex
neurons recorded while monkeys performed the same detection task (Carnevale et al.,
2015) sheds light on this issue. In FA trials, those cortical neurons underwent transient
activity increases resembling the response to a weak true stimulus. These transient FA
events occurred at random times within the possible stimulation window; that is, inside
the 2 s-interval starting 1.5 s immediately after the key down event (Figure 3.1a). We
have then assumed that these events are transmitted to DA neurons in a way similar as
true stimuli are. If this assumption were correct, then the mean firing rate of DA neurons
in FA trials, computed during the possible stimulation period, should be slightly higher
than the mean firing rate in CR trials evaluated during the same period. To test this
hypothesis, we aligned all FA trials to the key down event and compared their mean firing
rate in the possible stimulation window with the mean firing rate of CR trials computed
in the same temporal window. The results indicate that the mean firing rate in FA trials
is significantly higher than in CR trials (left panel of Figure 3.2b). This seems to be an
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Figure 3.2: Signatures of detection in FA trials and high amplitude miss trials.
(a) In high amplitude miss trials DA neurons responded transiently to the vibrotactile
stimulus (left). The activity of neurons after the stimulus onset (SO), standardized with
respect to a pre-stimulus window (see Methods), showed a significant phasic activation
(P < 0.05, two sample t test) in high amplitude miss trials compared to low amplitude
ones (right). (b) The mean activity in FA trials (see Methods) exhibited a significant
positive modulation with respect to CR trials during the possible stimulation window
(PSW) (P < 0.05, two sample one-tailed t test) but not outside it (P = 0.80, two
sample one-tailed t test) (left). On the contrary the activity in low amplitude miss trials
was indistinguishable from correct rejection ones both outside (P = 0.28) and within
(P = 0.11) the PSW (right).
exclusive property of this particular temporal interval: the mean firing rates in FA and
CR trials computed outside the possible stimulation window are rather similar (left panel
of Figure 3.2b). As a further test that the elevation of the firing rate during the possible
stimulation period is specific to FA trials, we did a similar analysis with low-amplitude
miss trials aligned to the key down event (Figure 3.1a). In contrast to what happened with
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FA trials, the mean firing rate in low amplitude miss trials was not significantly different
from that of CR trials neither within the possible stimulation window nor outside the
possible stimulation window (right panel of Figure 3.2a).
The transient events discussed above are presumably related to detection processes
taking place prior to their reception by midbrain neuron and much before the animal
reports its choice. We interpret them as contributing to the certainty about the de-
tection of transient activity fluctuations in circuits presynaptic to the midbrain DA
system, distinguishing it from certainty about the choice, a term which should be
used after the animal indicates its decision (Pouget et al., 2016). A precise definition of
certainty about the presence of the stimulus will be given later, in the context of our RL
model; however we can give a qualitative argument explaining why the transient events
contribute to this certainty. Regardless of whether the transient activation was produced
by a true stimulus (as in hit and high amplitude miss trials) or by some internal process
(as in FA trials), the transient event works as a subjective confirmation that a stimu-
lus was detected and hence it increases the certainty about its presence. The degree to
which the transient event contributes to the certainty would depend on its strength. For
instance, transient events generated in FA trials have a similar effect on DA neurons as
those produced by true low amplitude stimuli (see Figure B.4) and they could convey a
similar level of certainty about their detection.
3.2.3 Salience of the go cue and effects of temporal uncertainty
To obtain further insight about how the response to the go cue acquired a dependence
on the certainty about the presence of a vibrotactile stimulus we investigated the effect
of the stimulus amplitude on this task event. First, we notice the DA response to the
go cue decreases linearly with the amplitude of the stimulus (left panel in Figure 3.3);
this is similar to the results found previously for the larger dataset (de Lafuente and
Romo, 2011). For the moment we do not make any interpretation about this result,
preferring to discuss it in the context of the model presented below. Instead, we now
wonder whether the response to the reward delivery also exhibits a dependence on the
stimulus amplitude. The analysis shows that the dependence disappears (right panel in
Figure 3.3). Our interpretation of this observation is that the go cue acts as a physically
salient signal erasing from the DA activation (at least partially) the dependence on the
properties of previous task events. In fact, the responsiveness of DA neurons to the
physical salience of stimuli has been discussed frequently (see, e.g., Schultz, 2015).
The effects of the trial-to-trial variability in the duration of the interval immediately
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Figure 3.3: Responses to the go cue and to the reward delivery. In stimulus
present decision the DA response at the go signal linearly decreased with the amplitude
of the stimulus (left). The dependence on the amplitude completely disappeared in DA
activity at the reward delivery (R2 = 0.58, P = 0.02 for the linear regression at the go
cue; R2 = 0.02, P = 0.72 for the linear regression at the reward delivery). For details
about the standardized responses to the go cue and to the reward delivery see Methods.
before the go cue are visible in the phasic DA responses to that event. The data analysis
shows that, in both CR (Figure 3.4a, left) and low amplitude miss trials (Figure 3.4a,
right), the longest the key down-go cue interval, the stronger is the DA phasic activation.
This is opposite to what was found in some other studies (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Nomoto
et al., 2010) but agrees with (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). We will come back to this
issue later, when we will explain this result with our RL model. In contrast, the response
to the delivery of reward is the same for long-duration and short-duration trials, both in
CR and low amplitude miss trials (Figure 3.4b).
The variability of the duration of the trials also produces a modulation of the DA
activity during the period previous to the go cue (Figure 3.1b). To analyze this effect,
we have aligned CR trials at the key down event. The resulting firing rate has a nega-
tive modulation starting at about the predicted time (Figure 3.4c, top). We then asked
whether low amplitude miss trials, when aligned to the key down event, showed a tem-
poral profile similar to CR trials. Indeed, in low amplitude miss trials, the DA phasic
response to the stimulus was not present (Figure 3.2a), and the mean firing rates inside
and outside the possible stimulation window are not significantly different (right panel of
Figure 3.2b).
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Figure 3.4: Temporal Expectation. (a) Trial duration modulated the phasic DA re-
sponse to the go cue but did not affect its response after the reward delivery. Left: When
CR trials were sorted according to the duration of the key down event-go cue interval
the DA response to the go signal resulted stronger for long duration trials (right). Right:
the same effect is observed for miss trials of low amplitude. The gray lines indicate the
go cue. (b) The response of neurons to the reward delivery was independent of the trial
duration. Left: CR trials. Right: miss trials of low amplitude. The gray lines indicate the
push button event (PB). (c) In the four trial types before the go cue the DA firing rate
showed a slow negative modulation (Figure 3.3a). Top: The mean population activity
of DA neurons in CR trials aligned to the key down event (KD). The activity started
to decrease around the first time when the go cue could appear (gray short line on the
right). This negative deviation from the baseline increases as the time elapses and the
go instruction becomes more and more expected. Middle: the same effect is observed in
low amplitude miss trials. Given the lack of response to the stimulus presentation in this
fraction of miss trials, the DA activity anticipated the go cue presentation similarly to
what was observed in CR trials. Bottom: FA trials exhibited a similar temporal behavior.
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Clearly, their alignments to the key down event are also comparable; starting about 2 s
immediately before the go cue, the dopamine signal exhibits a tonic negative modulation,
as the one quantified in CR trials (Figure 3.4c, middle). The same effect is seen for FA
trials (Figure 3.4c, bottom).
3.2.4 The reinforcement learning model: formulation
It has been suggested that when the brain does not have full access to the correct value of
the physical attributes of the stimuli, the cerebral cortex uses noisy observations to infer
them (Knill and Richards, 1996; Rao et al., 2002), and that the midbrain DA neurons and
striatal neuronal circuits evaluate the state of the environment to select the appropriate
actions based on the results of that inference (Dayan and Daw, 2008; Rao, 2010; Bogacz
and Larsen, 2011). In this scheme, the outcome of the inference process is a posterior
probability about the state of the environment, which is interpreted as a measure of the
belief about that state (Kaelbling et al., 1998). In line with these ideas, we have assumed
that a Bayesian module (representing cortical circuits) accumulates sensory evidence to
compute a time-dependent posterior probability about the presence of the vibrotactile
stimulus (hereafter referred to simply as the belief and denoted as bsp(t)). The belief is
then sent to a RL module, representing midbrain DA neurons and striatal neuronal circuits
(Figure 3.5a). This is a valuation and action selection module that makes predictions
about the future reward, computes the error of this prediction (the RPE) and chooses
whether to press one button indicating a stimulus-present choice or another button press
indicating the stimulus-absence choice.
A crucial question is: When and how does the outcome of the accumulation process
(the belief state) affect the reward prediction and action selection operations? In the
analysis of the experimental data we found that DA neurons are activated transiently in
hit trials and in high amplitude miss trials by the vibrotactile stimulus and also in FA trials
during the window of possible stimulation by a stimulus-independent process. A simple
and plausible assumption is that the events responsible for those activations are related
to a belief evaluated by cortical circuits that exceeded a threshold value (the maximum a
posteriori -MAP- criterion sets the threshold at 0.5). Specifically, in the model we assume
that when the belief computed by the Bayesian module grows beyond that threshold it is
sent to the relevant downstream structures. When this happens a representation of the
stimulus is turned on in the RL module and it is used to establish associations between the
reward and the stimulus. To accomplish this function, the RL module operates following
RL rules based on belief states with two other important additions, inspired from the
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Figure 3.5: Model architecture and temporal representation of task events.. (a)
The model relied on two structures: a Bayesian module and a reinforcement learning
module. The Bayesian module used the noisy observations received from the environment
to compute a time-dependent posterior probability (the belief) about the presence of
external events and sent it to a RL module. The RL module consisted in an actor-critic
architecture (Sutton and Barto, 1998). It used the information inferred by the Bayesian
module to evaluate and to select actions (see Methods for more details on the model). (b)
Each task event was represented across time via a set of functions reproducing the event
at different latencies from its onset. Importantly, the resolution of the representation
degraded with the passage of time (Shankar and Howard, 2012).
previous data analysis. First, on the basis of the physical salience of the go cue observed
in the data (Figure 3.3), we introduce in the RL module a reset mechanism that allows
events predicting a high reward to disrupt the internal representations of earlier events
(Suri and Schultz, 1999). This mechanism does not introduce any parameter in the model;
see Methods).
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Second, given the effects of the variable duration of the trials found with the data
analysis (Figure 3.1b and Figure 3.4), each task event is represented with a temporal res-
olution that degrades with the passage of time (Shankar and Howard, 2012) (Figure 3.5b).
To update the value of states and actions the RL module computes the error made in the
prediction of the reward as δ(t) = r(t) + TD(t), where r(t) is the reward received at time
t in a trial and TD(t) is the temporal difference between the total rewards predicted at
times t+ 1 and t (Sutton and Barto, 1998; see Methods for further details on the model).
According to the RPE hypothesis, δ(t) should be compared with the population average
of the mean firing rate of the DA neurons.
In the following we will use the model to show that these mechanisms, belief states,
transmission of detected events, salience and a temporal representation with limited reso-
lution, suffice to explain the DA response to the go signal. We start by verifying that the
salience of the go signal actually produces a RPE after the reward delivery independent of
the stimulus amplitude. Then we analyze the events transmitted from the Bayesian to the
RL module in hit trials, high amplitude miss trials and FA trials. After that, we present
the model explanation of how belief states produce a RPE at the go cue that depends
on the trial type, reproducing the graded response of the DA neurons to this task event.
The explanation of this observation is one of the main objectives of the proposed model.
Finally, we close the analysis of the model with a study of how temporal expectation
modulates the RPE and propose an explanation of the differences in various experimental
observations about the dependence on trial duration of phasic responses.
3.2.5 Reset of the go cue
Data show that although the DA phasic activation at the go cue depends on the stimulus
amplitude this dependence disappears in the response to the reward (Figure 3.3), suppos-
edly as a consequence of the physical salience of the cue signal. This property led us to
formulate a RL model in which the task events are endowed with a reset mechanism. We
now analyze in the model the effect of this mechanism on the dependence on the stimulus
amplitude of the RPE at the go cue. In agreement with the data (Figure 3.3), numerical
simulations of the model exhibit a decreasing linear dependence of the RPE at the go cue
with the stimulus amplitude (Figure 3.6a, left) whereas after the delivery of the reward
the analysis does not show a significant slope (Figure 3.6a, right).
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3.2.6 Transmitted events during the period of possible stimula-
tion
We start by verifying that the belief transmitted from the Bayesian to the RL module
produces transient changes in the RPE in correspondence to those observed in the DA
activity. In hit trials, after the application of the vibrotactile stimulus, the RPE increases
linearly with the stimulus amplitude (Figure 3.6b), as the DA response does (Figure 3.1c).
An immediate prediction of the model is that miss trials can arise in two possible
ways. The most frequent ones happen when the stimulus is too weak to be detected by
the Bayesian module. Less often, for stronger amplitudes, even if the stimulus is detected
(Figure 3.6c) the variability of the action selection process may generate a stimulus-absent
choice, an effect that in our simulation occurred in about 12% of all miss trials. In fact,
data show that in high amplitude miss trials the animal reported stimulus-absence, though
the firing rate of the cells did increase at stimulus onset (blue trace in the left panel of
Figure 3.2a). Similar mismatches between the cortical detection and action selection
outcomes are also present in CR and FA trials (table in Figure 3.6e).
In the RL model, the times when the belief exceeds its threshold value are known. FA
trials aligned to those times evidences a transient increase of the RPE signal δ(t) at the
time of the FA events (left panel of Figure 3.6d). Furthermore, those detection times are
distributed mainly during the possible stimulation window (right panel of Figure 3.6d).
Interestingly, the distribution is similar to the one found from the activity of prefrontal
neurons (Carnevale et al., 2015). Notice that in FA trials perception arises from detected
transient events in the cortical module followed by a ”yes” response.
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Figure 3.6: Basic properties of the RPE. (a) The RPE at the go cue depended on
the stimulus amplitude but this dependence was lost at the reward delivery. In stimulus-
present decisions the RPE at the go cue linearly decreased (R2 = 0.84, P < 0.001)
with the amplitude of the stimulus (left). The dependence on the amplitude completely
disappeared in the RPE at the reward delivery (R2 = 0.03, P = 0.64) as a consequence
of the reset property of the go signal (right). This has to be compared with the DA
activity in Figure 3.3. (b) Responses at the stimulus onset (SO) in yes-decision trials as
predicted by the model sorted by stimulus amplitude. The model showed a positive linear
increase of the response with the amplitude of the stimulus (R2 = 0.98, P < 0.001). See
Methods for more details on the model analysis). (c) The model predicted a response to
the stimulus as a consequence of a Bayesian detection in miss trials when the amplitude
is high. A similar response was apparent in the data Figure 3.2b. (d) The RPE in FA
trials after an erroneous detection showed a phasic response (left). In the model these
erroneous detection events were produced mainly within the PSW (right). KD denotes
the key down event. (e) Percentage of trials where a transient event was detected by the
Bayesian module, for each of the four task contingencies. Note how the occurrence of a
detected event in the Bayesian module did not by itself generate perception (miss trials).
The values of the model parameters are given in ?? in Methods.
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3.2.7 Certainty about the presence of the stimulus
We now turn to the main issue we want to address with the model: how a RL mod-
ule receiving uncertain information through a Bayesian inferring process can explain the
graded phasic response to the go cue. The computations carried out by the DA neurons
during the delay period are crucial to understand and interpret their responses to the go
cue. The immediate effect of a large stimulus belief on the RL module is to initiate the
evaluation of how much reward it predicts till the end of the trial; that is, the estimated
value of the stimulus. Figure 3.7a shows the reward predicted by the stimulus in trials
with stimulus-present choices. The predicted reward increases in a graded manner with
the stimulus amplitude. The graduation is maintained during all the delay period, until
the presentation of the go cue. Note that the transient events in FA trials predict a re-
ward similar to that estimated by low amplitude stimuli (red line in Figure 3.7a). The
predicted reward increases with time during the delay period, as a consequence of the
temporal discount.
The total predicted reward in trials with stimulus-absent choices lie below those esti-
mated in trials with stimulus-present choices (Figure 3.7b). This is because in the first
case the key down event is the only task event contributing to the prediction, in the sec-
ond case the detection of an event increases the belief about the presence of the stimulus
so that it can reach its threshold and generate an extra contribution. Another relevant
observation is that the predicted reward is slightly higher in miss than in CR trials. As we
noticed before, miss trials behave as CR trials, but only when low amplitude stimuli are
presented; for high amplitude stimuli, a detected event increases the belief which then is
transmitted from the cortical to the RL module producing a somewhat higher estimated
value.
When the go cue is applied its high physical salience partly erases the information
about the stimulus amplitude and the corresponding reward predictions collapse in ap-
proximately the same value (Figure 3.7a). Since the error of each of these predictions
at the time of the go cue, δ(t), is the difference between the reward predicted by this
event and the prediction at the time preceding it, the response to the go cue should be
higher in FA than in hit trials, a result which is verified by the data (compare the RPE
in Figure 3.7c with the response of DA neurons to the go cue in Figure 3.1b). A similar
argument explains why the response to the go cue in CR trials is slightly higher than in
miss trials (Figure 3.1b and Figure 3.7c); here the small difference comes from the higher
value of miss trials during the delay period (Figure 3.7b). Finally, since during the delay
period the predicted reward in trials with stimulus-absent choices is smaller than in trials
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Figure 3.7: Predicted reward during the delay period and responses to the go
cue and to the reward delivery. (a) In trials with stimulus-present choices during
the delay period the predicted reward increased with the stimulus amplitude in a graded
manner. In FA trials (red line) its temporal profile was similar to that observed when a
low amplitude stimulus is perceived. (b) The predicted reward during the delay period
resulted higher in trials where the bayesian module detected a stimulus. It was greater in
miss than in CR trials due to the detection of the stimulus when the amplitude was high.
At the go cue, because of the reset mechanism, the reward predictions in the four trial
types collapsed in approximately the same value and immediately after they separated
in two values corresponding to the possible decisions. (c) The RPEs at the go cue were
lower on stimulus-present decisions (hit and FA trials) than in stimulus-absent choices
(miss and CR trials). According to the model this graduation was determined by the
modulation of the reward prediction as described in a and b and by the reset mechanism.
with stimulus-present choices, the responses to the go cue are larger in the former case
than in the latter. The resulting model prediction for the response to the go cue in the
four trial types is summarized in Figure 3.7c.
The above arguments explaining the response to the go cue can be phrased in terms
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of how the subject’s certainty about a detected event evolves throughout the delay pe-
riod. This certainty can be defined as the probability of a correct detection. Since the
Bayesian module decides about the presence of a stimulus using the MAP criterion, the
probability of a correct cortical detection is either the posterior probability about the
stimulus-present state (i.e. the belief bsp(t)), if this posterior is above 0.5, or the posterior
about the stimulus-absent state (i.e. 1 − bsp(t)), if it is below 0.5. When the Bayesian
module transmits the belief to the RL module, we can then say that all the subsequent
computations done in this module are based on the certainty that the received informa-
tion is correct. In particular, the different responses to the go cue in hit and FA trials are
due to the difference in certainty of these two trial types. Also, the difference between
the responses in miss and CR trials comes from the higher level of certainty in a fraction
of miss trials. The smaller response to the go cue in stimulus-present choices than in
stimulus-absent choices can be attributed to the larger certainty of the animal when it
reports the stimulus presence.
The go cue predicts the total future reward averaged over ”yes” and ”no” responses.
After its delivery, because of the reset mechanism, the RPE ceases to depend on the trial
type and starts coding the possible choices. This is seen in the response to the reward
both in the model and the data (Figure B.3). The smaller RPE in hit trials than in CR
ones is explained by a larger fraction of rewarded trials of the former type.
3.2.8 Temporal expectation
In the detection task used here, the time sequence of some events is not fixed and their
presentation cannot be predicted. Studies in cortical areas indicate that this produces
an expectation of the forthcoming events that is governed by the subjective hazard of
occurrence of the expected event (Janssen and Shadlen, 2005). This temporal expectation
might affect DA neurons by modulating their firing rate during the intervals between task
events (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Nomoto et al., 2010; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). In
our detection task this is particularly evident during the interval preceding the go cue,
where the firing rate in the four contingencies decreases with respect to its baseline value
(Figure 3.1b). Note, however, that the duration of this interval depends on the trial
type. While in stimulus-present trials the delay period has a fixed duration (3 s), in
stimulus-absent trials the interval between the key down event and the go cue varies from
trial to trial taking values between 5 and 7 s (Figure 3.1a). However, the fact that the
decay is also observed in hit trials with a fixed stimulus onset-go cue interval suggests
that there must be other factors responsible for the decrease of the firing rate. According
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to the model, the possible causes are: in some hit trials, particularly those with weak
stimulus amplitude, the event detected by the Bayesian module was not the stimulus
itself but a noisy fluctuation, similar to what happens in FA trials. In these trials, the
effective duration of the delay period depends on the time when the fluctuation occurs,
which lies within a 2 s temporal window (Carnevale et al., 2015). However, these are
only a small fraction of the total number of hit trials and this effect is expected to give
a small contribution. Even rarer are those weak amplitude trials in which the stimulus
was not detected, but variability in the selection of the action led to the correct response.
Finally, an imprecise estimate of the duration of the delay period could also lead to
an effective variability of this interval. This effect occurs in all trials and it could be
the most important explanation of the decaying tonic activity in hit trials. The coarse
resolution of the temporal representation of the task events that we introduced in the
model (see Figure 3.5b and Methods) allows us to test this conclusion. To analyze its
action on the RPE, we have aligned the simulated hit trials at the onset of the stimulus
and confirmed that the limited temporal resolution does generate a negative modulation
of the tonic activity that starts about half a second immediately before the go cue (cyan
line in Figure 3.8a).
The model also predicts a decreasing activity in all the other types of trials (Fig-
ure 3.8b). In CR trials both the coarse resolution of the temporal representation and the
variability in the duration of the interval between the key down event and the go cue
could contribute to this effect. Since this variability spans a 2 s-interval, the decay is
expected to start about 2 s immediately before the go cue. To check this in the model,
we aligned simulated CR trials at the key down event and averaged them by keeping each
trial only until the time when the go cue was presented. The resulting quantity exhibits
the expected decay (Figure 3.8b, middle). Since the precision of this timing is affected by
the limited resolution of the temporal representation, this signal starts decreasing slightly
sooner. The effect is weak, but it is apparent in the traces in Figure 3.8b.
According to the model, most FA trials (84%, see Figure 3.6e) arise from transient
events that occur at random times during the possible stimulation window (right panel
of Figure 3.6d). Since FA events behave as low amplitude true stimuli, they generate an
expectation of the go cue roughly 3.5 s immediately after their time occurrence. Therefore,
they produce a slow negative modulation in the RPE beginning approximately 5 s after
the key down event (because the first possible production time of FA events is around 1.5
s after the key down event), as shown in Figure 3.8b, top.
76 The dopamine signal in tasks with sensory and temporal uncertainty
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0
4
5
6
7
R
PE
Time from go cue (s)
a b
0 1.5 3.5 5
4
5
6
R
PE
Time from KD (s)
−.5 0 0.5
4
6
8
10
Time from go cue (s)
R
PE
 
 
Long duration
Short duration
c
0 .5 14
6
8
R
PE
Time from PB (s)
d
0 1.5 3.5 5
4
5
6
R
PE
Time from KD (s)
−.5 0 0.5
4
6
8
10
Time from go cue (s)
R
PE
 
 
Long duration
Short duration
0 .5 1
4
6
R
PE
Time from PB (s)
0 1.5 3.5 5
4
5
6
R
PE
Time from KD (s)
Figure 3.8: The RPE is modulated by temporal expectation only before the
go cue delivery. (a) In the four trial types before the go cue the RPE showed a slow
negative modulation similar to that observed in the data (Figure 3.1b). The decreasing
tonic activity was particularly evident in hit trials where it was generated by the finite
resolution of the temporal representation used in the model. (b) Top: The RPE in FA
trials aligned with the key down event (KD). Note the slight positive modulation inside
the possible stimulation window. Middle: The RPE aligned to KD for CR trials. In both
the data and the model the activity started to decrease around the first time when the go
cue could appear (gray short line on the right). This negative deviation from the baseline
seemed to code a form of negative RPE that became more pronounced as the time elapsed
and the expectation of the go instruction increased. Bottom: Same as in the top panel
but for low amplitude miss trials. Given the lack of response to the stimulus presentation
in this fraction of miss trials both the RPE and the DA activity anticipated the go cue
presentation similarly to what was observed in CR trials. (c) When CR trials were sorted
according to the duration of the key down event-go cue interval the RPE at the go cue
resulted stronger for long duration trials (top). The same effect is seen for miss trials of
low amplitude (bottom). The gray lines in a,b indicate the go cue. (d) The response of
neurons to the reward delivery was independent of the trial duration in CR trials (top)
and in miss trials of low amplitude (bottom). The gray lines in c,d indicate the push
button event (PB).
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Also, notice the slight elevation of the RPE during the window of possible stimula-
tion, as a consequence of the random production times of the FA events (as described in
Figure 3.6d). Similar effects are seen in the data (Figure 3.4c, bottom).
To complete the study of temporal expectation in the detection task, we now come
back to the analysis of the dependence on the duration of the trial of the phasic response
to the go cue. As we have already seen the largest DA firing activity occur for long
durations (Figure 3.4a). The same behavior is seen in the model simulations in both
CR (Figure 3.8c, top) and low amplitude miss trials (Figure 3.8c, bottom). It could be
argued that long trials should produce a response smaller than short ones because the
longer the interval, the higher the hazard for the occurrence of the go cue and the better
its prediction by the RL module (Fiorillo et al., 2008). However, the response to the
go cue is also affected by the finite resolution of the temporal representation. Longer
intervals are represented more coarsely than short intervals and the occurrence of the
go cue becomes more difficult to predict in these trials. Hence, for some value of the
temporal resolution, the response to the go cue becomes larger for long intervals than
for short intervals. Again in agreement with the data, where the DA phasic activation
at reward delivery does not depend on trial duration (Figure 3.4b), the RPE after that
event is the same for long-duration trials and short-duration trials. This result is shown
in Figure 3.8d top and Figure 3.8d bottom, for CR trials and low amplitude miss trials,
respectively.
Summarizing, during the variable interval in the task the RPE is modulated by the
hazard function for the occurrence of the go signal. The limited resolution in the estima-
tion of time intervals produces a similar modulation in hit trials. The hazard function,
together with the imprecise temporal estimation, determines the phasic response to the
go cue.
3.3 Discussion
Perceptual decisions under uncertain conditions cannot be based on the true state of the
environment. Rather, noisy observations have to be combined with an internal estimate of
the state, referred to as the belief state. This is the basic scheme followed in early proposals
about how to extend the RL framework to model the DA activity in decision-making tasks
(Dayan and Daw, 2008; Rao, 2010; Bogacz and Larsen, 2011). In this approach, the belief
state is used to predict rewards, to compute the error in the prediction and to select the
action that indicates the final choice. On the experimental side, de Lafuente and Romo,
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2011 studied a detection task in which in each trial the animal made a choice about the
presence or absence of a vibrotactile stimulus. Their main finding was that the response
of midbrain neurons to a go signal reflected an internal process that they termed decision
certainty, that is, the certainty the animal had on its choice. Here, to investigate this and
related issues further, we adopted a different approach that allowed us to identify the type
of certainty coded by the go signal and to elucidate the reasons why this certainty becomes
visible at that task event. To achieve this, we defined a RL model based on the belief
about the presence of the stimulus and three other features, suggested by our empirical
observations: the transmission of transient activity events from a Bayesian module to a
RL module; the salience of the task events and a temporal representation of those events
with limited resolution.
Although other authors have included belief states (Rao, 2010), reset mechanisms
(Suri and Schultz, 1999) and temporal finite resolution (Ludvig et al., 2008) separately in
RL models, the need to consider them together in tasks with uncertain reward-predicting
stimuli has not been noticed before. Transient increases in the firing rates of DA neurons
appear in hit trials, high amplitude miss trials at the onset of the stimulus and plausibly
in FA trials during a possible stimulation window. In the model, the strength of these
transient events conveys the belief (and certainty) about the presence of the vibrotactile
stimulus. This certainty remains hidden during the period preceding the go cue but
it becomes evident in the response to this signal, generating a graduation of the RPE
according to the trial type. This visibility is due to two robust properties of the model:
(i) transmitted transient events of higher strength predict a higher reward (Figure 3.7a);
(ii) due of the salience of the go signal the predicted reward after the delivery of the
go cue is roughly independent of the occurrence of a transient event and on its strength
(Figure 3.7a,b). As a consequence, the RPE is smallest for transient events of large
strength and is largest in the absence of those events. This means that the RPE is large
in CR trials, slightly smaller in miss trials and takes its smallest values in FA trials followed
by hit trials (Figure 3.7C), in agreement with the graded DA phasic response observed
in the data (Figure 3.1b). Our results help to clarify up to which point the DA response
to the vibrotactile stimulus correlates with its perception. The uncertainties about the
presence or absence of the vibrotactile stimulus and the time when it is applied cause
a trial type dependent activity in DA neurons during the possible stimulation window.
Part of this variability comes from a detection process occurring in a Bayesian module.
Detection of a true stimulus produces a transient response in a RL module and leads to
hit trials. Non-detected stimuli lead to miss trials. A perhaps less expected phenomenon
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is that in high amplitude miss trials, the stimulus is detected, but the variability of the
action selection process produces a stimulus-absent choice. In these trials, the model
predicts that the cortical detection of the stimulus activates the DA neurons, although
the animal’s report indicates that it did not perceive it. More interesting is the case
of FA trials. The average of the firing rate of DA neurons over these trials exhibits a
positive modulation throughout the interval of possible stimulation. A modulation is not
apparent in CR trials, although in both trial types the stimulus was not presented. The
explanation comes from a recent study on cortical premotor neurons (Carnevale et al.,
2015), that found that FA trials arose from transient activity events similar to those
evoked by low amplitude stimuli. Consistent with this finding, our study found that the
positive modulation observed in the DA activity might arise from transient cortical inputs
produced at random times within the period when the stimulus is expected. In conclusion,
perception is normally accompanied by a transient increase of the DA activity during the
possible stimulation window, except in high amplitude miss trials. In this case, although
the stimulus induced a response of the DA neurons the animal indicated that it did not
perceive it.
Interestingly, the DA activity during the period preceding the go cue codes temporal
expectation. The mean firing rate starts to deviate from its baseline value around the first
time when the go cue can appear. As time elapses, the deviation increases in magnitude
resembling a form of negative RPE strictly related with temporal expectation of the
forthcoming cue. In addition to this negative slow modulation, we found that also the DA
phasic activation at the go cue depends on the duration of the temporal interval preceding
it, resulting stronger for long intervals. While some previous results appear not to be in
contradiction with this pattern of phasic activation (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010), other
studies (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Nomoto et al., 2010) reported an opposite trend (stronger
response for short intervals). Here we propose an explanation of this discrepancy: the size
of the response to the go cue is determined by the hazard of occurrence of this event and
by the finite resolution in the estimation of the elapsed time, which is worse for long (as
in our work) than for short intervals (as, e.g, in Fiorillo et al., 2008). This explanation is
consistent with an argument made in a somewhat different investigation: in a contextual
instrumental task in which the hazard of occurrence of a rewarded cue increased with the
number of trials elapsed since its previous appearance, Nakahara et al., 2004 found that
during the early stage of learning, the response to this cue did not decrease with that
number. It was argued to be due to the large counting errors produced during that stage.
As in our detection task, the different responses after long or short intervals are due to
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the limited resolution in the estimation of time.
In our model, task events initiate an internal representation with coarse temporal
resolution. Recent works have provided direct evidence for a representation of time in
the striatum that is distributed over a set of neurons (Adler et al., 2012; Mello et al.,
2015). The specific set of functions adopted in our work (Shankar and Howard, 2012;
Tank and Hopfield, 1987) is a possible realization of these findings. Although there are
alternative temporal representations (Ludvig et al., 2008) and approaches (Daw et al.,
2006), our choice was dictated for the sake of simplicity and because there exist detailed
studies of this internal representation that makes its use attractive (Shankar and Howard,
2013; Shankar, 2015).
The main results of the model rely on robust features that depend little on the pre-
cise parameter values. Partly for this reason and also because of the difficulty of the
computation, we did not attempt to fit the model to the DA electrophysiological data.
Instead we preferred to identify the mechanisms that can explain how the DA activity is
modulated by the stimulus and temporal uncertainties present in the task. In addition,
some parameters have been set according to physiological constraints; this is the case
of the input noise, in the model it appears as Poisson spike trains with firing rates set
to values similar to those observed in prefrontal neurons. Hence, the events transmitted
to the RL module were not controlled by tuning the input noise. Other features of the
model did not required new parameters; for instance the reset induced by the salience of
the task events is based on the direct comparison between the reward predicted by the
current event and that predicted by the events preceding it, without including any specific
threshold parameter. The parameters associated with the limited resolution of the tem-
poral representation of the task events were set in such a way that the decay of the RPE
at the end of the interval preceding the go signal was similar to the decay observed in
the data. The same values of those parameters yield a dependence of the phasic response
to the go signal on the duration of the trial larger for the longest trial durations. The
discount factor, also relevant to describe this phenomenon, was fixed at γ = 0.98, which
is a standard value for this parameter.
Research about learning by reinforcement when reward predicting stimuli are uncer-
tain could be extended in several directions. Here we followed a normative approach; but
in reality learning occurs in networks of spiking neurons. Although there have been recent
promising advances in training this type of networks, the methods are based on supervised
learning (Abbott et al., 2016) instead of on reinforcement learning (but see Friedrich and
Lengyel, 2016; Friedrich et al., 2011; Vasilaki et al., 2009; Potjans et al., 2009). Assess-
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ing the generality of our conclusions would require consideration of other experimental
paradigms to guide the search for relevant features to be included in more complete RL
models. An intriguing case is the discrimination between two sequential stimuli, when
some physical property of one of them has to be kept in working memory before the
presentation of the second one. An example of this is the somatosensory discrimination
task thoroughly studied in several cortical areas (Romo et al., 1999; Herna´ndez et al.,
2010). This requires including memory in the model (Kaelbling et al., 1998; Todd et al.,
2009) and dealing with an uncertainty that does not reside in the stimuli themselves,
but in the comparison between the second stimulus and the memory of the first. In the
purely temporal domain, the study of tasks that compare two temporal patterns of pulse
stimuli (Rossi-Pool et al., 2016) would help to define the most convenient temporal rep-
resentations. A systematic study of these and other paradigms often used to investigate
decision making processes would contribute to understand how DA influences the learning
of associations between stimulus and reward under uncertain conditions.
The results obtained in the model and experimental data show that the RPE signal
codes also (i) the animal’s certainty about the presence of the stimulus; (ii) the temporal
expectation of reward predicting sensory cues; (iii) to some extent, also the perception
of uncertain stimulus. As it is proposed by the model, these processes take place in a
Bayesian (plausibly cortical) module, which are then sent to a RL module (plausibly the
midbrain DA system and the striatum). The results of the model and the experimental
data show that the activity of the DA neurons is not a mere reflection of the cortical
signals but rather that they are transformed into a new signal with a quite different
function. However, some expressions of the original inputs are still visible in the firing
rate of the DA neurons. These are, for example, the transient events that are related
to decision making processes; the certainty about the presence of these events originates
a hierarchy of responses to cues predicting reward; and the acquired knowledge about
the stochastic temporal structure of the trials produces a declining DA activity during
the intervals between task events. Whether these processes depend only on the inputs
to the DA neurons and the RL computations performed over them or if there is further
elaboration in the midbrain DA system is an open question.
3.4 Methods
Detection Task. Monkeys were trained to detect a vibrotactile stimulus of variable
amplitude applied to one of its fingertips (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005). Stimulus-present
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trials were randomly interleaved with an equal number of stimulus-absent trials. Stimuli
were delivered to the skin of the distal segment of one digit of the restrained hand,
via a computer-controlled stimulator (BME Systems; 2 mm round tip). Initial probe
indentation was 500 µm. Vibrotactile stimuli consisted of trains of 20 Hz mechanical
sinusoids with 9 different amplitudes between 2.3 and 34.6 µm. Crucially some of the
amplitudes were very weak and consequently difficult to detect. Animals were rewarded
with a drop of liquid for correct behavioral responses (correct detections in stimulus-
present trials and correct rejections in stimulus-absent trials) and received no reward
otherwise (miss trials and false alarm trials). Animals were handled in accordance with
standards of the National Institutes of Health and Society for Neuroscience. All protocols
were approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of the Instituto de
Fisiologa Celular.
Recordings. Data for this analysis were obtained from an earlier study (de Lafuente
and Romo, 2011). Recordings were obtained with quartz-coated platinum-tungsten micro-
electrodes (2 to 3 MΩ; Thomas Recording) inserted through a recording chamber located
over the central sulcus, parallel to the midline. Midbrain DA neurons were identified on
the basis of their characteristic regular and low tonic firing rates (1-10 spikes per second)
and by their long extracellular spike potential (2.4 ms ± 0.4 SD). Among the 69 neurons
analysed in the previous work we selected a group of 23 cells. The selected group of cells
corresponded to those neurons which response to the reward delivery did not violate rein-
forcement learning principles: they showed a positive phasic activation or lack of response
in correct trials (hit and correct rejection trials) while the activity paused or remained
at the baseline level when the reward is omitted (miss and false alarms trials). A similar
criterion has been adopted in many electrophysiological studies of midbrain dopamine
neurons (Morris et al., 2004; Roesch et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2016).
Data Analysis. For each neuron, we computed the firing rate as a function of time using
300 ms sliding windows displaced every 50 ms (Figure 3.1b). Responses to the stimulus
(in Figure 3.1c and in Figure 3.2a, right) were measured in a 500 ms window centered
350 ms after the stimulus onset and were standardized with respect to a pre-stimulation
window (of 500 ms centered 700 ms before the stimulus presentation). Responses to the go
instruction (Figure 3.3, left) were measured in a 250 ms window centered 170 ms after the
instruction and were standardized with respect to a precue window (of 250 ms centered
500 ms before the cue presentation). Responses to the reward delivery were measured
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in a 400 ms window centered 350 ms after the push button and were standardized with
respect to a precue window of 200 ms centered 200 ms before the push button (Figure 3.3,
right). The activity outside the possible stimulation window (PSW) was calculated in two
1 s windows before the start and after the end of the PSW (from 500 ms to 1.5 s after the
key down event and from 3.7 s to 4.7 s after that event). The mean activity during and
outside the PSW was standardized with respect to a 500 ms windows centered 1 s after
the key down event (Figure 3.2b).
Model. The model relies on two modules: a bayesian module and a reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) module. The first module uses observations to estimate a posterior probability
(belief) about the current state of the external world st. More specifically it calculates
the belief bsp(t) about the presence of the (ambiguous) vibrotactile stimulus:
bsp(t) = P (st = sp|X1:t) (3.1)
where X1:t is the entire history of observations up to time t. The stimulus is assumed to be
detected by the bayesian module when bsp(t) > 0.5 (i.e using the maximum a posteriori
-MAP- criterion). The latter module consists in a standard RL architecture known as
Actor/Critic (Barto, 1995). We consider a total of 6 events: the vibrotactile stimulus,
the start and go signals, the response movements of the animal (key down and the 2 push
buttons indicating yes/no responses).
The physical salience function of event i is represented by the i-th component of
the vector e(t). With the exception of the vibrotactile stimulus, the component ei(t)
takes value one at the onset of the event i and zero otherwise. The component ev(t)
corresponding to the vibrotactile stimulus is activated when the bayesian module detects
it. In this case we set ev(td) = bsp(td) (with td denoting to the time of the detection).
The onset of the salience function ei(t), at time t
i
on, activates a temporal representation
xi(t) of the event i. This is defined as a set of N functions Ti,m(t) (m = 1, . . . , N),
each representing the event (a pulse of one time step duration) around time τm after its
detection. We assume that the resolution of these functions decreases with τm and that
the times τm are distributed uniformly on a logarithmic time scale (from a minimum value
τmin = 0.1s to a maximum value τmax = 10s). This leads to a scale invariant representation
of the event i. An explicit mathematical realization is (Shankar and Howard, 2013):
Tim(t) ≡ Ti(t− tion, τm) =
1
|τm|C(k)
∫ ai(t)
di(t)
(
τ ′
τm
)k
e−k
τ ′
τm dτ ′ (3.2)
where C(k) = kk+1/k!, ai(t) = t
i
on − t, di(t) = tion + dt − t and dt is the duration of
the original pulse (alternatively Equation 3.2 could be expressed as a convolution of an
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alpha function with a pulse). The parameter k controls the smear in the representation
(the larger is k the more accurate is the representation). The temporal representation
xi(t) = {xi1(t), xi2(t), . . . xlN(t)} is taken equal to the functions in Equation 3.2 multiplied
by the physical salience function of the event i:
xi(t) = ei(t
i
on)Ti(t) (3.3)
The reward predicted by the event i is expressed as:
Pi(t) =
N∑
m=1
xim(t)wim (3.4)
The total predicted reward at time t, V (t), is given by:
V (t) =
∑
i
Pi(t) (3.5)
Following (Suri and Schultz, 1999), we suppose that the occurrence of an event i with
reward prediction higher than the total reward prediction at previous time disrupts earlier
events representations:
Pi(t
i
on) > V (t
i
on − 1)/γ =⇒ xj,m = 0, j 6= i (3.6)
The DA signal is assumed to be represented by the reward prediction error RPE.
However, DA neurons show an asymmetrical activity due to their low baseline firing rate.
This asymmetry is taken into account by introducing a rectification threshold ψ > 0 for
the RPE:
δ(t) =
r(t) + TD(t) if r(t) + TD(t) > −ψ−ψ otherwise (3.7)
where TD(t) = γV (t) − V (t − 1) and r(t) takes the value R if the reward occurs at
time t and 0 otherwise. The ratio between the value of ψ and the scalar reward value R
determined the degree of asymmetry in the error signal (the asymmetry increases if the
ratio decreases).
The weights wim in Equation 3.4 are adapted during learning as follow:
∆wim(t) =
η+c xim(t)δ(t) if δ(t) > 0η−c xim(t)δ(t) if δ(t) < 0 (3.8)
where η+c indicates the learning rate for acquisition and η
−
c is the learning rate in extinc-
tion.
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The input to the actor component is a vector trace e¯(t), which components e¯i are
defined as:
e¯i(t) = ei(t) + ρ e¯i(t− 1) (3.9)
where ρ < 1 is a decay parameter.
The actor selects an action aj only at the end of each trial, after the go cue. The
possible actions are pressing one of the two buttons corresponding to yes/no decisions
(the action of withholding movement is not allowed). The probability of choosing the
action aj for an input e¯(t) is given by a softmax distribution:
P (aj|e¯(t)) = e
∑
i νjie¯i/β
Z
(3.10)
where Z is the normalization constant and the parameter β governs the exploration/exploitation
trade-off: as β approaches 0, action selection approaches a winner-take-all mode while
larger values of β favour exploration.
The weights νji in Equation 3.10 are adapted only at the end of each trial when the
reward is expected. Pressing of one of the two buttons occurs 3 time steps ( i.e 0.3 s)
after the go cue. The reward is delivered 2 time steps after the movement. The weights
νlj are adapted with the following learning rule:
∆νij =

η+a
∑
t e¯i(tr)δ(t) if j = j¯, δ(t) > 0
η−a
∑
t e¯i(tr)δ(t) if j = j¯, δ(t) < 0
0 if j 6= j¯
(3.11)
where j¯ denotes the selected action and tr is the time when the reward is expected (i.e 5
time step after the go cue). The parameters η+a and η
−
a correspond to the learning rate
in acquisition and in extinction.
Model Analysis. In all the simulations we used a time bin dt = 100ms (for a full list
of parameters used in the model see ??). To compare the model results with the mean
activity of DA neurons we transformed the simulated RPE δ(t) in an equivalent firing
rate [δ(t)]equiv as follows:
[δ(t)]equiv = baseline+ F ∗ δ(t) (3.12)
The baseline representing the baseline activity of DA neurons during the trial was set to
5.1 Hz. The value of the scale factor F was chosen to obtain an equivalent prediction
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error [δ(t)]equiv that matched the mean dopamine response at the start cue. Its value
in all the simulations was 27.5 Hz. Additionally, the signal [δ(t)]equiv was filtered using
a 300 ms sliding window displaced every 100 ms (a procedure equivalent to the one
done to obtain the firing rate of DA neurons as a function of time). Responses to the
stimulus (in Figure 3.6b) were calculated averaging the signal [δ(t)]equiv over a 300 ms
window centered 100 ms after the stimulus onset. Responses to the go instruction and to
the reward delivery were calculated averaging the signal [δ(t)]equiv over a 300 ms window
centered, respectively, 100 ms after the go cue and after the reward delivery (Figure 3.6a).
Description Symbol Value
Critic Learning rate in acquisition η+c 0.1
Learning rate in extinction η−c 0.2
Rectification ψ 0.15
Discount Factor γ 0.98
Smear of the T functions k 40
Spacing of the T functions c 0.2
Actor Learning rate in acquisition η+a 0.03
Learning rate in extinction η−a 0.1
Noise of the softmax β 0.5
Decay of stimulus trace ρ 0.98
Chapter 4
The dopamine signal in tasks
involving parametric working
memory
4.1 Introduction
Working memory refers to the ability to hold information available for processing during
short periods of time (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974). Evidence for storage of working memory
contents in multiple brain regions has been provided by many studies in humans and non-
human primates (Christophel et al., 2017). In particular, it is almost universally accepted
that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a critical role in the dynamical control of items
stored for short periods of time. Furthermore, it has long been known that the dopamine
(DA) system interacts closely with the PFC (see for example Alexander et al., 1986)
and that damage to the DA system can impair cognitive functions typically associated
associated with this region (Moghaddam et al., 1997).
In task involving working memory manipulations of the DA receptors crucially affect
the behavioural performance (Sawaguchi and Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Arnsten et al., 1994;
Murphy et al., 1996) and single cell recording provided evidence for effects of DA on PFC
activity during task performance (Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Sawaguchi, 2001).
It has been suggested that the activity of DA neurons affects working memory in a dual
way: high tonic DA activity are thought to be relevant for maintaining information in
PFC, while phasic burst of DA neurons allows rapid updating and learning (Cohen et al.,
2002). However the role of DA neuron during tasks involving working memory is yet to
be clarified.
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To get more insights into this issue we focus our attention on the DA signal recorded
from behaving monkeys performing a well studied example of perceptual decision making
requiring working memory, the discrimination task reported in (Romo et al., 1999; Romo
and Salinas, 2003; see Figure 4.1). This task consists in the sequential comparison of two
vibrational stimuli separated by a delay period of a few seconds.
Extensive analysis of single cell activity revealed neural correlates of working memory
in multiple brain areas during the delay period between the first (base) stimulus and
the second (comparison) stimulus. In general, except for primary sensory cortex (S1),
which activity did not to show history-dependence (i.e dependence on the base frequency)
neither during the delay not at the presentation of the comparison stimulus, neurons in
other cortical areas showed activity correlated to stimulus value, memory, and decision
outcome (see for example Romo et al., 1999; Herna´ndez et al., 2002, 2010).
Of particular interest here is the activity in PFC, for the well known interaction
between PFC and the DA system in working memory tasks mentioned above. Previous
reports of the neural activity in this area showed that the the firing rate of many of the
cells either increases or decreases monotonically with the base stimulus frequency. The
monotonic tuning was observed not only during the stimulus presentation but also at
different time points during the delay period after the stimulus offset (Romo et al., 1999).
When the interval of the delay duration changed neurons rescaled their time-dependent
firing rate according to the new interval duration (Brody et al., 2003). Importantly, the
subpopulation of neurons that are tuned to the stimulus was not constant in time. This
subpopulation decreased during approximately the first second after the base stimulus
presentation and became more and more prominent as time elapsed through the end of
the delay (Romo et al., 1999; Jun et al., 2010). A subsequent analysis (Barak et al., 2010)
seemed indeed to support the idea that the quality of stimulus encoding by the population
deteriorated after the offset of the base stimulus, and gradually recovers toward the end
the delay period.
In what follows we present new data of the DA activity recorded during the discrim-
ination task. A model based analysis of these new experimental results supports the
hypothesis that the phasic DA reward prediction errors (RPEs) are shaped by a non-
trivial probabilistic inference sensory processing. Surprisingly, data showed a high tonic
positive modulation of the DA activity during the delay period. According to the model
also this sustained tonic modulation can be interpreted as a form of RPE relying on an
inference process, likely to take place in prefrontal areas, and transmitted to the DA
system during the delay period.
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Discrimination Task and Behavioral Performance
a
b
Figure 4.1: Discrimination task. (a) Trials began when the mechanical probe is lowered
(probe down, PD). The monkey reacted by placing its free hand on an immovable key
(key down, KD). After a variable period (1.5-3.0 s) the probe oscillated for 0.5 s at the
base (f1) frequency. A second vibrotactile stimulus at the comparison frequency (f2) was
presented 3 s after the offset of the first stimulus. At the end of the second stimulus
the monkey released the key (key up, KU) and pressed one of two push-buttons (PB)
to indicate whether the comparison frequency was higher or lower than the base. (b)
Stimulus sets (i.e the pairs of f1 , f2 used in the task. Numbers inside the brown boxes
indicate percentage of correct trials in each condition (left), and the absolute value of the
difference between the base and the comparison frequency (right).
During the vibrotactile discrimination task (Romo et al., 1999; Romo and Salinas,
2003), the monkey had to pay attention to the frequency of the base stimulus, remember
this frequency for a delay of 3 seconds, and then compare it to the frequency of the second
comparison stimulus. The time course of an individual trial is shown in Figure 4.1a. The
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animal obtained reward for correctly identifying the higher frequency. The sets, the pair
of frequencies, used during the recordings are illustrated in in Figure 4.1b (left) together
with the absolute value of the difference between the base and comparison frequency.
4.2.2 Phasic DA response to the first vibrotactile stimulus
At a population level, the onset of the base stimulus positively activated the DA neurons
(see Figure 4.3a ; p < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). This result indicates that DA
neurons were excited by the stimulus to be retained in working memory. An encoding
of the frequency has been observed in many areas, including PFC (Romo et al., 1999;
Herna´ndez et al., 2002, 2010). We therefore asked whether the mean activity of the
population encoded the specific frequency value that needed to be stored. Figure 4.2a
shows the response of the neurons to the first stimulus sorted by the value of the base
frequency. According to this analysis the population activity did not show any significant
dependence on the value of the first stimulus frequency (one-way ANOVA, p = 0.26).
However, data exhibited a slight tendency for a stronger activation for stimulus frequencies
toward the center of its value distribution. We analysed therefore whether this pattern of
activation could be related to the encoding of some reward-related information. Naively,
since the trial condition is not fully defined until the application of the second stimulus, the
phasic DA response to the first stimulus should not depend on the value of f1. However this
cannot be correct, as an inspection of the fraction of correct responses for each pair (f1, f2)
indicated. In fact, for the stimulation set used in the experiment, the performance at fixed
f1 was worse at the two end values of this frequency (Figure 4.1b, left). This anomaly in
the performance appears in delayed comparison tasks (first noticed in Hollingworth, 1910),
and it is known as the contraction bias. The bias consists in judging the magnitude of
the first stimulus as greater than that of the second one, when the two stimuli are small
in magnitude. The opposite happens for two the stimuli that are relatively large. So,
intuitively, it can be described as a shift of the perceived frequency of the first stimulus to
the center of its range. For example, if f1 is selected at the lower end of its range, it will
be judged as being larger. Then one expects that for the pair (f1 = 10 Hz, f2 = 18 Hz)
the performance would deteriorate with respect to that for values of f1 taking values far
from the ends of its range, as it is the case (Figure 4.1b, left). The same is true for the
pair (f1 = 34 Hz, f2 = 18 Hz). This phenomenon suggests that the higher DA responses
toward the center of the f1 distribution could be due to different predictions of reward.
To check the relevance of this reward-related effect we have compared the firing rate
of the DA neurons during the application of the first stimulus of the two values of f1
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Figure 4.2: DA response to the first stimulus. (a) Population response (z-score) to
the onset of the base stimulus sorted by the frequency of the vibration. (b) Population
response (z-score) to the onset of the base stimulus for ’extreme’ frequencies (i.e. f1 = 10
Hz and f1 = 34 Hz) and for ’center’ frequencies (i.e f1 = 18 Hz and f1 = 24 Hz). Error
bar are ± 1 SEM.
situated at the extreme of the its possible values (f1 = 10 Hz and f1 = 34 Hz, denoted
as extreme) with the two central values (f1 = 18 Hz and f1 = 24 Hz, denotes as center).
Although the difference in activation did not reach significance value (p = 0.067, two tail
t-test), the result of this analysis showed a clear tendency for larger activation when the
base stimulus frequency corresponded to trial types that resulted easier for the animal,
and thus more likely to be rewarded (see Figure 4.2b).
4.2.3 Modulation of the DA activity during the delay period
Individual neurons in several prefrontal areas exhibit persistent activity during the delay
period tuned parametrically to the value of the frequency of the first stimulus (Romo et al.,
1999; Herna´ndez et al., 2010). Besides, the traces of their firing rates are heterogeneous
and not uniform in time (Brody et al., 2003). This poses some intriguing questions about
how the activity of DA neurons behaves during the delay period. Are they temporally
modulated during that period? Do they code the value of f1? Do they code some reward-
related information? To answer the first question, for each neuron we have averaged its
spiking activity over all trials. In Figure 4.3c we present the result of this computation for
two example neurons. Note that the firing rate of the first neuron is clearly modulated in
time, increasing throughout the duration of the delay period (Figure 4.3c, left). Instead,
the firing activity of the other neuron has a more uniform temporal behaviour (Figure 4.3c,
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Figure 4.3: DA activity during the delay period. (a) Mean population firing rate
(black line, ± SEM colored band) plotted as a function of time for correct (rewarded)
trials. Trials are aligned to the onset of the base stimulus. The gray bars (from left to
right) indicate the onset and the offset of the first stimulus, and the onset of the second
stimulus. (b) Average activity of DA neurons during the delay period. Gray vertical lines
mark the offset of the base stimulus and the onset of the comparison stimulus. Blue lines
are mean baseline-subtracted firing rate in non-overlapping bins of 350 ms. Error bars
are ± 1 SEM. (c) Same as in a but for two example neurons.
right).
At a population level DA neurons show clear positive tonic modulation during the
delay period. The average firing rate starts to increase immediately after the offset of the
first stimulus and does so until the presentation of the second stimulus (Figure 4.3a-b).
Indeed the mean activity of the population before the presentation of the first stimulus is
significantly lower than the mean activity before the presentation of the second stimulus
(p < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank test; both means are calculated in a 500 ms which
position is indicated by the green horizontal lines in Figure 4.3a).
We next tried to determine the origin of this positive modulation in the delay activity.
It is known that the fraction of selective neurons in prefrontal areas is not temporally
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homogeneous (Romo et al., 1999; Herna´ndez et al., 2010). The size of this subpopulation
decreases during approximately the first second after the base stimulus presentation and
becomes more and more prominent as time elapses through the end of the delay. A
subsequent analysis (Barak et al., 2010) seemed indeed to support the idea that the
quality of stimulus encoding by the population deteriorates after the offset of the base
stimulus, and gradually it recovers toward the end the delay period. A similar behavior
of selective activity during the delay period happens in other tactile tasks where a sample
stimulus has to be kept in working memory (Vergara et al., 2016; Rossi-Pool et al., 2016).
We asked therefore whether the increase in the DA activity during the delay period could
result from a time varying signal received from prefrontal inputs. If this hypothesis was
true one would expect some tuning to f1 during the delay period, or at least toward the
end of the delay (because the activity in prefontal areas seems to show a better encoding
of the base frequency immediately before the onset of the comparison stimulus).
To investigate the possibility of f1 tuning during the delay period we computed the
temporal profile of the neurons’ firing rates sorting trials according to the value of the
first frequency. For the same two example neurons the curves for different values of
f1 appear superimposed (Figure 4.4c). This property can also be seen clearly in the
temporal averages of the firing activity (z-score) over the delay period at fixed f1 which
do not exhibit significant differences (Figure 4.4d). This absence of tuning exists also
at the population level during the entire delay period (Figure 4.4a; one way ANOVA,
p = 0.63). Even in the last 500 ms of the delay, where the activity of prefrontal areas
suggest a recovery of the information about the base frequency (Barak et al., 2010), DA
neurons did not exhibit any evident tuning to f1 (one way ANOVA, p = 0.71).
The DA signal during the delay period is therefore quite different from the delay ac-
tivity encountered in prefrontal cortex, where neurons code parametrically the memorized
value of the frequency (Romo et al., 1999; Herna´ndez et al., 2010). In principle, the lack of
tuning in the frequency of the first stimulus does not contradict the functional properties
of the DA neurons related to the prediction of reward. However, despite of the result
obtained for the activation after the base stimulus onset, during the delay period the DA
activity did not show any difference between the extreme and the central values of the f1
distribution (p = 0.95, two tail t-test; compare Figure 4.4b with Figure 4.2b).
Although our analysis did not allow to determine the origin of the DA modulation in
the delay activity, our data show a clear increasing DA activation from the offset of the
first stimulus to the onset of the second one. This result differs from that obtained another
study involving working memory. In that work Matsumoto and Takada, 2013 investigated
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Figure 4.4: Absence of f1 tuning during the delay period. (a) Mean normalized
activity (z-score) of the population sorted according to the value of the first frequency (see
Methods for details about the normalization). (b) Mean population response (z-score)
during the delay period for ’extreme’ frequencies (i.e. f1 = 10 Hz and f1 = 34 Hz) and for
’center’ frequencies (i.e f1 = 18 Hz and f1 = 24 Hz). Error bar in a and b are ± 1 SEM.
(c) Mean firing rate of the same two example neurons of Figure 4.3c sorted according to
the value of the first frequency for correct trials. Trials are aligned to the onset of the
base stimulus. The gray bars (from left to right) indicate the onset and the offset of the
first stimulus, and the onset of the second stimulus. (d) Same than in a but for the two
example neurons of panel c.
the DA responses in a visual search task in which monkeys had to maintain in working
memory the orientation of a lighted bar for a short interval, and then discriminate the
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sample stimulus within an array of bars with several orientations. In that study DA
neurons did not exhibit any persistent activation during the delay period.
4.2.4 Phasic DA response to the second vibrotactile stimulus:
correct and error trials
It is instructive to compare the firing response of DA neurons to the first and the second
stimuli, both in correct and wrong trials. After application of the first stimulus the phasic
responses in error and correct trials have a similar profile (Figure 4.5a).
In contrast, the application of the second stimulus produces a quite different behaviour
of the firing rates in the two trial types. After an initial common increase, the activity
in wrong trials deviates significantly from the activity in trials with correct choices (Fig-
ure 4.5b).
This difference could be related to the function of DA neurons as coding the error in
the prediction of the total future reward (dopamine reward prediction errors) (see model
results below). But the time when they start to depart from each other can be explained
in terms of the latency of cortical signals related to inference processes about which one
of the two frequencies is the largest. In fact, although in some sensory areas (i. e. S1, see
Romo et al., 2002; Herna´ndez et al., 2010) there are not significant differences between
the activity in correct versus error trials, a population of neuron in S2 tuned to (f1 − f2)
distinguishes well between the two trial types after about 220 ms (Romo et al., 2002).
Neural populations tuned to the difference between the two frequencies abound in sev-
eral prefrontal areas (Herna´ndez et al., 2010). Those neurons are processing the difference
of the frequencies in a way correlated with the animal’s behaviour. It is then plausible
that cortical neurons send this information to the DA midbrain system. In turn these
neurons could use those signals to comply with their own function of computing and rep-
resenting the error on the prediction of the future reward. In support of this conjecture,
we notice that the responses to the two stimuli have a short latency. However, as it was
noticed above, in the response to the second stimulus the activities in correct and error
trials start to diverge only after a longer latency. To further quantify divergence arises at a
population level, we used receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis and computed
area under ROC curve (AUC) in sliding time windows (see section 4.4).
According to this analysis DA neurons show a latency of about 250 ms, a value which
is longer than the latency of S2 neurons tuned to (f1−f2) and roughly equal to the latency
of prefrontal neurons with similar tuning. It is then plausible that DA neurons receive
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Figure 4.5: DA response to the stimuli in correct and in error trials. (a) Mean
population firing rate (black line, ± SEM colored band) plotted as a function of time for
correct and error trials. Trials are aligned to the onset of the base stimulus. The gray
bars (from left to right) indicate the onset and the offset of the first stimulus. (b) Same
than in a but with trials aligned to the onset of the comparison stimulus.
a signal coding the difference between the two frequencies. This is in agreement with
previous findings, suggesting that sensory evoked DA activity does not signal the stimulus
physical attributes but arises from the output of a perceptual process (de Lafuente and
Romo, 2011, 2012; Nomoto et al., 2010; Lak et al., 2017). DA neurons could use that
signal to compute the error in the estimate of the reward. It is therefore plausible that
in correct trials the cortical inference process is more accurate than in error trials. As a
consequence the quality of the perception results better in correct trials and this produces
a positive dopamine RPE while in error trials a poor sensory processing of the second
stimulus is responsible for a negative dopamine RPE in Figure 4.5.
4.2.5 Response of DA neurons as a function of task difficulty
How is the difficulty of the task controlled? The relevant task parameter is the difference
between the frequencies of the two stimuli, (f1 − f2). So, in principle, the task difficulty
could be defined in terms of this difference. If this were correct the monkey performance
in all trials with the same value of this difference should be similar. However, as discussed
in subsection 4.2.2, an estimate of the fraction of correct choices shows that this is not so.
Given a value of the difference |f1−f2| of 8 Hz, the performance for the extreme values of
f1 is rather poor (compare for example the performance of the pair of frequencies f1 = 24
Hz, f2 = 16 Hz, and f1 = 34 Hz, f2 = 26; see Figure 4.1). The behavioural anomaly is
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commonly attributed to the contraction bias.
This bias was initially explained with the existence of an internal reference, which
was used in the comparison tasks instead of the perceived magnitude (see for example
Hellstro¨m, 1985). Recently it was proposed that the contraction bias results from a
Bayesian inference computation in which noisy representations of stimuli are combined
with knowledge about the a-priori distribution of magnitudes in order to optimize perfor-
mance (Ashourian and Loewenstein, 2011). Intuitively, such an inference should lead to
the contraction bias because the perception of extreme magnitudes of the first stimulus,
which are unlikely given unimodal prior distributions, will be biased toward the ’center’
of the prior distribution. The contraction bias naturally arises from Bayesian inference if
one assume that the level of uncertainty (i.e the noise) in the representation of f1 (the
information that needs to be retrieved) is higher than the the level of uncertainty in the
representation of f2 (because the comparison stimulus is supposed to be present when the
decision is made). This is indeed equivalent to suppose that anomaly in the performance
is due to the memory retrieval/decision making process and not to the memory encoding.
In the context of our discrimination task this Bayesian contraction bias can be incorpo-
rated as follows (see section 4.4 for more details): right after the onset of the comparison
stimulus the animal receives a noisy observation about the memory of the base frequency
and a (less) noisy observation about the frequency of the second stimulus. These noisy
informations are combined with the knowledge of the two prior distribution to calculate
the posterior distributions, or beliefs, about the values of the two frequencies. Given the
two beliefs about the first and the second stimulus frequency, denoted respectively as
b1(f) and b2(f) the posterior distribution about f1 > f2 can be obtained as follows:
b(f1 > f2) =
fmax1∑
fi
b1(fi)
∑
fj<fi
b2(fj) (4.1)
The above quantity is then used by the model to make a decision about which of the two
frequency is the highest (see the section section 4.4). In our analysis of the task difficulty
we assume the validity of the Bayesian decision model sketched above, and adjust the
level of noise in order to minimize the difference between the performance of the model
and the performance of the animal(this corresponds to fit two noise parameters to the
animal performance; see section 4.4 for details about the model fitting).
We then redefine the difficulty of the task according to the performance of the model.
That is: easy classes are those in which the model reached the highest performance,
intermediate difficult classes corresponded to those with intermediate performance in the
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Figure 4.6: DA response to the stimuli in correct and in error trials. (a) Mean
population firing rate (black line, ± SEM colored band) plotted as a function of time for
correct and error trials. Trials are aligned to the onset of the base stimulus. The gray
bars (from left to right) indicate the onset and the offset of the first stimulus. (b) Same
than in a but with trials aligned to the onset of the comparison stimulus.
model, and difficult classes are those in which the model performed the worst. Intuitively,
this way of defining the difficulty of the task, corresponds to say that the animal is
indeed following an internal model similar to our Bayesian model, but with some level of
randomness in action selection related with the suboptimal behaviour commonly observed
in mammals (see Morris et al., 2006 for behavioural results on suboptimal performance
in monkeys).
We next analyse the DA responses to the two relevant stimuli sorting trials according
to the definition of the task difficulty based on the Bayesian model. The mean firing rate
in easy, intermediate and difficult classes reveals an interesting pattern of activation (see
Figure 4.6). During the presentation of the base stimulus the firing rate in difficult classes
is slightly lower than than in intermediate and easy classes, compatibly with the idea
of a RPE coding. The effect is not significant during the entire period of the stimulus
presentation but it does reach the significance level during the interval that lasts from 220
ms to 350 ms after the stimulus onset (p < 0.05; sliding ROC analysis with permutation
test). During the presentation of the second stimulus the DA phasic activation clearly
reflects the subjective difficulty that the animal needs to cope with in the decision process
and the RPE coding related to this difficulty. In the temporal window from from 210
ms to 365 ms the firing rate in the three difficulty levels completely separate, resulting
graduated according to the difficulty (p < 0.05; sliding ROC analysis with permutation
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test). Indeed the mean activation during the entire 500 ms of stimulus presentation in
easy classes is significantly higher that the activation in intermediate and difficult classes
(p < 0.05,one-way ANOVA).
According to the Bayesian model, the pattern of responses observed during the pre-
sentation of the comparison frequency can be related the certainty of the animal about
the future decision. The quantity that determine the choice according to the model, i.e
the belief in Equation 4.1, can be indeed interpreted as the certainty of the animal about
the decision f1 > f2. In difficult trials the belief about the decision is slightly above the
threshold of 0.5 imposed by the MAP (maximum a posteriori) optimal criterion. This
trials results therefore in a less accurate performance and in low levels of certainty that
determine a less pronounced activation of DA neurons. We will further discuss the rela-
tionship between the activation of neurons and RPEs related to the certainty about the
future decision in subsection 4.2.7.
4.2.6 DA response to the delivery of reward
In contrast to the response to the second stimulus, the response after the delivery of the
reward does not depend on the difficulty of the task (see Figure 4.7a). This pattern of
response is similar to that encountered in the detection task analysed in chapter 3. In
that case the response to the reward delivery in hit trials did not depend on the amplitude
of the relevant stimulus. However another recent study that analysed the response of DA
neurons in the random dots motion (RDM) task showed an opposite result. In that case
the response to a feedback tone announcing the trial outcome before the reward is delivered
did depend on the motion coherence (Lak et al., 2017, Figure 3d right). Analysing the
origin of these differences is beyond the scope of this work. However we speculate that
the different pattern of responses could be related to the fact that in the RDM task the
relevant stimulus is still present when the animal communicates its decision and receives
the feedback tone. On the contrary both in the detection and in the discrimination
task the relevant stimulus has already disappeared when the animal receives the reward.
Therefore it is possible that in the first case (i.e. in the RDM tasks) the neural activity
maintained some dependence on the certainty that determined the decision, whilst in the
other to cases this dependence is lost.
In correct and error trials the DA firing rate behave as a RPE signal, resulting positive
for correct trials and negative when the decision was wrong. It is interesting to note that
the trend of activation separate depending on the trial outcome soon after the delivery of
the reward. (Figure 4.7). This has to be contrasted with the response of DA neurons to
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Figure 4.7: DA response to the reward delivery. (a) Mean population firing rate
(black line, ± SEM colored band) plotted as a function of time for correct trials sorted
according to the trial difficulty. Trials are aligned to the push button. The gray bar
indicates the push button. (b) Same than in a but for correct and error trials.
the second stimulus; in that case the activity in both trial types followed a similar trend
for about 150 ms.
4.2.7 Reinforcement learning model
We construct a computational model to investigate whether the processing of a Bayesian
variable that, at behavioural level, is responsible for the contraction bias, could generate
RPEs consistent with the the activity of DA neurons encountered in our data. As dis-
cussed in chapter 3 for tasks involving the elaboration of noisy sensory information, as the
discrimination task analysed here, reinforcement learning (RL) models, and in particular
the temporal difference (TD) algorithm, need to be based on partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP), as proposed in (Daw et al., 2006; Rao, 2010).
Similarly to what done in subsection 4.2.5 we assume that when presented with the first
stimulus, the model uses the noisy observation o1 to construct a belief over all the possible
values of the first frequency, given by b1(f) = P (f |o1). To calculate the RPE at the onset
of the first stimulus, the model also stores the values of waiting (W) until the presentation
of the second stimulus given each possible value of f1. These quantities are denotes as
Q(W, f1). When the second stimulus is presented the model calculates a the belief over all
possible values the second frequency, given by b2(f) = P (f |o2) using the noisy observation
o2. In addition it receives another noisy observation o
∗
1 about the frequency of the first
stimulus, and construct a new belief over the value of the first frequency (see section 4.4
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Figure 4.8: Response of the model in correct and error trials. (a) The RPE
generated by the model after the onset of the first stimulus is similar in correct and error
trials. (b) The RPE generated by the model after the onset of the second stimulus shows
an activation in correct trials and a depression in error trials. (c) The RPE generated by
the model after the reward delivery.
for more details about the model). We assume that the observation o∗1 is noisier than
the observation o2 to model the fact that the retrieval process is noisier than the sensory
integration (as suggested in Ashourian and Loewenstein, 2011). Another set of variables
is stored by the model after the presentation of the comparison stimulus: the values of
calling the first frequency higher (H) or lower (L) given each possible pair of frequencies
(f1, f2). These two set of variables are denoted as Q(H, f1, f2) and Q(L, f1, f2). In our
model-based analysis we focus on the DA phasic activity, and therefore the RL model only
produces three task-related prediction errors: the RPE at the onset of the first stimulus
denoted as δ(f1), the RPE at the onset of the first stimulus denoted as δ(f2), and the
RPE at the reward delivery denoted as δ(r). After the onset of the two stimuli the model
combines Bayesian inference and information about the reward obtained in the previous
trials (that is stored in the variables Q) to compute the RPEs. For the calculation of
the RPE at the reward delivery we assume that the model does not use the information
collected during the Bayesian inference (see section 4.4).
The RPE generated after the three relevant task events in correct and error trials is
depicted in Figure 4.8. The RPE after the onset of the first stimulus is approximately
independent from the final outcome (Figure 4.8a). However, similarly to the DA responses
found in our data analysis (see Figure 4.5b), the RPE after the second stimulus results
positive in correct trials and negative in error trials (Figure 4.8b). In the model this
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Figure 4.9: Response of the model in correct trials sorted by difficulty. (a) The
RPE generated by the model after the onset of the first stimulus is similar in correct of
different difficulty. (b) The RPE generated by the model after the onset of the second
stimulus shows a graduation that depended on the subjective difficulty during the elab-
oration of the stimulus. (c) The RPE generated by the model after the reward delivery
does not depend on the difficulty.
separation arises from the processing of the two Bayesian variables related to f1 and to f2.
Before the onset of the second stimulus the reward expectation is associated with the first
stimulus only. When the second stimulus is presented the reward expectation is associated
with it becomes to be relevant. According to the model error trials produce because of
ambiguous observation that generate two posterior distributions picked around similar
values of frequencies and with great overlap. In such condition decisions are difficult and
result in a great amount of incorrect choices. Therefore the onset of the second stimulus
assumes low reward prediction values. The opposite is true for the majority of correct
trial: the overlapping between the two posterior distribution is not much, the processing
of the two belief results in a large amount of rewarded trials, and, as a consequence,
the onset of the second stimulus assumes high reward prediction values. At the reward
delivery the RPE shows a typical profile, resulting negative in error trials and positive in
correct trials (Figure 4.8c).
Figure 4.9 depicts the RPE generated by the model in correct trials of different diffi-
culty. The RPE after the onset of first stimulus show a slight dependence on the difficulty
of the task. These RPEs are similar to the DA activations reported in Figure 4.6a. In
the model, this profile produces because the information about the first frequency only
is not enough to produce a fine prediction of future reward. However when the second
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stimulus is presented the RPE clearly graduates according to the difficulty. This effect in
the model is due to the different degree of overlapping between the two posterior distribu-
tions, similarly to what happens in correct and error trials. When the two distributions
do not overlap at all (in easy trials), decision are always correct and the second stimulus
generates great reward expectations and very pronounced RPEs. On the opposite when
the overlapping is relevant (difficult trials), decision are sometimes wrong and the second
stimulus generates lower reward expectations and little RPEs.
4.3 Discussion
Using the discrimination task, we found that the DA neurons responses showed a distinc-
tive pattern of activation both at phasic and at a tonic level.
DA neurons were phasically activated by the base stimulus (Figure 4.3a). These phasic
bursts did not encode the frequency of the stimulus, which represented the information
that the animal needed to retain in working memory (Figure 4.2a). However we observed
a slight tendency for a stronger activation for stimulus frequencies situated toward the
center of the stimulus frequencies distribution. We attributed this effect to the contraction
bias. According to this bias, the perceived frequency of the first stimulus shifts toward the
center of its range, and, as a consequence, the frequencies that lie at the two extremes of
the frequency range result in a worse performance. Indeed we found that the responses of
DA neurons during the application of the first stimulus for central values of the frequency
range, were (almost significantly) higher than those for extreme values. This pattern of
activation suggested that the response to the first stimulus was coding a reward prediction
error signal.
We next analysed the activation of neurons during the comparison stimulus. We fo-
cused our attention on the DA responses in correct and wrong trials. After an initial
common increase, which lasted about 150 ms, the activity in wrong trials decreased sig-
nificantly with respect to the activity in trials with correct choices (Figure 4.5b). A similar
pattern of activity has been encountered in the RDM task (Lak et al., 2017). In that case,
after the onset of the dots motions, DA response were uniform for about 200 ms, and then
the mean firing rate increased for correct choices and decreased for error choices.
These responses to the second stimulus suggested that the DA activity could reflect
some internal process related to the trial-to-trial difficulty faced by the animal. However,
the variable controlling the trial difficulty is not clearly defined in the discrimination task,
as confirmed by the different accurate performance in classes where the difference |f1−f2|
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was the same (see Figure 4.1b). We speculated that the effective difficulty in a given trial
was not due to the real frequencies of the two stimuli, but to the perceived frequency of
the first stimulus, that resulted shifted toward the center of the f1 as a consequence of
the contraction bias. We used a Bayesian model of the contraction bias (Ashourian and
Loewenstein, 2011) to investigate the relationship between this behavioural anomaly and
the activity of dopamine neuron. We adjusted the noise level of the model to get a good fit
with the psychophysical results obtained in the experiment, and adopted the performance
of the model as a measure of the difficulty of each frequencies pair. We found indeed
that the response of neurons during the comparison stimulus was graduated according to
the difficulty. It resulted higher for easy classes as posited by the reward prediction error
coding commonly observed in the phasic DA activation.
We then tried better elucidate these responses by using a reinforcement learning (RL)
model based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). Guided from
the result obtained at behavioural level the RL model used a posterior distribution (i.e
a belief obtained using Bayesian inference) as input to calculate reward predictions and
RPEs. The model reproduced all the relevant aspects of the phasic activation of the DA
neurons. It suggested that the different responses to the second stimulus in correct and
error trials could be due to a differential integration process, which changed from trial to
trial. In correct trials of different difficulty the model explained the graduated responses
to the comparison stimulus in terms of the belief about the higher frequency that the RL
model used as input variable.
The fact that the two relevant stimuli were separated by a few seconds allowed to
study the temporal profile of the DA activity during the temporal interval that require the
use of working memory. We found a sustained positive tonic activation of the dopamine
neurons during the delay period. This delay activation was not tuned to the first frequency
value, and, unlike the response immediately after the base stimulus presentation, appeared
unrelated with a reward prediction error coding. A previous study involving working
memory did not report such a persistent activation during the delay period (Matsumoto
and Takada, 2013). However, although we could not determine its origin, the positive
modulation that we encountered is consistent with the idea that tonic dopamine plays an
important role to retain the relevant information in working memory (Cohen et al., 2002).
Moreover, this result is in line with persistent firing of dorsolateral prefrontal neurons that
have long been implicated in working memory (Wilson et al., 1993; Rao et al., 1997).
Our results extended the understanding of the DA activity in tasks that require in two
directions: on the one hand the positive modulation that we observed during the delay
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period and that was not encountered in previous studies opens new perspective regarding
the role of tonic DA firing in maintaining working memory functions in PFC. On the
other hand the phasic responses to the relevant stimuli, apart from being in line with a
reward prediction error coding, confirm that DA signals are triggered by internally arising
experiences rather than external sensory stimulation per se (as suggested in chapter 3 and
in some recent study; see for example Nomoto et al., 2010; de Lafuente and Romo, 2011;
Matsumoto and Takada, 2013). In addition our analysis suggested that the DA responses
to the comparison stimulus were shaped by the contraction bias.
4.4 Methods
Discrimination Task. Monkeys were trained to perform the vibrotactile task as de-
picted in section 4.4a . Trials began with the probe indenting the finger (Probe Down,
PD), followed by the monkey grasping a metal bar with his other hand (Key Down,KD) to
signal readiness. After a variable delay of 1500-3000 ms, the first stimulus was applied for
500 ms, followed by a 3000 ms delay and the second stimulus. The monkey then released
the bar (Key Up,KU), indicated the discrimination by pressing one of two push-buttons
with the right hand (Push Button, PB), and was rewarded for correctly discriminating
the higher frequency. Stimuli were delivered to the skin of the distal segment of one
digit of the restrained hand, via a computer-controlled stimulator (BME Systems; 2 mm
round tip). Initial probe indentation was 500 µm. Vibrotactile stimuli were mechanical
sinusoids. Stimulation amplitudes were adjusted to produce equal subjective intensities.
Animals were handled in accordance with standards of the National Institutes of Health
and Society for Neuroscience. All protocols were approved by the Institutional Animal
Care and Use Committee of the Instituto de Fisiologa Celular.
Recordings. Recordings were obtained with quartz-coated platinum-tungsten micro-
electrodes (2 to 3 MΩ; Thomas Recording) inserted through a recording chamber located
over the central sulcus, parallel to the midline. Midbrain DA neurons were identified on
the basis of their characteristic regular and low tonic firing rates (1-10 spikes per second)
and by their long extracellular spike potential (2.4 ms ± 0.4 SD). The group of 15 cells
used for the analysis corresponded to those neurons that showed a phasic increase in
discharge caused by the delivery of reward.
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Data Analysis. For each neuron, we computed the firing rate as a function of time using
300 ms sliding windows displaced every. Responses to the first stimulus (in Figure 4.2)
were measured in a 450 ms window centered 280 ms after the stimulus onset. The z-score
in Figure 4.4a,b,d were measured during the entire delay period. All the responses (z-
score) were standardized with respect to a temporal window preceding the onset of the
base stimulus ( the window lasted of 500 ms centered 1000 ms after the KD).
Bayesian model for the contraction bias in the discrimination task. In a
Bayesian framework the discrimination task can be modeled as follows: when presented
with a base stimulus of frequency f ∗1 , the monkey has only access to a noisy representa-
tion of it, or observation o∗1. The observation are sampled from a normal distribution with
constant variance σ21 around the true stimulus frequency; that is: if the true frequency of
the first stimulus in a given trial is f ∗1 the observation is sampled from o
∗
1 = N (f ∗1 , σ1).
This noisy information of is combined with the knowledge of the prior distribution P1(f)
to calculate the belief, or posterior distribution about the value of the first frequency
b1(f) = P (f |o∗1) ∝ P1(o∗1|f) · P1(f). This is a vector of n1 = 6 components (because the
frequency of the first stimulus can assume 6 different values). The belief b2(f) about the
second frequency (a vector of n2 = 12 components) can be constructed in a similar way,
with the only difference that the observation are now sampled from a normal distribution
of variance σ22. Given the two beliefs about the first and the second stimulus frequency,
the posterior distribution about f1 > f2 can be obtained using the Equation 4.1. An ideal
Bayesian observer, who has access to o1 and o2 , would report that f1 > f2 in trials in
which b(f1 > f2) > 0.5. Therefore, the probability P (H|f ∗1 , f ∗2 ) that a model would report
that f1 was higher then f2 in a trial in which f
∗
1 and f
∗
2 are presented is given by:
P (H|f ∗1 , f ∗2 ) =
∑
o1
∑
o2
P (o1|f ∗1 )P (o2|f ∗2 )G(b(f1 > f2)) (4.2)
where G(b(f1 > f2)) = 1 if b(f1 > f2) > 0.5, and G(b(f1 > f2)) = 0 if b(f1 > f2) < 0.5.
Equation 4.2 defines the performance of the model in any possible class. We adjust the two
noise parameters σ1 and σ2 in order to minimize the difference between the performance
of the model and the performance of the animal. To model the fact that the memory
retrieval/decision making process and not during the memory encoding we constrained
the two parameters to respect the relationship σ1 < σ2.
Reinforcement learning model. The model relies on the POMDP formalism. It
assumes that a Bayesian module processes the sensory information about the values of
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the two frequencies, and then transmits the result of this inference to a RL module that
selects action and generates RPEs. In each trial at the onset of the first stimulus the
Bayesian model receives an observation o1 about the value of f1, which is sample from a
normal distribution of mean equal to the true frequency in that trial f¯1 and variance σ
2
S,
i.e. o1 = N (f¯1, σS). Using this observation it calculates the posterior over all possible
value of f1. For simplicity we assume an uniform prior. The belief distribution is a vector
of n components, each one representing the probability that the presented frequency had
specific value. Here we discretize the frequency range in steps of 1 Hz, so the dimension
of the belief corresponds to the upper limit of the frequency range, that is 34 Hz for the
first frequency. Given the belief distribution about f1 the RL module calculates the value
of waiting (W) until the presentation of the second stimulus:
Q(W |b1(f)) =
34∑
f1=1
Q(W, f1) · b1(f1) (4.3)
The RPE at the onset of the first stimulus is calculated as δ(f1) = Q(W |b1(f)).
At the onset of the second stimulus the Bayesian module calculates a posterior proba-
bility about the value of the second frequency b2(f), using the observation o2 = N (f¯2, σS)
(where f¯2 is the true value of f2 in the trial). In addition it receives another observation
o∗1 = N (f¯1, σR) from a storage area about the value of f1. We assume σR > σS to model
the loss of information during the retrieval process. The observation o∗1 is used to calculate
a new posterior about f1, denoted as b
∗
1(f). These two beliefs are combined by the RL
module to calculate the values of calling the first frequency higher (H) or lower (L) than
the second one:
Q(H|b∗1(f), b2(f)) =
34∑
f1=1
44∑
f2=1
Q(H, f1, f2) · b∗1(f1) · b2(f2) (4.4)
Q(L|b∗1(f), b2(f)) =
34∑
f1=1
44∑
f2=1
Q(L, f1, f2) · b∗1(f1) · b2(f2) (4.5)
The outcome of the discrimination a is obtained as a = argmaxD Q(D|b∗1(f), b2(f)). This
outcome is combined with the previous information about f1 to compute the RPE a the
onset of the second stimulus:
δ(f2) = Q(a|b∗1(f), b2(f))−Q(W |b1(f)) (4.6)
The RPE in the above equation is used to update the set of values Q(W, f1) as follows:
Q(W, f1) = Q(W, f1) + α · δ(f2) · b1(f1) (4.7)
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where α represents the learning rate.
We assume that between the offset of the second frequency and the second frequency
and the delivery of the reward the system forgets the beliefs that determined the decision.
Thus the RPE at the reward delivery using a decision value Q(a) that is a weighted
average of Q(a|b∗1(f), b2(f)) over uniform posterior distribution about the two stimuli:
δ(R) = R−Q(a) (4.8)
where R = 1 for correct discrimination and R = 0 otherwise. This RPE is is used to
update the set of values Q(a, f1, f2) as follows:
Q(a, f1, f2) = Q(a, f1, f2) + α · δ(R) · b∗1(f1) · b2(f2) (4.9)
Chapter 5
Final conclusions
The ability of processing and using incomplete information to predict the value of out-
comes and make appropriate decisions is essential to the organization of behaviour. Al-
though dopamine prediction errors are believed to play a crucial role in associative learning
and goal-directed behaviour their role in decision making is yet to be clarified.
In this thesis we tried to elucidate how dopamine neurons behave during tasks that
require non-trivial processing of external information. To do so, we combined the analysis
of data from recordings of the firing activity of dopamine neurons taken while monkeys
perform decision-making tasks using data analysis and modeling work based on algo-
rithmic ideas from reinforcement learning. Importantly, we addressed this model-based
analysis to two different experimental paradigms.
In chapter 3 we re-examined data recorded when the animal was engaged in the detec-
tion of possibly weak vibrotactile stimuli delivered at random times. This study allowed
to shed light on several features of the dopamine reward prediction error signals which
were not reported before. We demonstrated the existence of dopamine excitations to false
detections of the vibrotactile stimulus, reward-related events the animal believed had oc-
curred but which did not actually occurred. In line with a previous study (Carnevale
et al., 2015) we found that the signature of these false detections in the dopamine activ-
ity became evident during the temporal window in which the stimulus was expected to
happen. Building a Bayesian/reinforcement learning model we elucidated the way how
the response of dopamine neurons were related to both timing and stimulus uncertainty.
We showed that when the animal was asked to communicate its decision dopamine neu-
rons coded a reward prediction error signal related to the certainty of the animal about
the detection. In addition we found that the dopamine activity was shaped by temporal
expectations in a way that depended on the subjective detection of the relevant stimulus.
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In chapter 4 we analysed new recordings collected during a discrimination task in which
the animal was presented with two vibrotactile stimuli and was required to distinguish
the one with the higher frequency. We observed that dopamine neurons were phasically
activated by the first stimulus. These phasic bursts did not code the specific information
about the stimulus to be retained in working memory (the frequency), instead they were
partially consistent with reward prediction error signals. The fact that the two relevant
stimuli were separated by a few seconds allowed to study the temporal profile of the
dopamine activity during the temporal interval that require the use of working memory.
We found a sustained positive tonic activation of the dopamine neurons during the delay
period. This delay activation was not tuned to the first frequency value, and, unlike
the response immediately after the base stimulus presentation, appeared unrelated with
a reward prediction error coding. A previous study involving working memory did not
report such a persistent activation during the delay period (Matsumoto and Takada,
2013). However, although we could not determine its origin, the positive modulation that
we encountered is consistent with the idea that tonic dopamine plays an important role
to retain the relevant information in working memory (Cohen et al., 2002).
Tasks that require the sequential comparison of two stimuli separated by an interval
of a few seconds constantly show a behavioural bias that is known as the contraction bias
(first noticed in Hollingworth, 1910). Assuming that Bayesian computation underlies the
contraction bias (Ashourian and Loewenstein, 2011) we found that the phasic activation
of dopamine neurons after the second stimulus reflected this behavioural anomaly. Addi-
tionally, we used a Bayesian/reinforcement learning model to further elucidate the nature
of this distinctive pattern of responses. The model results showed that the phasic bursts
of dopamine neurons after the second stimulus can be interpreted as reward prediction
error signals that stem from differential sensory evidence integration and that reflect the
subjective difficult of the animal in processing the stimulus.
During the last years there has been an increasing interest in clarifying the role of
dopamine in shaping behaviour. Many recent studies have focused on analysing the re-
lationship between the dopamine activity and interval timing, showing that phasic and
tonic dopamine signals conveyed information about the elapsed time (see for example
Fiorillo et al., 2008; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Pasquereau and Turner, 2015). Al-
though apparently different from the decision making problems analysed in this thesis,
from a theoretical perspective time is nothing more than any other state that cannot be
observed directly (i.e a hidden state) that the system needs to infer in order to calculate
reward predictions and reward prediction errors. Indeed, in line with this view, recent
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data provided support for a temporal difference learning model that operates over belief
states in a task that involved the estimation of time (Starkweather et al., 2017). Another
recent study has demonstrated that, in addition to reflect interval timing, dopamine neu-
ron activity can directly control the judgement of time (Soares et al., 2016). Therefore,
regarding to the perception of time, the dopamine reward prediction error signals seem
to operate on hidden states and actively guide the inference process.
In these thesis we analysed and modeled the dopamine signal in perceptual decision
making tasks, mainly focusing on a form of state inference different from time inference.
Our results support the view that also in complex decision making processes dopamine
neurons operate on hidden states. The study suggests that dopamine neurons convey a
teaching signal that reflects an optimal/Bayesian inference process and that is appropriate
to guide optimal decision making. Although the way how these dopaminergic reward
prediction error signals affect the inference process is yet to be clarify, our results open
new perspectives on a possible active role of dopamine neurons in guiding optimal decision
making.
Chapter 6
Conclusiones Finales
La habilidad de procesar y utilizar informacio´n incompleta para predecir el valor de dist-
diferentes desenlaces y tomar las decisiones apropiadas es esencial para la organizacio´n
del comportamiento. Aunque se piensa que los errores de prediccio´n codificados por las
neuronas dopamina juegan un papel crucial en aprendizaje asociativo y comportamiento
orientado a objetivos, su rol en la toma de decisiones esta´ au´n por clarificar.
En esta tesis he intentado dilucidar como las neuronas dopamina se comportan en
tareas que requieren procesamiento no trivial de informacio´n externa. Para hacer esto, he
combinado ana´lisis de datos sobre la tasa de disparo de neuronas dopamina, tomados en
monos mientras estos completaban tareas de toma de decisiones, con trabajo de modelado
inspirado en algoritmos de aprendizaje con refuerzo. He dirigido este ana´lisis basado en
modelos a dos paradigmas experimentales distintos.
En el capitulo 3, re-examinamo datos tomados mientras el animal esta involucrado
en la deteccio´n de posibles est´ımulos de´biles, administrados en tiempos aleatorios. Este
estudio permitio´ descubrir varias caracter´ısticas del comportamiento de las sen˜ales de
prediccio´n de error de la recompensa, que no se conoc´ıan con anterioridad. Demuestro
la existencia de excitaciones de la dopamina a falsas detecciones del estimulo vibrotactil,
eventos relacionados con recompensa que el animal cre´ıa que hab´ıan ocurrido, pero que no
hab´ıan ocurrido realmente. En concordancia con un estudio previo (Carnevale et al,2015)
encuentro que la traza en la actividad de la dopamina de estas falsos detecciones se vuelve
notable durante la ventana de tiempo en la que se espera que ocurra el estimulo. Mediante
un modelo que combina estimacio´n bayesiana y aprendizaje con refuerzo he encontrado de
que manera la respuesta de las neuronas dopamina esta relacionada con el cronometraje
e incertidumbre del estimulo. Muestro que cuando se requer´ıa que el animal mostrase su
decisio´n, la actividad de las neuronas dopamina reflejaba la certeza del animal respecto
112
113
a la deteccio´n. Asimismo encuentro que la actividad de la dopamina se ve afectada por
las expectaciones temporales de una manera que depende de la deteccio´n subjetiva del
estimulo relevante.
En el cap´ıtulo 4, he analizado nuevos datos tomados durante una tarea de discrimi-
nacio´n, en la cual al animal se le presentan dos est´ımulos vibrotactiles y debe distinguir
cual de los dos tiene mayor frecuencia. Observo que las neuronas se activan de forma fa´sica
al primer est´ımulo. Estas ra´fagas no codifican informacio´n especifica acerca del est´ımulo
para ser retenida en la memoria de trabajo, sino que son parcialmente consistentes con
errores de prediccio´n de recompensa. El hecho de que los dos est´ımulos estuvieran separa-
dos por un intervalo de tiempo me ha permitido estudiar el perfil temporal de la actividad
de la dopamina durante este intervalo, en el cual se requiere el uso de memoria de tra-
bajo. Encuentro una activacio´n positiva y sostenida de las neuronas dopamina durante el
periodo entre est´ımulos. Esta actividad sostenida no depende de la frecuencia del primer
est´ımulo, y a diferencia de la actividad justo despue´s del primer est´ımulo, tampoco cod-
ifica errores de prediccio´n de la recompensa. Estudios previos acerca de la memoria de
trabajo no reflejaron esta actividad sostenida en el periodo entre est´ımulos (Matsumoto
and Takada, 2013). No obstante, aunque no he conseguido encontrar su origen, esta mod-
ulacio´n positiva de la actividad dopamina en el periodo entre est´ımulos es coherente con
la idea de que la dopamina juega un papel importante en la memoria de trabajo (Cohen
et al., 2002).
Aquellas tareas que requieren la comparacio´n secuencial de dos est´ımulos separados por
un periodo de unos pocos segundos presentan de manera consistente una tendencia en el
comportamiento que se conoce como prejuicio de contraccio´n (descrito por primera vez en
Hollingworth, 1910). Asumiendo que lo que hay tras este prejuicio es integracio´n bayesiana
(Ashourian and Loewenstein, 2011), he encontrado que la activacio´n fa´sica de las neuronas
dopamina despue´s del segundo est´ımulo reflejan esta anomal´ıa en el comportamiento.
Ademas, he utilizado un modelo que combina integracio´n bayesiana y aprendizaje con
refuerzo para entender la naturaleza de este distintivo patro´n de respuesta. Los resultados
del modelo nos mostraron que las ra´fagas to´nicas de la actividad de las neuronas dopamina
despue´s del segundo estimulo pueden interpretarse como sen˜ales que codifican errores en
la prediccio´n de recompensa, estas sen˜ales surgen de una integracio´n diferencial de la
evidencia sensorial y reflejan la dificultad subjetiva del animal en procesar el est´ımulo.
Durante los u´ltimos an˜os ha habido un intere´s creciente en dilucidar el papel que juega
la dopamina en el comportamiento. Muchos estudios recientes se han centrado en analizar
la relacio´n entre actividad de la dopamina y la duracio´n de los intervalos de la tarea,
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mostrando que tanto la actividad fa´sica como to´nica de la dopamina llevan informacio´n del
tiempo transcurrido (ver por ejemplo Fiorillo et al., 2008; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010;
Pasquereau and Turner, 2015). Si bien parece un tema distinto a los analizados en esta
tesis, el tiempo no es ma´s que otro estado que no puede ser observado directamente (estado
oculto), que el sistema necesita inferir para poder predecir recompensas futuras. En efecto,
en concordancia con esta perspectiva, datos recientes proveen apoyo para un modelo de
diferencia temporal que opera sobre estados de creencia en una tarea relacionada con la
estimacio´n del tiempo (Starkweather et al., 2017). Otro estudio reciente ha mostrado
que ademas de reflejar el tiempo de los intervalos, las neuronas dopamina pueden afectar
directamente la percepcio´n del tiempo (Soares et al., 2016). De modo que, en relacio´n a
la percepcio´n del tiempo, las sen˜ales de error en la prediccio´n de la recompensa parecen
operar sobre estados ocultos y guiar de manera activa el proceso de inferencia.
En esta tesis he analizado y modelado la sen˜al de dopamina en actividades relacionadas
con percepcio´n y toma de decisiones, concentra´ndome principalmente en una forma de
inferencia del estado diferente a la inferencia del tiempo. Mis resultados apoyan la idea
de que tambie´n en tareas complejas de toma de decisiones las neuronas dopamina actu´an
en estados ocultos. Este estudio sugiere que las sen˜ales dopamina portan una sen˜al de
aprendizaje que refleja un proceso de inferencia bayesiana adecuado para guiar una o´ptima
toma de decisiones. Au´n cuando la manera en la cual estas sen˜ales de error en la prediccio´n
de la recompensa afectan el proceso de inferencia esta´ au´n por clarificar, miss resultados
abren nuevas perspectivas en un posible rol activo de las neuronas dopamina en la toma
de decisiones.
Appendix A
Supplemental Material to Chapter 2
Here I analyse the convergence of the TD algorithm for experiments of simple acquisition
in which the reward follows a CS (assumed to occur at time 0) after a random ISI drawn
from a probability distribution f(t). The analysis of the convergence relies on the fact
that the TD algorithm forces the mean of the delta signal across trials ∀t to converge to
zero.
The delta signal will always defined as (Montague et al., 1996; Ludvig et al., 2008):
δ(t) = r(t) + γV (t)− V (t− 1) (A.1)
I will assume that the ISI duration varies between tminr and t
max
r , i.e that f(t) = 0∀t >
tmaxr . I will also use the implicit assumption of episodic tasks. This last condition forces
the value function to zero at times bigger than tmaxr . I will denote with h(t) the hazard of
the reward at time t, i.e. the probability that the reward will occur at time t given that it
has not yet occurred. The hazard can be expressed in term of the probability distribution
f(t) as h(t) = f(t)/[1 − F (t)] where F (t) = ∑t−1i=0 f(i) is the cumulative distribution
function of f(t). Equivalently h(t) can be written as h(t) = f(t)/[
∑tmaxr
i=t f(i)].
In the last section I will show that the TD model with the reset mechanism in the
simulation of the simple acquisition described here produce a RPE at reward delivery that
is equivalent (from an algorithmic point of view) to the RPE generated by the occurrence
of a general task event that resets the representation of previous stimuli.
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A.1 Convergence of the TD algorithm without reset
In absence of the reset mechanism δ signal in a given trial is in principle different from zero
at each time step t. Considering that the reward is delivered at time t with probability
f(t), the constraint that the delta signal across trials ∀t converges to zero implies the
following equation:
< δ(t) >= f(t) · [1− γ · V (t)− V (t− 1)] + [1− f(t)] · [0 + γ · V (t)− V (t− 1)] = 0 (A.2)
where I use the fact that the scalar value of the reward is set to 1. Therefore the value
function converges in mean to1:
V (t) = f(t+ 1) + γ · V (t+ 1) (A.3)
Given that V (tmaxt ) = 0 the above equation implies that V (t
max
r − 1) = f(tmaxr ) and that
the value function can be written as:
V (t) =
Nt∑
i=0
γif(t+ 1 + i) (A.4)
where I define Nt = t
max
r − t − 1. Equation A.4 corresponds to the expectation of the
exponentially discounted sum of future rewards from time t to the end of the current
trial. The above equation implies that when time elapses between tminr and t
max
r the value
function decreases roughly as [1 − F (t)]. In particular when γ = 1 the value decreases
exactly as [1− F (t)].
If time is represented by a tapped delay line (i.e through the CSC representation)
the TD algorithm without reset converges exactly to the value function expressed in
Equation A.4.
1Equation A.3 is equivalent to V (t− 1) = f(t) + γ · V (t) that directly follows from Equation A.2.
A.2 Convergence of the TD algorithm with reset 117
A.2 Convergence of the TD algorithm with reset
The reset mechanism implies that when the reward is delivered at time tr the value
function V (t) = 0, and that the RPE δ(t + 1) = 0, ∀t ≥ tr. Therefore the δ signal in
a given trial at time step t is different from zero if and only if the reward did not occur
before such time step. This condition is verified with probability equal to the hazard
h(t) of the reward occurrence at time t. The constraint that the mean of the delta signal
across trials ∀t converges to zero implies that:
< δ(t) >= h(t) · [1− γ · 0− V (t− 1)] + [1− h(t)] · [0 + γ · V (t)− V (t− 1)] = 0 (A.5)
The above equation takes into account that when the reward occurred at time t (this
happens with probability h(t) in each trial) r(t) = 1 and V (t) = 0, whereas when it does
not occur r(t) = 0 and V (t) can be different from zero.
Therefore the value function converges in mean to:
V (t) = h(t+ 1) + [1− h(t+ 1)] · γ · V (t+ 1) (A.6)
Considering that V (tmaxr ) = 0 the recursive relationship in Equation A.6 can be written
as:
V (t) = h(t+ 1) +
Nt∑
k=1
γk · h(t+ 1 + k)
k∏
i=1
[1− h(t+ 1 + k)] (A.7)
where Nt = t
max
r − t − 1 as in section A.1. Using the fact that h(t) = f(t)/
∑tmaxr
i=t f(i)
each term h(t + k)
∏k
i=1[1 − h(t + k − 1)] of the sum in Equation A.7 can be written as
f(t + k)/
∑tmaxr
i=t f(i), i.e as probability of the reward occurrence at time t + k given that
the reward has not occurred before t2.
Defining P (r(t+ k)|r(t′ < t) = 0) = f(t+ k)/∑tmaxri=t f(i) the value function converges
in mean to:
V (t) =
Nt∑
k=0
γkP (r(t+ 1 + k) = 1|r(t′ < t) = 0) (A.8)
It is easy to see that Equation A.8 is equivalent to Equation 2.7. When time is repre-
sented by a tapped delay line (i.e through the CSC representation) the TD algorithm with
reset converges exactly to the value function expressed in Equation A.8 (see Figure A.1).
2Note that this probability is different from the hazard h(t+k) that represents the probability of the
reward occurrence at time t+ k given that the reward has not occurred before t+ k
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Figure A.1: Convergence of the value function with the reset mechanism. Time is repre-
sented through the CSC representation and reward is delivered following uniform distri-
bution (Left) and a gaussian distribution(Right). The stimulus is delivered at ts = 3 and
the reward occurs between tminr and t
max
r (gray dashed lines). The blue line represents
the mean value function obtained when simulating the TD model. The red dashed line
represents the value function as obtained from Equation A.8.
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A.3 TD learning and reset after a task event different
from the reward
In this last section I will analyse the properties of the TD model with reset when the
resetting task event is different from the reward. In order to allow analytic calculations I
will adopt the simplified assumption that only the representation of one event (denoted
as event j) is active when the resetting event i is presented.
I propose to study how the event i presentation affects the value developed by stimulus
j, under the hypothesis that the event i resets the representation of the event j. Let
assume that event j is presented at time tonj = 0 and that the event i follows the event
j with probability fi(t) (different from 0 between t
min
i and t
max
i ) and hazard denoted as
hi(t). Denoting with Vi(t) and Vj(t) respectively the values of events i and j at time t the
constraint that the delta signal across trials ∀t converges to zero implies that:
< δ(t) >= hi(t) · [γVi(t)− Vj(t− 1)] + [1− hi(t)] · [γVj(t)− Vj(t− 1)] (A.9)
where I use the fact that r(t) = 0, Vi(t−1) = 0, and that when the event i occurs Vj(t) = 0
(because of the reset).
Assuming that the TD model shows a stable behaviour after a sufficient number of
trials the onset value of the event i converges to its asymptotic value denoted as V ∗i and
this value is independent from the (variable) time elapsed before the occurrence of the
event i. Equation A.9 the value function associated with the event j converges in mean
to:
Vj(t) = γV
∗
i · hi(t+ 1) + [1− hi(t+ 1)] · γVj(t+ 1) (A.10)
Equation A.10 apart from the multiplicative factor γV ∗i is equivalent to Equation A.6.
The value function Vj(t) converges therefore in mean to:
Vj(t) = γV
∗
i ·
N it∑
k=0
γkP (ei(t+ 1 + k) = 1|ei(t′ < t) = 0) (A.11)
where I Indicate as P (ei(t+ k) = 1|ei(t′ < t) = 0) the probability that the event i occurs
at time t+ k given that it did not occur before time t, and N it = t
max
i − t− 1.
Concerning to the dependence on temporal expectation Equation A.8 and Equa-
tion A.11 are perfectly equivalent, and therefore they are expected to show the same
RPEs.
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B.1 Bayesian Module
Here we describe the detailed equations used by the bayesian module. This module
represented some high-level cortical area receiving inputs from sensory areas. We referred
to these inputs as observations xt and interpreted them as Poisson trains with firing rates
λi (i = 0, ..., Na). Each λi corresponded either to the absence of a vibrotactile stimulus
(i = 0) or to the application of that stimulation with one of the Na = 9 possible values
of its amplitude during the time step t. Each of the 10 mean firing rates λi corresponded
to a different state i of the world. In each time step t the module computed a posterior
probability (belief) bt(i) about the hidden state of the world using the entire history of
observations X1:t up to time t:
bt(i) = P (λt = λi|X1:t) (B.1)
The beliefs about the absence and the presence of the stimulus corresponded respectively
to:
bt(sa) = P (λt = λ0|X1:t)
bt(sp) =
∑
i 6=0
P (λt = λi|X1:t) (B.2)
Due to the complex temporal structure of the task evaluating the bt(i) required to estimate
the joint posteriors b˜t(i, n) on the value of the rate of the input (λi corresponding to the
state i) and the time n elapsed since the environment underwent a change to the state i.
We therefore computed the belief over λt by marginalizing:
bt(i) =
∑
n
P (λt = λi, lt = n|X1:t) =
∑
n
b˜t(i, n) (B.3)
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We separated the last part of the history, i.e the last observation xt, and calculated
each belief b˜t(i, n) recursively over time using Bayes’ rule:
b˜t(i, n) = P (λt = λi, lt = n|X1:t−1, xt)
= k · P (xt|λt = λi)
∑
n
P (λt = λi, lt = n|X1:t−1) (B.4)
where k = P (xt|X1:t−1) is a normalization constant. The second term of Equation B.4
had been simplified using the Markov assumption and the fact that xt did not depend
on the length lt (it depends only on the firing rate at current time λt). This term of
Equation B.4 represented the observation probability (see section ??) . The last term of
the above equation could be rewritten as follow:
P (λt = λi, lt = n|X1:t−1) =
∑
j,m
[
P (λt = λi, lt = n|λt−1 = λj, lt−1 = m,X1:t−1)
P (λt−1 = λj, lt−1 = m|X1:t−1)
]
=
∑
j,m
[
P (λt = λi|λt−1 = λj, lt−1 = m, lt = n,X1:t−1)
P (lt = n|λt−1 = λj, lt−1 = m,X1:t−1) b˜t−1(j,m)
]
(B.5)
Equation B.4 together with Equation B.5 represented a recursive relationship for the
joint posteriors b˜t(i, n). Evaluating them required the knowledge of the change-point
prior CPP (lt, lt−1, λt−1, X1:t−1, t − 1) = P (lt = n|λt−1 = λj, lt−1 = m,X1:t−1) and of the
transition probability P (λt = λi|λt−1 = λj, lt−1 = m, lt = n,X1:t−1).
The change-point prior resulted independent from the history X1:t and, taking into
account that the run-length either increased by one after each time step or became zero
at a change point, the CPP could be defined as :
CPP (n,m, λj, t− 1) =

1− h(λj,m, t− 1) if n = m+ 1
h(λj,m, t− 1) if n = 0
0 otherwise
(B.6)
The function h(λt−1, lt−1, t − 1) represented the hazard rate, i.e the probability that a
change point occurred at time t− 1 given that the state of the world was λt−1 for exactly
lt−1 time steps. It could be defined accordingly to the task structure (see Section ??).
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The third term of Equation B.5, i.e the transition probability, could be written as:
P (λt = λi|λt−1 = λj, lt−1 = m, lt = n) =

δij if n = m+ 1
Tij if n = 0
0 otherwise
(B.7)
where we δij represented the Kronecker delta and we introduced the matrix Tij = P (λt =
λi|λt−1 = λj, lt = 0) representing the transition probability conditioned to the occurrence
of a change-point (see section ??).
Using Equation B.6 and Equation B.7 we could rewrite Equation B.4 as:
b˜t(i, 0) ∝
∑
j 6=i
∑
m
Tij h(λj,m, t− 1)b˜t−1(j,m)
b˜t(i, n 6= 0) ∝
[
1− h(λi, n− 1, t− 1)
]
b˜t−1(i, n− 1) (B.8)
The equations above completely described the temporal evolution of the b˜t(i, n) once the
hazard rate h and the transition probability matrix Tij were defined.
B.1.1 Transition Probabilities
Given that the transition matrix Tij was conditioned to the occurrence of a change-
point we only needed to define the quantities Ti 6=0,sa and Tsa,i 6=0. These probabilities
were independent from the particular value of the firing rate λi in the stimulus present
condition. We obtained that Tsp,sa = 1/9 (because all the 9 amplitude values were equally
probable) and Tsa,sp = 1 (because the delay period always followed the stimulation).
B.1.2 Hazard Rate
As for the transition matrix the hazard rate for the stimulus present condition was inde-
pendent from the particular value of the firing rate λi. The hazard rate only depended
on the time t− 1, on the duration of an epoch before the transition lt−1 and on the state
corresponding to that epoch λt−1
In stimulus absent condition this function took a value different from zero only during
the possible stimulation windows and depended on and on the epoch length λt−1 the time
t− 1 (because transitions were not allowed during the delay period). We defined it as :
h(λt−1 = λ0, lt−1 = m, t− 1) =
hsa(m) if m = t− 10 otherwise (B.9)
B.1 Bayesian Module 123
In stimulus present condition, given the task we were considering, the hazard rate only
depended on the duration of the epoch before the transition and was defined simply as :
h(λt−1 6= λ0, lt−1 = m, t− 1) = hsp(m) (B.10)
The exact form of the functions hsa(m) and hsp(m) depended on the task temporal struc-
ture. If the interval timing mechanism was perfect the function hsa(m) would represent
the hazard rate corresponding to a uniform probability density function whilst hsp(m)
would represent the hazard rate corresponding to a fixed duration interval lasting as the
stimulation period.
Nevertheless these definitions ignored the fact that animals’ interval timing processes
did not take place with infinite accuracy (the accuracy of temporal estimation is supposed
to be constrained by Weber’s law). Following (Janssen and Shadlen, 2005) we calculated
a ’subjective’ hazard function based on the assumption of timing scalar noise and used
these subjective hazard to perform the inference. The value of the Weber fraction for
time estimation used in the simulations was φ = 0.18.
B.1.3 Observation Probabilities
The last step to implement Equation B.4 was to define the quantities P (xt|λt). We
considered that the observation xt represented the number of spikes produced in a sensory
area on a given time step and it was generated from a poisson distribution with mean
λt. The parameter λ represented the mean firing rate of a sensory area. Depending on
the presence of the stimulus and on the amplitude value, the parameter λt could take the
value λ0, in stimulus absent conditions, and the value λi with i 6= 0, when a stimulus with
amplitude i is presented. Therefore, we defined the observation xt as follow:
xt =
{
Poisson(λ0) if the stimulus is absent
Poisson(λi) if the stimulus is present with amplitude i
We defined the probability to obtain the observation xt given a mean firing rate λi at
time t as:
P(xt|λi) = Ppoisson(xt|λi) (B.11)
where Ppoisson(x|λ) indicated the probability to obtain the observation x given a poisson
process with mean λ. The 10 values of the parameters λi were obtained from previously
recorded data of the same experiment (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005) and corresponded
to the mean firing rates of a sensory area in the 10 different conditions. Their values,
ordered according to increasing values of the amplitude of the stimulus, were: 15 Hz, 15.2
Hz, 15.5 Hz, 16 Hz, 17 Hz, 20 Hz, 23 Hz, 27 Hz, 35 Hz and 40 Hz.
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B.1.4 Belief Equations
Using Equation B.8 the posterior probability bt(i) of being in the state i could be expressed
as:
bt(i) =
∑
n
b˜t(i, n)
∝
∑
j 6=i
∑
m
Tij hj(m, t− 1)b˜t−1(j,m)
+
∑
n6=0
[
1− hi(n− 1, t− 1)
]
b˜t−1(i, n− 1) (B.12)
For the stimulus absent state the above equation took the form:
bt(sa) ∝
∑
j 6=0
∑
m
Tsa,sp hj(m, t− 1)b˜t−1(j,m)
+
∑
n6=0
[
1− hsa(n− 1, t− 1)
]
b˜t−1(sa, n− 1) (B.13)
Using the fact that b˜t(sp,m) =
∑
j 6=0 b˜t(j,m) and the considerations about the hazard
rate and the transition probabilities made in the previous sections we obtained that:
bt(sa) = k · P (xt|sa)
[∑
m
hsp(m)b˜t−1(sp,m) +
∑
n6=t
b˜t−1(sa, n− 1)
+
[
1− hsa(lt−1 = t− 1)
]
b˜t−1(sa, t− 1)
]
(B.14)
The first two term of the Equation B.14 represented the probability of the delay interval
whilst the last term corresponded to the probability of remaining within the pre-stimulus
interval. Using Equation B.8 we could define bt(λi 6= λ0) for each of the 9 amplitudes
(with λi 6= λ0) as follow:
bt(i 6= 0) = k · P (xt|λi)
[∑
m
Tsp,sahsa(t− 1)b˜t−1(sa, t− 1)
+
∑
n>0
[
1− hsp(n− 1)
]
b˜t−1(i, n− 1)
]
(B.15)
Taking into account that bt(sp) =
∑
i bt(i 6= 0) and the considerations about the transition
probabilities and the hazard rate we obtained:
bt(sp) = k ·
[
1/9
∑
i
P (xt|λi)
]∑
m
hsa(t− 1)b˜t−1(sa, t− 1)
+ k ·
[∑
n>0
[
1− hsp(n− 1)
]∑
i
P (xt|λi)b˜t−1(i, n− 1)
]
(B.16)
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The former term in the above equation represented the probability of stimulus onset whilst
the latter was the probability of remaining in a stimulus present state condition before
the stimulus offset (but after the onset of the vibration).
The stimulus was detected by the bayesian module when the belief about its presence
exceeded the belief about its absence:
bt(sp) > bt(sa) =⇒ stimulus detected (B.17)
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Figure B.1: Selection of midbrain neurons. The neurons used for the study (n=23)
corresponded to those cells which responses to the reward delivery in correct trials were
significantly higher of the responses to reward omission in incorrect trial (P < 0.05, two
sample t test). Responses to the reward were measured in a 400 ms window centered 350
ms after the push button.
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Start cue Stimulus Go cue Reward
Figure B.2: Mean firing rate of the discarded neurons. Mean population firing rate
(black line, ± SEM colored bands) of the discarded neurons plotted as a function of time
for the four trial types. Activity is aligned to the start cue (left), go cue (center) and
reward delivery (right). The dotted line indicates the baseline activity (5.9 spikes per
second). The color code used to indicate the four trial types is the same as in Figure 3.1b.
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Figure B.3: DA phasic responses and RPEs at the reward delivery. Both the mean
firing rate (left) and the RPE (right) showed a positive activation in rewarded trials and
a pause in incorrect decision trials. The larger fraction of rewarded trials with stimulus-
present decision was responsible for the smaller RPE in hit trials than in CR ones (right).
The color code used to indicate the four trial types is the same as in Figure 3.1b. PB
denotes the push button event.
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Figure B.4: DA activity in low amplitude hit trials compared with the activity
in stimulus absent trials. The mean activity in low amplitude hit trials (see Methods)
exhibited a significant positive modulation with respect to CR trials during the possible
stimulation window (PSW) (P < 0.05, two sample one-tailed t test) but not outside it
(P = 0.26, two sample one-tailed t test). Notably the activity in low amplitude hit trials
and in FA trials during the PSW did not show any significant difference (P = 0.21, two
sample one-tailed t test).
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